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Introduction
Women and War: Identity, Citizenship and Security
JENNIFER G. MATHERS
Abstract: The senior executive editor of Minerva Journal of Women and War uses this intro-
duction to summarize the articles in this issue and to highlight the major themes which run
through them, in particular the centrality of women (both real women and women as symbols)
to the development of conceptions of identity, citizenship, and security.
Keywords: women and war; veterans; Vietnam War; Iraq War; National
Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies; First World War; Rwanda;
genocide; gender; India; Women’s Army Corps; Second World War
On behalf of my fellow editors, I am very pleased to introduce this fourth issue of the
relaunched Minerva Journal of Women and War. One signiﬁcant change for the journal since
the publication of the spring 2008 issue is that Lance Janda has now stepped down as book
review editor. Although we were very sad to see him go, the extent of his other professional
responsibilities meant that he was not able to devote as much attention to the role as he
would have liked. We wish Lance all the best for his future endeavors and hope that he will
continue to have some association with the journal in the years to come. At the same time
we welcome Marie Woodling as the journal’s new reviews editor. Marie is completing her
PhD thesis in the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University and is
working as my research assistant on a number of projects related to women and war. We
have been overwhelmed with the response to the calls for reviewers which Marie issued, and
the reviews of many exciting new books about women and war will begin to appear in the
Spring 2009 issue of Minerva. As well as commissioning reviews of books in the ﬁeld, Marie
has been organizing the review of relevant ﬁlms (hence the change in the title of the post
from book review editor to reviews editor). There is a tremendous amount of new work
appearing about women and war across the range of disciplines in the humanities and social
sciences, and the editors hope that the reviews section of the journal will help readers keep
up with the latest scholarship. A portion of the Minerva Journal of Women and War Web
site is now devoted to reviews, and potential reviewers are invited to visit http://www.mcfar
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landpub.com/minervabookreviews.html to see a list of books and ﬁlms available for review.
To offer to review a work or to suggest an item that Minerva should review, please contact
Marie at bookreviews.minerva@mcfarlandpub.com.
Although this issue does not have a collection of articles formally organized around a
common theme, in fact all of the articles in this issue demonstrate the centrality of women
(whether as symbols or as real, living beings) to the development of conceptions of iden-
tity, citizenship, and security. The relationship between women and the state is a key com-
ponent of this dynamic. Are women citizens of the state? Are they defenders of the state
through military service, and if so are the conditions attached to their service different from
those of male soldiers? Do women pose particular threats to the security of the state, either
through their presumed sexualized natures or through the need to protect them from exter-
nal enemies?
In “Navigating Gender Boundaries Inside and Outside the Wire,” Christina Weber
draws on published memoirs, archival sources, and interviews which she herself conducted
with women veterans to explore the contrasting experiences of U.S. women veterans of the
conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq. Weber makes use of the physical and symbolic meanings of
“the wire,” as marking the boundaries between the relative safety of the base and the rela-
tive danger of combat, as well as between the professional spheres occupied by men and
women, to highlight the contested nature of women’s roles in the military during wartime.
At ﬁrst glance it might seem that these two groups of women veterans would have lit-
tle in common. Although the conflict in Vietnam encompassed a period when opportuni-
ties for women in the U.S. armed forces were beginning to expand, with the abolition of
the 2 percent limit on the proportion of women serving in 1971 and the introduction of the
all-volunteer force in 1973, few U.S. military women actually served in Vietnam, and the
vast majority of those who did were nurses. As Weber demonstrates, the caring roles per-
formed by nurses ensured that the women were not perceived by the men as challenging
the latter’s identities as the “true” soldiers. However this also meant that these nurses’
wartime experiences were underestimated, belittled, and even denied by many of the men
who had served with them in-country, such as the male Vietnam veteran who told one for-
mer military nurse that she should not participate in a Vietnam Veterans Against the War
march because she was not really a vet.
American military women serving in Iraq, in contrast, are frequently exposed to con-
ditions that are associated in the public’s mind with combat even though they are formally
not appointed to combat positions. The wartime service of women returning to the United
States after deployment in Iraq seems to be acknowledged by their families, friends, and by
U.S. society more generally, again in contrast with the experience of Vietnam veterans. But
Weber ﬁnds that the issues of formal combat service continue to shape perceptions of the
roles and actions of these women soldiers, including their own perceptions of their achieve-
ments.
In an article ﬁlled with analysis and important empirical evidence, one scenario is par-
ticularly striking. One of Weber’s interview subjects described her confrontation with a
group of male infantry soldiers returning to base and their graphic challenge to the legiti-
macy of her authority over them. In many ways that one image encapsulates not only the
argument that Weber is making in this article, but also the uneasy relationship that many
women soldiers have with their male colleagues and with their society’s expectations of
appropriate behavior for men and women.
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The issue of a society’s views of appropriate behavior for men and women in wartime
is also prominent in Marc Calvini-Lefebvre’s article, “‘Women! Your Country Needs You!’
Fleeing Feminism or Gendering Citizenship in Great War Britain?” which focuses on the
claims to citizenship by British civilian women during the First World War. Through a close
reading of two suffragist periodicals, Common Cause and the Englishwoman, Calvini-Lefeb-
vre argues that the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) was engaged
in a concerted effort to gender the concept and language of citizenship in order to create a
space for women to be acknowledged as citizens. At this point, of course, women in Britain
were not regarded by their state or their society as true citizens, and the outbreak of the
First World War made the argument, persuasive to many, that liability for military service
should be a necessary condition for citizenship. But instead of calling for women to be per-
mitted to serve in the armed forces in order to qualify for citizenship, the NUWSS devel-
oped a notion of feminism which identiﬁed and celebrated different roles which men and
women should perform for their countries and made that the basis for their wartime cam-
paign for full citizenship for women.
Calvini-Lefebvre argues that the suffragists’ focus on the “woman’s sphere” actually
expanded the realms of women’s responsibilities as citizens rather than limited women to
duties within their homes and immediate families. The article also highlights the suffragists’
attempts to reconcile their approach to feminism and citizenship with the behavior of some
women who were problematic for this approach, namely paciﬁsts and prostitutes. With his
in-depth examination of primary sources and his engagement with debates among histori-
ans about the nature of the British women’s suffrage movement during this period, Marc
Calvini-Lefebvre makes an important contribution to the recent burgeoning scholarship
about women and the First World War (see de Vries 1994; Grayzel 1999; Grayzel 2002; Gul-
lace 2002; Smith 2005; and Fell and Sharp 2007).
In “The Postcolonial Politics of Militarizing Rwandan Women,” Georgina Holmes
draws our attention to aspects of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda that are often overlooked in
both popular media accounts and academic studies of that tragedy. Holmes highlights the
gendered power relations which developed in the region in the years before the genocide
took place and argues that we need to pay closer attention to detail and historical context
in order to gain a fuller understanding of the events of 1994. The author also emphasizes
the need to confront uncomfortable realities, such as the evidence that some women sup-
ported and perpetrated the violence, including violence against women and even genocidal
rape.
Holmes argues that the construction of militarized masculinities was central to the
development and popularization of the notion of a pure Hutu nation state, and to demon-
strate the ways in which this process took place she makes extensive use of articles and car-
toons which appeared in Kangura, one of several extremist journals published in Rwanda
in the early 1990s. The extent of Kangura’s use of sexualized images is very striking and likely
to have had a particularly strong impact in a country such as Rwanda which had high rates
of illiteracy or semiliteracy, as Holmes points out. The message being conveyed to Kangura’s
readers was that Tutsi women, in their supposed role as temptresses, posed a danger to
Hutu men and by extension to the integrity and purity of the Hutu people and indeed to
Rwandan state itself. Hutu women, by contrast, were depicted in the pages of Kangura as
loyal citizens and victims of violent Tutsi men. An exception to this rule was made, though,
for certain high-proﬁle Hutu women who did not support extremist positions. The exam-
Introduction 5
ple highlighted by Holmes is that of Madame Agathe Uwilingimana, who served as minis-
ter of education and as prime minister. Uwilingimana was presented in Kangura as a par-
ticularly dangerous, hypersexualized collaborator with the Tutsi enemy and she was among
the ﬁrst political leaders to be murdered in 1994.
In her article “Nationalism, Gender and (In)Securities in Postcolonial Indian Politics:
Ideology and Identity,” Runa Das focuses on the case of India to make an argument about
the symbolic roles which women can play in the creation of national identities and the con-
struction and justiﬁcation of national security threats. A particularly fascinating feature of
this article is the discussion of the abduction of Hindu women by Muslims (and Muslim
women by Hindus) in the aftermath of the partition of India. Das demonstrates that this
episode has shaped the views of generations of Indian politicians and that its legacy is vis-
ible in the contemporary rhetoric of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The idea (rather than
the actual, lived experiences) of abducted Hindu women is closely linked by BJP activists
and political leaders with Indian religious and cultural imagery to make an emotive and
argument that Pakistan represents a visceral threat to the India which must be countered,
by nuclear weapons if necessary, in order to preserve the nation-state.
In a research note entitled “The Letters of Mollie Weinstein: Experiences of a WAC in
Wartime Europe,” Cyndee Schaffer provides extracts from her mother’s wartime letters,
which she is currently editing as a book manuscript, together with some commentary to
provide context for the events and personalities which the letters mention. Although a great
deal of work has been done by historians in recent years to uncover and examine the roles
that American women played in the Second World War (see, for example, Bellafaire 1993;
Verges 1991; Thomas 1987; Danner 1995; Morden 1990; Soderbergh 1992; Larson 1995), there
is still a need to publish the kind of personal, eyewitness accounts of women’s contribu-
tions to that conflict which this piece offers. Weinstein’s accounts of her wartime service
joins works by other former members of the Women’s Army Corps (WACs), such as Early
(1989), Grahn (1993) and Weise (1999), to enrich our understanding of the wartime expe-
riences of these women. Weinstein’s correspondence with her family covers the full range
of her time in the WACs, from basic training through various deployments. Unlike many
women who volunteered for the U.S. armed forces during the war, Weinstein spent virtu-
ally her entire period of military service overseas. As the letters published in this issue make
clear, Weinstein’s own Jewish identity made her particularly aware of the persecution of
European Jews and the fact that the suffering of Holocaust survivors continued even after
their countries were liberated from Nazi control. Mollie Weinstein is a gifted letter writer
and we are fortunate that so much of her correspondence has survived.
Finally, the production of a peer-reviewed journal would be impossible without the
contributions of the peer reviewers, who make time in their busy schedules to read articles
that have been submitted to Minerva and give the editors and authors the beneﬁt of their
expertise. The editors would like to offer their warmest thanks to the following scholars who
have provided comments and recommendations on articles submitted to Minerva Journal
of Women and War during the period covered by this volume: Sarah Badcock, Marie Cole-
man, Janet Coryell, Bina D’Acosta, Darlene Iskra, Kimberly Jensen, Rosemary O’Kane, June
Purvis, Brooke Rogers, Margaret Rossiter, Anita Rupprecht, Trudi Tate, Regina Titunik, and
Emma Vickers.
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Navigating Gender Boundaries Inside
and Outside the Wire
A Qualitative Analysis of U.S. Women Veterans
of Vietnam and Iraq1
CHRISTINA D. WEBER
Abstract: This article explores the ways in which U.S. military women negotiate gender bound-
aries within the contexts of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars. Based on interviews conducted by the
author, archival oral histories from women in the upper midwestern United States, together
with published memoirs of U.S. women who served in the armed forces during these wars, the
article provides an intimate portrait of the ways in which these women talk about their expe-
riences in the military during wartime. Although excluded from duties that are ofﬁcially classed
as ground combat, the women provide important insights into the war experience. In spite of
the fact that they are more numerous and visible than ever in the U.S. military, women still
face a variety of challenges in this highly masculine institution.
Key Words: American military nursing; gender and the military;
Iraq War; U.S. National Guard; North Dakota; post-traumatic
stress disorder; Vietnam War; women and war
“Exposure to danger is not combat. Being shot at, even being killed, is not com-
bat. Combat is ﬁnding ... closing with ... and killing or capturing the enemy. It’s
KILLING. And it’s done in an environment that is often as difﬁcult as you can
possibly imagine.... It’s ... uncivilized! And WOMEN CAN’T DO IT! Nor should they
even be thought of as doing it.... And it may be old-fashioned, but I think the
very nature of women disqualiﬁes them from doing it. Women give life. Nur-
ture life. They don’t TAKE it.”—Marine Commandant Gen. Robert H. Barrow
[quoted in Holm 1993, 483]
“Women as women must be denied access to ‘the front,’ to ‘combat’ so that men
can claim a uniqueness and superiority that will justify their dominant position
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in the social order. And yet because women are in practice often exposed to
frontline combat, the military has to constantly redeﬁne ‘the front’ and ‘com-
bat’ as wherever ‘women’ are not.”—Cynthia Enloe [1983, 15]
Introduction: Combat, the Wire and Women in War
Combat is a contentious and gendered concept with a history of ambiguity that ﬁlters into
women’s position and place in militaries. As Jeanne Holm comments, “When it comes to
women in the military, the all-purpose word is combat—it means whatever the services
choose it to mean.” As she goes on to clarify, “The one sure-ﬁre justiﬁcation for barring
women from any job, unit, ship, aircraft, or mission was to designate it ‘combat’ or ‘com-
bat related’ no matter how tenuous the connection” (1993, 398). Although a deﬁnition of
combat was written into U.S. military policy in 1994, combat is not clearly understood as a
concept, nor is the policy relating to it universally applied in the U.S. armed forces (Holm
1993 and Skaine 1999). For example, ground combat and air combat have different impli-
cations both in practice and in policy. Women have been able to participate in air combat
because it is considered less dangerous and removed from the frontlines of ground combat
(McSally 2007). The deﬁnition of ground combat, though, has serious implications for gen-
der relations in the military and is the threshold experience that maintains important divid-
ing lines between male and female soldiers. Ultimately the relationship between war and
gender is fraught with questions about where it is and is not appropriate for women to exist
during wartime. There is a desire among many senior ofﬁcers in the U.S. military to main-
tain a strict distinction between combat and noncombat support ﬁelds, with women con-
ﬁned to the latter. Gender boundaries between men and women in the military during
wartime rely on clear boundaries between combat and noncombat or support ﬁelds, which
are often reinforced by women’s physical location inside the wire, that is, on military bases.
In this paper I explore the ways in which women navigate the boundaries between combat
and noncombat, outside and inside the wire, and masculinity and femininity in the war con-
texts of Vietnam and Iraq.
Although it is not my intention to trivialize the realities and inherent dangers of war
and ground combat, I do want to emphasize that combat is more than a concept utilized
in military strategy and development of war readiness and effectiveness. It is also a gen-
dered concept that deﬁnes women’s place in the military, as it simultaneously establishes
men’s positions in the military and the patriarchal ordering of the institution itself. It is dif-
ﬁcult to understand the constructs of woman and femininity without addressing aspects of
man and masculinity, particularly within a highly masculine institution such as the mili-
tary. The military institution has historically played a signiﬁcant role in shaping dominant
forms of masculinity. As David Morgan explains, “Of all the sites where masculinities are
constructed, reproduced, and deployed, those associated with war and the military are some
of the most direct. Despite far-reaching political, social, and technological changes, the war-
rior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity.... The uniform absorbs individualities
into a generalized and timeless masculinity while also connoting a control of emotion and
a subordination to a larger rationality” (1994, 165). Women are not factored into the war-
rior identity and therefore pose a variety of threats to the coherence of militarized mas-
culinity as they take on more diverse roles in the military.
Navigating Gender Boundaries Inside and Outside the Wire 9
Sandra Whitworth emphasizes that militarized masculinity as form of masculinity relies
heavily on subordinate others to reinforce its superiority (2004). As subordinate others,
women and their presence produce problems as they dilute the position of men in the mil-
itary. “The myth of the male superiority is hard to maintain when military men are obliged
to work equally alongside, or for, military females” (Lehr 1999, 123). These points reveal
deeper issues behind Commandant General Barrow’s comments, reinforcing questions
raised by Holm and Enloe about traditional and essentialized beliefs about gender and how
those beliefs relate to the military and its concepts and policies. Barrow’s belief that women
are unable to withstand the physical and mental demands of war—especially killing—relies
on essentialized views of men and women and establishes the basis for the legitimacy of
women’s subordination in the military. Although I concede that there are clear physical dif-
ferences between males and females, my analysis relies on the work of feminist scholars,
together with scholars in the area of masculinity, who point to the way that the military
establishes gender hierarchies based on essentialized views of men and women. From my
limited sample of women, there is such a diversity of responses and experiences that such
views prove problematic and at the very least raise questions about the viability of the con-
tainment of combat to the domain of men. Combat, according to Barrow, is not simply expo-
sure to dangerous situations; it is actively participating in the brutality of killing. A 1994
memorandum by U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin established a written rule governing
the relationships between women and combat. The memo stated that “[s]ervice members
are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualiﬁed, except that women
shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission
is to engage in direct combat on the ground” (1994). Direct ground combat was deﬁned by
Aspin as, “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while
being exposed to hostile ﬁre and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the
hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battleﬁeld
while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by ﬁre, maneuver, or shock effect”
(1994). Consistent with Barrow’s deﬁnition, this view of ground combat assumes a set of
offensive actions and strategies rather than defensive ones. The U.S. armed forces have uti-
lized this rule and it supplements the 1948 Integration Act, which did not explicitly outline
or deﬁne women’s place in combat. “Because the Army was unable to come up with an
acceptable deﬁnition of combat, Congress elected to leave this matter to be sorted out by
the Secretary of the Army so long as he clearly understood the intent of the Congress, which
was no combat for women” (Holm 1993, 118–9).
But the implementation of the combat rule is far more complicated than the deﬁni-
tion of combat conveys and the route to the establishment of this rule has been littered with
debate and contention. Holm provides the historical groundwork for a complex under-
standing of combat as a gendered concept that reflects not simply the tensions within the
military institution between men and women but also changes at work in the larger soci-
ety. At the same time Cynthia Enloe’s discussion of women’s relationship to “combat” and
“the front” reinforces the point that much more is at stake in these concepts than war readi-
ness. There is a question that silently rests at the margins of her passage: if combat is deﬁned
as that which women are not, how do women negotiate their participation in war as women?
If combat is a deﬁning component of being a solider and women are excluded from that
experience, how do they articulate their positions in the military? It is important to under-
stand the institutional forms and structures shaping these women’s experiences but what
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is most interesting to me is the question of how women shape and deﬁne their own posi-
tions as they act within the institutional forces of the military. The stories women tell about
their experiences in war can help to better understand how women respond to the military
institution, combat, and their unique position as women soldiers during wartime.
Contextualizing Women in the U.S. Military:
Historical Shifts between Vietnam and Iraq
The changes that have occurred for women in the U.S. military and in American society
between the Vietnam War and the present war in Iraq are profound. The purpose of bring-
ing these two eras together, though, is not to highlight the obvious changes in society but
to understand how gender continues to be a guiding force in modern warfare. Women and
men who serve in the U.S. military relate to it in very different ways, while the military as
a social institution responds to and participates in the shaping of gender relations. Although
combat has historically been an activity in the military that is off limits to women, the mil-
itary institution has embraced women’s presence in war efforts with variable levels of tol-
erance. Societal and institutional changes over time reflect both the level and type of
participation by women in war, which in turn has an impact on the ways in which women
narrate their wartime experiences.
The research undertaken for this project involved the analysis of several qualitative
data sources. The sample for this paper is comprised of original interviews, archived oral
histories, published memoirs, and statistical data from the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA). Fifteen women veterans from North Dakota were interviewed, most of whom
served with the Air and Army National Guard. Many of these women were veterans of the
Iraq War, although ﬁve of them served during earlier war eras including the Second World
War, Vietnam, and Bosnia. Pseudonyms have been used for these interview subjects and
their personal information altered in order to maintain their anonymity. In addition to
these interviews, ten oral histories of women from the Vietnam War era deposited in the
North Dakota Veterans History Project were analyzed. These women were primarily nurses
and medical corps members who served in the United States during the war. Analyses of
published memoirs and oral histories of women veterans from the Vietnam and Iraq Wars
reinforce this data. In order to contextualize the narrative analysis that comprises the core
of this paper, the discussion that follows provides the historical context of women in the
U.S. military and wars fought by the United States, together with statistical data from the
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.
Although the 1948 Integration Act might have marked a victory for women’s rights and
indicated a changing tide for women in the U.S. military, it was ultimately overshadowed
by efforts during the 1950s to reestablish traditional gender roles. For that reason, by the
time the United States embarked on the Vietnam War, women’s position in the military
had “retreated” since the 1948 Integration Act (Holm 1993, 178). Rather than setting a prece-
dent for greater integration and equality in the American armed forces, the act was used to
create a separate and unequal place for women in the military. By 1967 Congress had mod-
iﬁed provisions of the Act to emphasize that “there could not be complete equality between
men and women in the matter of military careers” (Holm 1993, 178). At the time this meas-
ure went largely unchallenged because most women accepted that their place in the mili-
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tary and society at large was subordinate to that of men. As Col. Barbara J. Bishop stated,
“It behooves every woman to remember she is not going to be asked to put her life at stake
as the men are” (quoted in Holm 1993, 179). By treating combat as the deﬁning feature of
true military service, women’s subordinate position in the armed forces can be justiﬁed. Yet
during both the Vietnam and Iraq Wars the rules governing women’s roles and participa-
tion in the military and in war have been ignored.
Holm explains that the service policies leading up to the Vietnam War “transcended
the restrictions in the law and the congressional intent relative to combat. They mirrored
the stereotypical thinking of the ﬁfties concerning women’s proper roles in society and the
workplace” (1993, 179). Holm identiﬁes two key themes that mark women’s position in the
military during the period between the Korean and Vietnam Wars: a double-standard elit-
ism that degraded women’s presence in the armed forces and a desire to preserve traditional
notions of femininity within women’s military activities (1993, 179). This reflected wider
societal shifts after the Second World War that sought to reestablish normative gender roles
and bring the traditional nuclear family to the forefront of society (Stacey 1991; Bordo 1999).
Ultimately, both of these themes had dramatic implications for women’s presence in the
U.S. armed forces during the Vietnam War.
The data provided by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs on women’s military
service reflects the historical context of women’s integration process but the data is frag-
mented and incomplete. The raw data reveals that, as of 30 September 2007, there are 256,047
American women veterans from the Vietnam War era (that is, women comprise 3.2 per-
cent of all U.S. Vietnam-era veterans).2 Yet this data does not tell us how many women actu-
ally served in Vietnam (as opposed to serving stateside on military bases and hospitals). Nor
does the data tell us how many of those women were exposed to combat. To get an esti-
mate of the number of women veterans who experienced combat during the Vietnam War,
one must go to unofﬁcial documents. Various sources identify anywhere from 7,000 to 7,500
U.S. women serving in country (Holm 1993, 206; Skaine 1999), comprising roughly 3 per-
cent of the total number of women veterans from the Vietnam War era.
The proportion of North Dakotan women veterans from the Vietnam War era closely
parallels the national percentages. Veterans Affairs identiﬁes 548 Vietnam War–era women
veterans at the census date of 30 September 2007, which constitute 3 percent of all North
Dakotan Vietnam War–era veterans. In contrast, the number of North Dakotan women
veterans from the Iraq War has already reached 1,921, which means that women make up
17 percent of all veterans of the Iraq War from North Dakota. In addition the North Dakota
Veterans History Project includes ten interviews with women from the Vietnam War era.
Of those ten women none had served in Vietnam, although one nurse had served in a ﬁeld
hospital in Korea. The experience of women veterans from North Dakota reflects the restric-
tions on women’s presence in Vietnam as well as the profound changes that have occurred
in the intervening thirty years. As one North Dakotan woman who served during the Viet-
nam War era stated, “I asked about going to ’Nam and they told me that they were not send-
ing female corpsmen. There were some females they sent over but those were more clerical
and they weren’t sending the corpsmen” (Helke 4 March 2005).
Yet the effort to contain women’s roles in the U.S. military and reestablish normative
gender roles in American society after the end of the Second World War eventually broke
down as the conflict in Vietnam continued and personnel waned. The growing women’s
movement in the United States also encouraged changes in the military’s policies toward
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women. The 1970s saw not only an increase in the number of women in the service and
doors opening to women in various career ﬁelds, but also further changes that led to the
dismantling of support institutions such as the Women’s Air Force (WAF) and Women’s
Army Corps (WAC). This led to women’s greater integration into the military with the con-
solidation of basic training (including weapons training) for men and women and women
increasingly ﬁlling positions outside of those stereotyped as feminine ﬁelds.
Women’s service in the U.S. military and women’s presence in war dramatically
increased during the Persian Gulf War and has increased again in the Iraq War. According
to Rosemarie Skaine, the Persian Gulf War saw over 33,300 American military women serve
in combat-support positions (1999, 64). There are currently 740,558 U.S. women veterans
who have served in the armed forces since the Persian Gulf War (roughly 15 percent of the
total number of U.S. veterans who have served during this period). As of June 2006, 344,418
women have been on active duty in the Iraq War (roughly 16 percent of the total number
of service personnel on active duty in this conflict).3 Because the data is fragmented and
clear statistics showing where women are serving are not centralized, it is difﬁcult to deter-
mine precisely how many of those women served in country during the Iraq War, although
one source estimates that it could be as many as 155,000 (Holmstedt 2007). This is a dra-
matic increase from both the Vietnam War era and the Persian Gulf War.
Women’s roles in the U.S. military remained controversial throughout the 1980s and
1990s, with debates focusing in particular on whether women should serve in combat roles
and culminating in Secretary Aspin’s 1994 memorandum. Although the memo set speciﬁc
perimeters around women’s service, at the same time it opened the door to more career
ﬁelds for women in the armed forces, including air combat positions. The deployment of
large numbers of women to Iraq and Afghanistan has given new impetus to the debate about
women in combat and especially on collocation policies. Collocation refers to the strategic
placement of units in order to support each other. Recent news reports reveal that women
have been collocated with direct ground combat units, coming close to breaking the 1994
combat rule.4
Regardless of the dramatic changes that have taken place between the conflicts in Viet-
nam and Iraq, women continue to confound and disrupt traditional notions that war is the
sole terrain of men. Even though the involvement of women in combat is likely to remain
a contentious topic, the presence of women in war reminds us that men and women (and
expressions of masculinity and femininity) do not always conform to institutional ideals.
Inside and Outside the Wire:
Women’s Negotiation of Gender in Wartime
“If you ... can’t go out and visit soldiers and put your life on the line then you’re
a wimp. I thought that ... if I came to your staff meeting that you should look
just as shitty as I do. And not be all pressed and clean.... It was kind of the dif-
ference between inside the wire and outside the wire. And I lived my whole expe-
rience outside the wire.”—Amy, Iraq War veteran
Women’s negotiation of gender in wartime requires us to look not only at the boundaries
between combat and noncombat or support roles, but also at women’s placement in rela-
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tion to the wire. The wire is both literal and a ﬁgurative construct. It is literal because the
wire surrounds the base and marks the boundary that identiﬁes whether a person’s duty
takes them outside of the relative safety of the base and places them closer to the frontlines
and its dangers. The wire is also ﬁgurative and metaphorical in the way that it marks the
boundary between men and women in the military, providing a threshold between gender
identities. Women serving in the U.S. military in the Iraq War negotiate this boundary dif-
ferently than their counterparts did during the Vietnam War. To understand the differences
between the ways that these two groups of women veterans managed this boundary, I jux-
tapose two stories told by women who were exposed to the realities of moving inside and
outside the wire.
Amy’s statement that she lives “outside the wire” subverts the expectation that women
are inside, protected by the wire, and men are outside, defending it. At the same time it
conveys something beyond the literal notion of the wire as simply a physical location. Her
statement metaphorically encompasses the outsider status she feels as a woman ofﬁcer who
does not neatly ﬁt inside the power structure of the military and who has transgressed gen-
der boundaries in a variety of ways over the course of her career. In her discussion, the roles
are reversed as she places her male superiors inside the wire, as they marginalize her and
deﬁne the line of danger.
Amy’s experiences are not unique; U.S. women serving in the conflict in Iraq frequently
experience the war outside the wire. These women construct water lines, build bridges,
patrol areas of rivers against enemy attacks, work as administrators on bases, perform gate
searches at military bases, and drive in convoys. The U.S. military and U.S. society appears
to be willing to recognize women as soldiers and to permit them to be exposed to danger,
even if they are unwilling to let women formally cross the line into combat.
During the Vietnam War era, the vast majority (approximately 84 percent) of women
who were in Vietnam were nurses (Enloe 1983; Holm 1993; Skaine 1999), with the remain-
ing women serving in supportive and administrative roles. Throughout this analysis the
primary emphasis will be on the experience of nurses, simply because the experience of
nurses was synonymous with the experience of the vast majority of U.S. women in Viet-
nam. These women were clearly not regarded as serving in combat roles and were physi-
cally contained behind the wire, yet they were exposed to the damage that war and combat
inflict on human beings. Often working shifts of twenty hours or longer in the operating
room, the nurses routinely cared for severely wounded and dying men. In addition, the
dangers they experienced in the ﬁeld hospitals were often greater than those serving as clerks
and personnel (both men and women) stationed in cities such as Saigon and Long Binh
(Holm 1993, 207).
Although they were not serving in combat roles, U.S. women stationed in Vietnam were
exposed to ground combat situations when they traveled outside their bases. Not fully inte-
grated into the military and serving under separate branches such as the Women’s Army
Corps (WAC), the women were not ofﬁcially trained in the use of weapons and could not
carry weapons to defend themselves. Instead they had to rely on male soldiers to protect
them. As one nurse explained, “The security police (SP) used to drive me and another nurse
out to Cam Ranh City, where we taught a village-nursing class at night. One night, as we
drove back, we saw a flash of light and gunﬁre. We ducked down in the jeep, and one SP
lay across us ﬁring his weapon out the back as we sped out of there” (Norman 1990, 92).
Although the situation described in this passage would not be regarded as combat under
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the 1994 deﬁnition of the term, this nurse and her colleague were exposed to enemy attack
in an incident that took place outside the relative safety of the military base. The physical
boundary of the wire was crossed but this crossing failed to transgress gender boundaries
because these men and women continued to conform to traditional gender patterns of men
(the SP ofﬁcers) protecting women (the nurses).
In this speciﬁc incident and during the Vietnam conflict in general, moving off the base
reinforced women’s position as liabilities and supporting actors who did not participate in
war—either defensively or offensively. Although they may have held higher ranks than some
of their male comrades, American women were clearly present in Vietnam to support the
U.S. war effort and care for the wounded. They were never intended to participate in com-
bat nor even to defend themselves or others. The greatest distinction for these women lay
in whether they served in the relative safety of the cities of Vietnam or in ﬁeld hospitals that
were often set up in heavy combat areas such as Pleiku.
In contrast, the complication of negotiating the wire for U.S. women in the Iraq War
becomes both literal and metaphorical as they negotiate gender boundaries that exist both
on and off the base. Because these women serve outside the wire in nontraditional gender
roles, their presence disrupts gender boundaries. One woman’s comments solidify the way
in which the literal wire acts as a metaphorical boundary that is extremely sensitive to the
transgressions between combat (read men’s) and noncombat (read women’s) experiences.
Ellen was the only woman working at the gate of the base where she was stationed and had
to clear a group of infantrymen before they could enter the base. She explained,
[A]t one point there was a truck full of twenty infantrymen and in infantry there’s no
females there and I got down and I told them, “get out and clear your weapons.” And
they said, “no, we’re not going to” and I said, “yes you are.... I’m not letting you on base
until each and every one of you get off the back of this truck and clear your weapon.”
And of course they’re gonna be mad. Everybody got out, cleared their weapons and
every single one of ’em turned around, pulled down their pants, and pissed in front of
me.
Ellen is literally on the boundary of the wire, negotiating a position that plays with the gen-
der boundaries in war. It reflects the signiﬁcance of militarized masculinity in the military
institution and the threat that women pose to this construct. In particular the militarized
masculinity ethic relies on clear distinctions between the masculine self and others, in this
case women. Sandra Whitworth writes, “In order for truths that are ﬁxed through these
processes to remain intact, self and other must remain both distinct and separate.... The
presence of the ‘other’ makes the strategies of recruitment, basic training, and the inculca-
tion of appropriate militarized masculinity all the more difﬁcult to accomplish” (2004, 162).
Ellen’s authoritative presence represents a challenge to men that requires a clear response
from them in order for them to maintain a coherent boundary between their masculinized
selves and the feminine other. At the same time, Ellen works with this boundary, position-
ing herself as the other in relation to the infantrymen, even though their disrespect angered
her. “I mean, they [the infantrymen] have to be tough and mean to do their job and I under-
stand that. But I guess I don’t appreciate it when I’m serving on their same side. But I under-
stand. They have a dirty job and have to be tough and dirty and grimy and tough and mean
and rude to do it. And that’s ﬁne.” Ellen repeatedly asserts that she “understands” and that
it is “ﬁne,” which reinforces the boundary between combat and noncombat support per-
sonnel, and the difference between herself and the infantrymen. That this happened on the
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threshold between outside and inside the wire is not a coincidence. In fact it reinforces how
these men distinguish themselves as men as they cross the wire onto the base, a place that
arguably dilutes men’s unique place and status in the military in comparison with the sphere
of combat from which they have just come.
These two examples are important to consider. One woman is unarmed and relies on
the protection of her fellow (male) soldiers to defend her and remove her from danger. The
other woman is in a position of authority over her fellow (male) soldiers. She carries a gun
and orders the men to disengage their own ﬁrearms. Yet the men make it clear to her that
they do not accept her authority over them nor do they regard her as their equal. The con-
text of the conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq may be very different, but in each there is a dis-
tinct way in which women are positioned as something other than men. The nurse in
Vietnam is an object to be protected on the frontlines. The guard in Iraq carries power
within military hierarchies but that authority is aggressively undermined as she is reminded
of what she is not by the men, who flaunt their manhood and mark their territory in front
of her. The boundaries shift over time and space and each example reveals different ways
in which gender lines are drawn during war.
Women soldiers do subvert the military’s efforts to enforce the perimeters of combat
through their discussions of the frontlines. Stacy, an Iraq War Veteran, was particularly
pointed in her comments: “I don’t like when people say ... ‘the frontlines of Iraq.’ [There
are] really no frontlines of Iraq. If you want to get technical, the frontlines are driving along-
side the road. Because that’s where the most casualties are.... So there were times [when]
our weapons—or our convoy—got attacked by an IED [Improvised Explosive Device] right
behind my truck. It was my truck and then a Humvee. And I couldn’t see the Humvee
because of the mushroom cloud.” Although she was outside the ofﬁcial deﬁnition of com-
bat, this woman soldier was obviously exposed to the dangers of war. Stacy spoke of sev-
eral occasions when she witnessed other vehicles in her convoy getting hit by an IED.
Similarly, Amy, an ofﬁcer who served in Iraq, had to maneuver around her superior’s
determinations of what were and what were not dangerous missions—and, ultimately, what
constituted the frontlines. At the beginning of the Iraq War, driving in convoys was not
considered as dangerous and as exposed to enemy attack as other duties, and therefore
women were often assigned as convoy drivers. Amy’s commanders underestimated the dan-
gers of driving in convoys and as a result took decisions that increased the danger to which
Amy and other women soldiers were exposed. For example, Amy explained that when sup-
plies such as flak vests were received, they would be directed to missions where men were
assigned “because that’s where the enemy is.” As she went on to explain, “Well, hell, the
enemy wasn’t there—we didn’t know the enemy was drivin’ with us. You know what I’m
sayin’? We had no idea that we would lose all our soldiers driving convoy.” Amy’s com-
manders refused her request for flak jackets for the drivers, because, they told her, “‘Oh,
you’re just driving.’ Are you kidding? Driving ... is extremely stressful. Because they started
out with, you know, this size [of] IEDs [makes a small ball shape with hands]: pop cans and
lunch boxes and things like that. And it grew really fast, you know, into something bigger.”
Although women do have the power to tell their experiences, they are subjected to the real-
ities of participating within the military and its rules and decision-making processes. At the
same time, Amy’s observations and experiences certainly helped her understand the dan-
gers and perimeters of the frontlines better than some of her male superiors, who were not
outside the wire.
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U.S. women who served in Vietnam negotiated their presence by conforming to tra-
ditional gender roles. It was not until they returned home that this conformity began to
take its toll on many of the women Vietnam veterans. This is largely because, while in Viet-
nam, both women and men identiﬁed women as simply nurses and support staff, not sol-
diers. Thus women found themselves taking part in highly traditional roles while they were
in Vietnam. According to Elizabeth Norman, enlisted men felt that they needed to protect
women. “In return, they expected nurses to become surrogate mothers, sisters, wives, and
girlfriends” (1990, 67). One woman explained that she would sit with men in the hospital
and write letters home for them (Stockwell 16 May 2006). Another woman described one
of her favorite patients, who had been injured three times and had been in her hospital on
each occasion. She had talked with him about his fear of being sent back out and getting
killed: “I told a doctor who worked with us and who operated on Danny, ‘You can’t send
him back out there. This is the third time. If he really thinks he’s going to get killed, he
probably will.’ Meanwhile, I ask[ed] Danny if he wanted me to write a letter to his mother.
I told her how we’d been taking care of him. Danny did end up being air-evacked stateside.
His mom wrote me a thank-you letter and told me he had made it home safely. I still have
that letter” (Walker 1985, 173). What is interesting about this story is that this woman was
empowered enough in her position as a nurse to give advice to a doctor and at the same
time conforms to a caretaking role when she offered to write a letter home for the soldier.
Although nurses had a great deal of responsibility and leverage in their positions in regard
to patients, they had very little power within the military structure. They were protected by
men and expected to uphold appropriate gender and professional behavior within the war
context. “Being protected by men and living in such a male world was both welcome and
suffocating. Women had to be ‘on duty’ twenty-four hours a day. Armed escorts accompa-
nied the nurses every time they went off base. One nurse stopped going to orphanages when
she realized a soldier might get wounded or killed defending her need to go off base” (Nor-
man, 1990, 68). These types of differences translated into challenges for the women upon
their return home as veterans.
Coming Home: Women as Veterans
For women who participated in the Vietnam and Iraq Wars coming home meant dealing
with issues of reintegration into the families and communities they left behind. For Viet-
nam veterans, gender issues surfaced in relation to their status as veterans. Because nurses
in Vietnam were not always looked upon as soldiers, they struggled with their veteran sta-
tus in their civilian communities as well as among the Vietnam veteran community and in
their self-identiﬁcation. In contrast the women I interviewed who served in the Iraq War
show little hesitation in identifying themselves as veterans; yet most qualiﬁed that status by
pointing out that they were noncombat veterans.
The assumption that only men could be soldiers in war dramatically affected the way
in which women talked about their service in Vietnam and how they dealt with their post-
war lives. For some women it took decades to claim their experiences in Vietnam as war
experiences. The silence that pervaded women’s experiences in Vietnam parallels that of
their male counterparts. Yet, the women experienced a second layer of silence that was dis-
tinct from that experienced by the men. Although both men and women veterans were
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reluctant to speak about their war experiences to friends and family as a result of the pub-
lic opposition to the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, many male veterans found com-
fort and solace within the Vietnam veteran community and were able to come to terms with
their memories with the support of fellow veterans. Women veterans of Vietnam, however,
did not have this opportunity. These women were denied a meaningful presence within the
Vietnam veteran community and even found themselves silenced by it.
The silence of women veterans upon their return from Vietnam was often a reaction
to the unspoken directive from family and friends that the topic of war was off-limits (Nor-
man 1990, 188–223). These details are remarkably similar to men’s accounts of their return
home (Kovic 1976; Caputo 1977; Walker 1985). In her book Home Before Morning: The Story
of an Army Nurse in Vietnam, Lynda Van Devanter described her ﬁrst day back home with
her family. Van Devanter explained, “I wanted to tell my family what it was like, to make
them understand.... I wanted them to be a part of every moment, good and bad, so there
would be no distance between us, so they could understand the person I had become” (1983,
220). As she was showing them slides of her year in Vietnam, however, her parents became
increasingly uncomfortable. The pictures were of the ﬁeld hospital’s operating room, which
were quite graphic. Finally, her mom stopped her. “She got up, touched my shoulder, and
looked at me with sadness. I could see that those pictures had given her the idea of how
much I had suffered. It hurt her to know that. ‘I don’t think you really want to show those
slides,’ she said sorrowfully. ‘Maybe it would be wise to put them away’” (Van Devanter
1983, 221). Another female Vietnam veteran commented, “I went to see friends and they
didn’t want to hear about Vietnam. I couldn’t relate to them. I thought people had to know
what was going on over there but people didn’t want to hear it. I started to feel really alien-
ated” (Norman 1990, 121).
Issues around gender boundaries arise as women discuss the second level of silence they
experienced from within the Vietnam veteran community. Van Devanter stands out as one
of the ﬁrst women to break the silence of women Vietnam veterans. Throughout her book
she discusses her struggle to be considered a veteran. Van Devanter tells the story of going
to a march organized by Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). “As I made my way
through the room, I could hear guys talking about their tours and some of the things they
saw in ’Nam. I felt at home with these men. They had been through the same experiences
as me” (Van Devanter 1983, 231). Yet when she went to join the men in the march her pres-
ence was refused. As she describes the exchange with a male Vietnam veteran, it becomes
clear that she does not ﬁt the image of the Vietnam veteran:
“Well,” he said uncomfortably, “I ... uh ... don’t think you’re supposed to march.”
“But you told me it was for vets.”
“It is,” he said. “But you’re not a vet.”
“I don’t understand.”
“You don’t look like a vet,” he said [1983, 231].
Van Devanter did not ﬁt societal expectations of a Vietnam veteran because she was a
woman. Men returning from Vietnam felt their own gender identities breaking down with
the stigma of the war and the actions they may have participated in during the war. Mili-
tarized masculinity is particularly fragile. As Sandra Whitworth has pointed out, “The kinds
of promises made through the processes of military indoctrination, moreover, are funda-
mentally an illusion, and eventually many soldiers come to recognize this” (Whitworth
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2004, 165). Examples of the fragility of militarized masculinity can be found in numerous
memoirs and research on male Vietnam veterans (Kovic 1976; Karner 1995; Karner 1996;
Caputo 1977). The point is not to excuse the treatment of women Vietnam veterans, but to
understand how men’s and women’s gender roles are complicated by institutional forces
that promise clear paths, identiﬁcation markers, and gender roles, but cannot deliver them.
Ultimately the discrepancy between those promises and the realities which male and female
soldiers experience can create a host of problems for men and have serious implications for
women.
Through their published memoirs and oral histories, women veterans of Vietnam
repeatedly reveal their feelings that they were not truly veterans and that this perception
often undermined their memories and responses to their war experiences. Many of these
women discuss their alienation from other veterans, both male and female, recounting a
long struggle to develop the willingness to talk to others about their service. One woman
explained, “I received a Bronze Star for my work and I showed it to an infantryman when
I got home. He looked at it and began to lecture me. I got a big long story about why they
gave out medals to people who were not in combat. I put it away and never looked at it
again. I decided I did not deserve it” (Norman 1990, 111). Here is displayed a sense that com-
bat is a superior and more privileged aspect of war and that all other experiences fall short
of true war experiences.
This had signiﬁcant implications for the willingness and ability on the part of women
veterans to seek support for the trauma they had experienced in Vietnam. Several of these
women reveal that once they had ﬁnally decided to go to a veterans center for help they
were either made to feel unwelcome by the male Vietnam veterans or came to feel that their
experiences were so different from men’s that it was difﬁcult to share them. As one woman
veteran stated, “I felt obligated to say that my experience was not such a big deal compared
to the guys over there. Now I realize that it was. I felt obligated to push it aside and say,
‘Well, look, I was just a nurse and it wasn’t so bad.’ But it was. It took me many years before
I decided that I owed it to myself, that I had the right to say it was stressful” (Norman 1990,
147]).
An initial consideration of Iraq female veterans’ narratives suggests that gender issues
are remarkably absent from their stories of coming home. In fact many either did not refer
to gender relations at all or spoke positively about their relations with male veterans upon
their return home. As Stacy explained, “I know our guys [in my unit] defended us too.
Tooth and nail. So me being a female over there did affect other people. I know that even
to this day one of my guy friends went down to a military school and he said I would love
for you guys to meet any girl in my unit. You pick any one of them and you meet them.”
Instead of struggling for acceptance from their male comrades, these women veterans
emphasized the challenges of reintegration and reestablishing a home routine with their fam-
ily and friends.
The apparent absence of gender tensions between returning male and female veterans
could be related to the fact that military service in the Iraq War has so far not attracted the
same stigma from American society as service in Vietnam. This suggests that a record of
service in Iraq does not disrupt a man’s identiﬁcation with militarized masculinity, although
such an assessment at this early stage of research (and of the men’s and women’s recent war
service) is premature. Yet it does raise questions about what happens to these men and
women when they return home.
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It also is important to emphasize that the silence that was so profound in the Vietnam
veterans’ narratives did not appear to be a factor in the narratives of the Iraq veterans. The
women Iraq veterans interviewed for this project reported that their families and friends
were openly curious about their experiences in Iraq. Casey remarked that even after she had
been home for more than two years, her parents continued to introduce her to friends as
their daughter who went to Iraq. In fact, it frustrated her that she had to tell her story over
and over again. As she explained,
And another thing is that everybody wanted to know, “How was it? How was it? What
did you guys do?” And it was like, “I could talk to you for days and tell you how it was.
I could talk to you forever and tell you stories about it, but I don’t really feel like it.”
And you don’t want to have to tell the stories over and over. And actually my friend and
me used to make a joke that we should just put a big sign on us that said, “Yep, I was
deployed, don’t ask me about it.” ... It was annoying to have everybody want to know
everything about it. Ask you questions because they don’t understand how it was and
they don’t even have a clue as to what the situation was there. And ... it’s hard to
explain and then nobody would understand it anyways.
The feeling that civilians at home cannot understand the experiences of the soldier in war
is neither unique to the Iraq War, nor is it peculiar to women veterans. Even if these women
did not feel silenced by their families and friends, the returning women veterans were aware
of a growing disconnection between themselves and civilian society as they adjusted to home
life. This is an important point because a smooth reintegration into civilian life is not sim-
ply a matter of how receptive the general population is to the war and individuals’ partic-
ipation in it. Returning home after war is a difﬁcult process of melding the person a soldier
was before going to war with the person he or she has become as a result of war service.
This makes reintegration challenging in general, even if the war in Iraq is better received
than the Vietnam War.5
As Norman’s research on Vietnam veteran nurses indicates, it is difﬁcult for the aver-
age citizen to understand the experience of war. Vietnam veterans who stayed in the mili-
tary for even a few years after returning from the conflict zone felt better able to integrate
back to civilian life than those who immediately cut their ties with the military. Norman
reports that one nurse regretted that she had severed her ties with the military so soon after
her service, even though she had been disillusioned upon her return home. As this woman
stated, “It’s not something I would recommend for the future. We were so surrounded by
Vietnam and the camaraderie. It was like getting a divorce” (Norman 1990, 126). This point
might explain why several of the Iraq War interviewees decided to start working full-time
for the National Guard. Most of the women veterans interviewed for this study emphasized
that in their ﬁrst year after returning home they spent little time with their families and
socialized only with others who had been deployed to Iraq. They described feeling detached
from civilians and impatient with their questions and with what they considered to be banal
concerns of daily life.
Combat and the Question of Killing
For the remainder of this paper, I focus closely on the experiences of women Iraq veterans
returning home, because their experiences draw out important dialogues with—and
responses to—the earlier discussion of combat and the restrictions on women’s involve-
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ment in it. Although gender boundaries between men and women recede into the back-
ground of these women’s stories as they discuss their reintegration process, several of my
interviewees provide insights into some of the foundational issues surrounding the contro-
versies over women in combat, in particular that of killing in the line of duty.
Veronica, an Iraq War veteran and a member of the Air National Guard, expressed
ambiguity and struggles between her sense of self as a woman and as an airman. She was
the only one of the women interviewed for this project who identiﬁed her experiences in
Iraq as a factor in her decision to leave the military. She admitted that she intends to retire
from the Air National Guard.
Veronica identiﬁed herself as “a true female. I like to use that word. I don’t want to
spend time trying to prove that I can be a man.” She explained that as an airman she always
saw herself as an airman ﬁrst, and a woman second. “Veronica” felt that because of her age
(she was in her late thirties at the time of the interview and had been in the Air National
Guard for twenty years) and her views on womanhood, it was time for her to retire. She
hinted at struggles experienced during her time in Iraq, even though she remained inside
the wire and worked in personnel, widely regarded as a women’s job. “If I were to stay in,
it would just keep getting harder and harder,” she said, because she felt her beliefs were being
compromised. When asked to explain those beliefs, she said, “[P]robably ... true female[s]
would be [ones who] really couldn’t go to war and shoot someone. They don’t have it in
them—in me, I should say. I’m not gonna say ‘them’ because there are some [women] who
can [be women] and ... actually kill somebody. Of course, if I wanted to save my life, I’d
have to do that.” Veronica has very particular views on womanhood and femininity that
came into conflict with her military service during her deployment in Iraq. During her pre-
vious years of service in the Air National Guard she was able to disconnect her day-to-day
duties from the reality of participating in a military institution. The war deployment dis-
solved the false boundary between her life in the military and the ideological issues that it
raised for her.
Veronica is by no means representative of my research sample but she does articulate
the ambiguity and challenges that are at the heart of the debates about women in the mil-
itary and women in combat. It takes us back to the opening of this paper and General Bar-
row’s comments about women’s inherent ability to nurture and inability to kill. What is
striking about Veronica’s comments are her clariﬁcations and hesitations about women as
a generalized category and the woman she identiﬁes as herself. She shifts between these as
she simultaneously struggles with the moral quandaries of killing in the line of duty. This
is something to take seriously in the context of women and men who serve in the armed
forces.
Natalie and Amy, two of the other women from my sample, did kill in the course of
their duties as soldiers and struggled with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In the
interviews both women describe the navigation of their experiences in ways that appear
similar to men’s struggles with PTSD but also touch on what these experiences mean to them
as women (Grossman 1996).6
Natalie had a particularly difﬁcult experience in Iraq and felt very isolated as a result
of her guilt over killing. Her description of the incident and its aftermath echoes aspects of
Amy’s narrative: “I don’t like it when people tell me I’m a hero,” Natalie stated. “I’m not a
hero. People that died are heroes. The people that I failed to protect are the heroes. [pause]
I don’t know. I’m just ashamed.” Although she felt welcomed when she returned home,
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Natalie was cautious about what she told friends and family. No one, not even her husband
who is also in the military, knew the details of her experiences in Iraq. Amy too was unable
to tell her family and friends about having to kill in the line of duty.
Natalie, though, refuses to identify her experience of PTSD as related to her identity
as a woman. As she explained, “Maybe women are more emotional, but I think just as many
men have PTSD as women. It would almost be strange not to have it in those situations.”
Although she concedes that there are gender differences between men and women, she
asserts that killing is not outside of women’s capacities but is part of the moral breakdown
that happens when a person has taken another life. As a woman who served in the Security
Forces, she did not believe being female weakened her abilities. She did however feel the
contradictions between her identity as a human being and her identity as a soldier trained
to follow orders.
At the same time, Natalie expressed concern about her ability to have a family. She
said, “I’m scared I’ll be a bad mom. [pause] I was scared about getting married. [Weber:
But that’s going okay?] Yeah [half-heartedly]. Sometimes I feel bad. I feel like this is a whole
other side of me that he doesn’t know about. Almost like I’m lying to him. And it’s—[sigh]
I feel bad about it, but I think I’d feel even worse if he knew. And [if] I had to look at him
every day knowing he knew what I had done. What I was capable of.” Both Natalie and Amy
expressed concern about their ability to engage in intimate relationships since their return
home from war and both struggle with it as they work through their war experiences.
Amy’s narrative was ﬁlled with far more ambiguity in regard to gender and killing,
which leads to her discussing her actions in Iraq through a variety of lenses.
You always dream—you always kinda plan for killing people. And then when you do it’s
like, wow. It wasn’t quite how I thought it would work. You know.... You don’t call
home. I didn’t call home. And I probably struggled. Probably my biggest struggle is that
it’s—the struggle between being just kind of a friendly person and crossing over that
line, and the whole religion—.... And all the counselors in the world can say, “but were
you trying to protect yourself or others?” Well, yeah, I get that part. Totally get that
part. It doesn’t make it any easier. Part of that girl thing probably weighs on [me] a lit-
tle bit more. And it has made me probably more callous than I probably ever would
[have been otherwise].
Although Amy expresses her belief that the “girl thing” might have made her more callous
about her experiences, she is unable to explain why that might have been the case. Highly
aware of her gender position and “crossing over that line,” she navigates between deeply
held beliefs about women and her personal experiences, which simultaneously question and
undermine the notion that women are unable to kill. Part of her explanation for her callous-
ness might be from her own inability to contend with the guilt and anguish she carries as
a result of her war service.
In addition, Amy was uncertain about whether women should be placed in combat roles
and speculated about the costs it could have for the women concerned and for American
society.
I’m not one that really stands up and says women are equal. I think there’s a lot of dif-
ference. Not only just physically. I think some of the traditional combat roles women
will get into because they won’t realize—and this might be one of those wars that says,
“Women are doin’ pretty good out there. They’re shootin’ people. They’re not cryin’ all
the time.” That those roles will open up and us as women will say, “Be careful for what
our generations have wished for.” Equal opportunity. Do you really want your daughter
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to have the opportunity to carry a sixty-pound pack on her back and be an infantry
grunt? ... Do you really want to be that equal, when we could be a cook? [pause] I think
there’s—you just got to make sure we look at it both ways. The whole “be careful what
you wish for” could backﬁre for the next generation. And I’m not sayin’ that we
shouldn’t carry sixty-pound packs.
Amy raises important concerns about what it would mean for society to erase the differ-
ences between the wartime roles of men and women and for women to follow the rules of
engagement developed by men. She was articulate in her assertion that being a woman in
service has both costs and beneﬁts—as well as compromises. It is important to bear in mind
that these statements were made by a woman who has been in the U.S. military for more
than ﬁfteen years, who has been exposed to urban combat situations similar to those expe-
rienced by infantrymen in Iraq and who feels strongly that women are important to the mil-
itary institution. Her question is one that seeks greater consideration of the military and
societal consequences of experiencing the damaging effects of the realities of war. These are
realities that she and Natalie exemplify in their struggle to come to terms with experienc-
ing ﬁrsthand the moral breakdown and brutality of war.
Women’s experiences in war, whether they are inside or outside the wire, are as var-
ied and unique as the women themselves. I end this paper on an ambiguous note because
it is important to understand that the relationship between war and gender is particularly
troubled by a variety of issues. In addition, my small sample indicates that there is a need
to explore how women soldiers experience killing and PTSD because they are having these
experiences even if they are not regarded as serving in combat roles according to the ofﬁ-
cial deﬁnition. Ultimately, questions about the ability of women soldiers to take the lives
of the enemy are tangled up in societal beliefs about women and about the differences
between men and women. To debate issues surrounding women’s role in war and their abil-
ity or inability to participate in combat necessarily requires a more explicit debate about
what it means to be a woman. Combat is a highly gendered concept and as women negoti-
ate their roles in the military during war they are working within the perimeters of the mil-
itary’s rules and regulations that deﬁne their place, as well as their beliefs and values about
what it means to be a woman in U.S. society. These women’s narratives remind us that as
much as we try to believe that war is the domain of men, it is anything but that.
Notes
1. For the purpose of this paper, the Iraq War includes military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan that have taken place since 2003.
2. All data from Veterans Affairs comes from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs projec-
tions for 30 September 2007 based on 30 September 2003 data.
3. Based on data from the U.S. Department of Defense and Women in Military Service for Amer-
ica Memorial.
4. In a report prepared by the RAND Corporation for the secretary of defense, collocation was
deﬁned as “both unit interdependency and physical proximity” (Harrell et al. 2007, xvii). Scarbor-
ough (2004) and Bender (2005) reported that units containing women were being collocated with
combat units. The Center for Military Research, among other organizations, claims that the army has
broken the combat rule for women through these collocation actions. The growing number of women
in greater numbers of units makes collocation tricky for military strategy, because women are not
supposed to be collocated with direct combat units. Collocation also helps explain how women in
noncombat roles may end up facing combat situations.
5. The point is that important changes take place in individuals who serve in war deployments
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that are separate from societal responses to the war. It is certainly the case that public responses can
aid or exacerbate the individual’s reintegration process, but even the most positive and supportive
public response to a war and to those who serve in it cannot prevent the realities of wartime service
from affecting those individuals.
6. Grossman (1996) provides insight into the complications involved in killing and its impact
on the development of PTSD. The work is based largely on men’s experiences in these situations.
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“Women! Your Country Needs You!”
Fleeing Feminism or Gendering Citizenship
in Great War Britain?*
MARC CALVINI-LEFEBVRE
Abstract: When war broke out in August 1914, the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Soci-
eties suspended its political work on behalf of women’s suffrage and plunged into relief work
for women and children. Because it appeared to conform to the reigning ideology of separate
spheres, this response has been presented as conclusive evidence of British feminism’s ideologi-
cal collapse in the face of war. This article argues a contrario that the National Union’s response
is further evidence of feminism’s ideological resilience in this period. Relief work, it shows, was
one aspect of a broader project aimed at “gendering” the concept and language of citizenship
in order to appropriate them for women. The result was an insistence on women’s identity as
“citizens,” an identity that in turn had important consequences for the kind of feminism that
could be articulated in its name.
Keywords: National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies;
feminism; citizenship; gender and war; First World War;
Millicent Fawcett; gendering; ideology
Introduction: War In, Feminism Out?
When the Great War broke out in August 1914, women across the United Kingdom turned,
like Vera Brittain, to “the only work it seems possible as yet for women to do—the making
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of garments for the soldiers” (quoted in Kent 1993, 14). In those ﬁrst few months of war,
Ray Strachey recalled, “[it] seemed almost as if the old anti-feminist argument was true, and
that in a time of national crisis women were superfluous and irrelevant, passive creatures
to be fought for, whose only personal function was to sit at home and weep” (Strachey [1928]
1978, 338). Perhaps S. Bulan captured the spirit animating the country best in declaring that
“[a]t the call of war, the ﬁrst thought of every man is to ﬁght, of every woman to nurse”
(Bulan September 1914, 267). In other words, the eruption of total war had “acted as a clari-
fying moment” that “revealed the [British system] of gender in flux and thus highlighted [its]
workings” (Higonnet et al. 1987, 5). And those workings were clearly along the most tradi-
tional of “separate spheres” lines, with men expected to ﬁght and protect the literal and
metaphoric home, and women expected to support their protectors unflinchingly and mind
the home dutifully in their absence. In short, the outbreak of the Great War gave renewed
currency and plausibility to ideas and practices that were strongly identiﬁed with the anti-
suffrage movement. It was against this background that the constitutionalist National Union
of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS), the largest organization in the British women’s
movement, decided to temporarily suspend its suffrage agitation and turn its considerable
organizational abilities instead to relief work targeted speciﬁcally at women and children.
As it appeared to accept and even sanction the renewed currency that separate-spheres
thinking was enjoying, this abrupt turn to work along so clearly deﬁned traditional gender
lines has been presented as conclusive evidence of a broader trend: British feminism’s ide-
ological collapse in the face of war. This case has been made most forcefully by Susan Kent.
Describing the NUWSS’s reaction as “unreflective, almost knee-jerk” (Kent 1993, 16), she
draws on the work of Denise Riley to argue that its flight from feminism was twofold: “The
NUWSS failed to challenge [the dominant] images and representations of women; its val-
orizing of women’s fundamental identity as mothers and homemakers constituted an
embracing of what Riley calls ‘the social.’ In contrast to its prewar stance, however, femi-
nists in the National Union failed to take the next step, to utilize women’s association with
‘the social’ in order to make claims for participation in ‘the political’” (Kent 1993, 22).1
Yet if the activities of the National Union certainly drew on the association of women
with “the home,” to claim that it did not attempt to use these actions as a stepladder into
“the political” is to ignore the countless claims by both its leaders and members that in engag-
ing in relief work they were, in the words of their president Millicent Fawcett, showing
themselves “worthy of citizenship, whether our claim to it be recognized or not” (Fawcett
7 August 1914, 376, emphasis added). Entry into “the political,” however tentatively formu-
lated, was certainly part of the agenda.
This may not yet make the agenda feminist, however. Jo Vellacott has indeed suggested
that Fawcett’s instinctive adoption of “a traditional view of the appropriate role of women
in wartime” was “reinforced by the realization that women’s ‘good behavior’ during the war
might further their admittance to the political system—on men’s terms” (Vellacott 1987,
121). So admittance to “the political” may well have been sought but on principles which
owed little to prewar feminist ideas, a more subtle form of ideological capitulation perhaps,
but an ideological capitulation nonetheless.
Yet behaving in ways that antisuffragist men ﬁnd palatable is not the same thing as
adopting their vision of the world. This has been a central contention of scholars such as
Jacqueline de Vries and Nicoletta Gullace, who have sought to recover the distinctively fem-
inist dimension of another alleged symptom of feminism’s wartime ideological collapse: the
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xenophobic jingoism of Christabel and Emmeline Pankhurst, the charismatic leaders of the
militant Women’s Social and Political Union (de Vries 1994, Gullace 2002, see also Purvis
2002 and Purvis 2007). By paying close attention to the context, their analyses show that
the Pankhursts’ patriotic discourse was not identical to that of the conservative press in either
its speciﬁc content or intended effects. What they were doing, they reveal, was not capitu-
lating to patriotism but gendering it with a speciﬁc goal of obtaining votes for women.2 Far
from demonstrating the ideological collapse of British feminism in the face of war, their
prowar stance is suggestive instead of the resilience of feminist thought. As Gullace puts it:
“[T]he Great War gave patriotic suffragists ... a more auspicious environment in which to
justify claims that had a long and important history within the feminist movement” (Gul-
lace 2002, 6).3 Such ideological resilience also marked, I will argue in a similarly contextu-
ally sensitive reading in this article, the response of Fawcett and her followers in the NUWSS
to the outbreak of war.4
Drawing on Common Cause and the highbrow monthly that was closely linked to it,
the Englishwoman, this article shows that the main object of that response was to appropri-
ate the concept and language of citizenship for women.5 This was done ﬁrst by arguing that
the gendered nature of citizenship had been conﬁrmed by the war itself. This allowed for a
reframing of the language of separate spheres as a non-hierarchical, complementary dis-
course, while radically redrawing the boundaries between men and women’s respective
spheres, to the beneﬁt of the latter. It was done secondly by developing a rhetorical strat-
egy of inclusion that sought to appropriate the language of citizenship for women while
simultaneously rejecting all attempts at excluding them from the national community.6 The
result was an insistence on women’s identity as “citizens,” an identity that in turn had
important consequences for the kind of feminism that could be articulated in its name.
Gendering Citizenship and
Redeﬁning the “Woman’s Sphere”
A month into the war, the front page of Common Cause strongly encouraged readers to turn
to its correspondence section, where “A Member of the Newcastle Society” had written in
to reject the “war argument,” that is, the claim that women could not be citizens because
they could not ﬁght (“Opportunity” 28 August 1914, 405).7 Suffragists had heard this argu-
ment before. It had a long ancestry, plunging deep into classical theorizing on citizenship,
as a status of freedom that one must be both able and prepared to die for to defend.8 Yet
although the outbreak of war seemed to vindicate this classical conception of citizenship,
Common Cause’s correspondent thought that it could be easily rebuffed. One needed sim-
ply to repeat in wartime the standard suffragist response given to it in peacetime: “[T]he
work of women in the nurture and care of humanity [is] at least as valuable as that of men
in armed defence.” This war thus appeared to her as an opportunity to demonstrate the
value of women’s contribution to the nation: “No one would suggest that women share in
the warfare” but the “lion’s half of the work that is to be done at home” must fall on their
shoulders. For suffragists not to engage in this work would be to “shirk the citizenship we
have so long asked to be allowed to share.” By taking part in this work at home, the NUWSS
demonstrated to British men that “those who claim the privileges of the State are also the
ﬁrst to offer to do its work.”
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The sex-speciﬁc roles that war imposed on men and women were not, then, a demon-
stration of the impossibility of women’s citizenship but rather a vindication of feminists’
long-standing claim that there were two faces to citizenship: one male, one female (for a
similar point, see Allen 2005, 111). It followed that to accomplish those roles was not so much
to take part in the reproduction of one’s ancestral calling as a member of one’s sex but
rather to respond to one’s duty as a citizen who happened to be of a particular sex. The
sexed citizens were, moreover, strictly equal in their contribution to national survival and
complemented one another. Where men must go and ﬁght, women must concentrate on
their sphere of expertise and devise solutions for guaranteeing that the impact the war had
on it was not detrimental to the nation’s struggle (see Fawcett August 7 1914, 376). As we
will now see, in the process of discussing what this entailed, promoters of a gendered citi-
zenship, having already reframed separate spheres as a mutually supportive and nonhier-
archical discourse, pushed the boundaries of the “woman’s sphere” beyond the well-deﬁned
limits it was usually associated with. Ultimately but importantly, the only boundary they
accepted was the role of the soldier.
In its ﬁrst war issue, the Englishwoman reacted strongly to the “perfect orgy of needle-
work” and the “sewing-mania” that it felt had gripped the nation’s women (“Echoes of
War” September 1914, 303). It reproached the authorities for thinking and saying that women
should sew in this crisis, and women for listening to that message: “Are we still in the
mid–Victorian age struggling with our Butterick patterns and our needles and threads, to
supplement the stupid omissions of a blundering commissariat? Or are we really women of
the new era, the era of social science and electric sewing-machines?”
Similarly Common Cause welcomed the coverage by newspapers such as the Evening
Standard of the numerous activities women were involving themselves in: “It is distinctly
refreshing to find that some newspapers recognise that women’s work in time of war
embraces something wider than sewing parties and knitting teas” (“Press Department” 2
October 1914, 465).
This is not to say that sewing parties and knitting teas were not also on the agenda.
Indeed, focusing on women’s sphere of expertise meant multiplying articles on how to limit
the impact of the war on issues ranging from food supplies to caring for infants, from sol-
dier’s clothing to children’s entertainments. Entire columns were given over to detailing
ways in which to conserve food in order to prepare for the long haul and to announcing
the creation of maternities, as well as toy and shirt-making shops.9 It must be noted how-
ever that the latter were opened to help women thrown out of work by the war. Thus, focus-
ing on the “woman’s sphere” also meant devising solutions to tackle women’s unemployment
caused by war, ﬁghting the corner of soldiers’ dependents against ill-treatment by the author-
ities, ﬁnding homes for stranded Belgian allies, accompanying “alien enemies” back to their
homeland, or creating and funding all-female hospital units for the front.10
In fact the boundaries of the “woman’s sphere” seemed to be almost endlessly expand-
able in war. Witness this amused reaction from Common Cause to the surprise raised in some
quarters at the National Union’s enthusiastic turn to relief work: “[O]ur members are drawn
from that class of women (to be found in all classes) who have held that the world is their
home and their charge is to make it home-like” (“The World Our Home” 21 August 1914,
393, emphasis added). It is tempting to dismiss this as merely rhetorical flourish. And yet
when Common Cause offered an inventory of the activities women should be engaging in,
it did not content itself with quoting the four core areas outlined by Fawcett in a letter to
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the Manchester Guardian, “(1) Doctoring and nursing (2) Care of the young womanhood
of the nation (3) Care of children (4) Care of child-bearing women,” but also suggested
that women should “work as far as we are trained and able, in shop and factory and ofﬁce
and school” (“Our Active Service League” 11 September 1914, 431).
Nor did the argument stop at the expansion of the “woman’s sphere” into nontradi-
tional sectors of activity at home. The Englishwoman, for instance, called for some women
to be allowed onto the front lines to pick up the wounded even during combat. Drawing
on two reported cases of women nursing soldiers in the line of ﬁre, it argued: “[W]e should
perhaps reconsider the customary refusal to let women, either nurses or doctors, work at
the front. This, perhaps, is another practice which has been put out of date by the military
methods of the Germans” (“The Utilisation of Voluntary Aid Detachments” November
1914, 107). The authorities, it concluded, should allow women a “share in the work [and]
in the risks” (“The Utilisation of Voluntary Aid Detachments” November 1914, 108).
Thus, far from conﬁning women physically and occupationally to the home, the notion
that war imposes sex-speciﬁc duties only really meant, from the perspective of this dis-
course, that women could not ﬁght. For in lieu of two rigidly separate spheres, this discourse
suggests the existence of three broad spheres of activity in war: one speciﬁc to men (ﬁght-
ing), one speciﬁc to women (minding the home, caring for children and pregnant women),
and one that consists of activities that men alone do, or overwhelmingly do, but that women
could and should do as well (working in shops, factories, ofﬁces, schools, and so on). Nor
are women conﬁned to working on the home front: those who have the ability and desire
should be allowed to risk their lives on the war front. Men, by contrast, do not ﬁnd their
duties expanding into women’s sphere of responsibilities: it is not suggested that they should
care for babies, the elderly, or pregnant women and even less that they should take care of
the home. However they do retain one monopoly: the role of the soldier. Indeed, even advo-
cates of allowing women into the line of ﬁre limit the possible roles women would take on
the front line to “nurses and doctors.” Even here, women remain caregivers.
The role of the soldier thus appears as the ultimate outer limit of the expansion of the
“woman’s sphere” in war. One could argue that this is the result of feminists’ careful tread-
ing. After all, the Englishwoman’s suggestion is framed largely as a necessary response in the
face of Germany’s “military methods,” implying that such a change in “custom” is required
as a result of changed conditions and of the nature of the evil-faced, not as a demand of
irresponsible feminists hell-bent on equality with men. But far from being a case of unchar-
acteristic shyness, this non-advocacy of the recruitment of women into the armed forces is
best understood as self-imposed. Indeed, for this vision of gendered citizenship to hold,
women simply cannot be soldiers. As Common Cause put it, “[t]he part of women, even in
time of war, is still not to destroy, but to heal; not to strike down, but to raise up and sup-
port. About our immediate duty there can be no doubt for any of us; it is to give, to work,
to share” (“The Wine Poured Fourth” 9 October 1914, 474–5). If women could be soldiers,
they could be killers and would thus not be essentially different from men.11 Yet if the asso-
ciation of women with “the home” means anything, it means that where men excel in the
physical domination of the world, women excel in its “moral” or—in the language of the
time—“spiritual” domination. And this in turn justiﬁes both their claim to expertise in cer-
tain spheres of life and their claim to citizenship: as they are spiritually or morally better
equipped than men, they will bring an important moral dimension to public decision mak-
ing.
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The outbreak of war certainly gave renewed currency to the language and practice of
separate spheres. But by the same token it presented these feminists with a unique oppor-
tunity to promote their gendered understanding of the concept of citizenship. This in turn
allowed them to frame separate spheres as a non-hierarchical, equalitarian discourse and
to radically redraw the boundaries between the two gendered spheres without discarding
them altogether, thus harnessing the power of the language of separate spheres for their
cause.
However, to present bottling fruit, opening a toyshop, and even nursing soldiers on
the front line as acts of citizenship is one thing. It is quite another to convince a wider audi-
ence that these are just as much acts of citizenship as men’s taking up of arms. To this end,
these feminists consistently pursued a rhetorical strategy of inclusion that involved appro-
priating the discourse of citizenship for women.
Women as Citizens
Using the language of citizenship to describe actions to which it was not customarily applied
required the use of two discursive techniques: one which might be called “mirroring” and
the more familiar operation of gendering.
Mirroring involved the straightforward application of keywords of the discourse of cit-
izenship to women’s actions. Women’s caring roles, for instance, were regularly framed in
language more usually associated with military service. Common Cause explained its mem-
bers’ enthusiastic plunge into relief work as a response to a “call for service,” and further
described them as “[standing] to their posts” and “[working] for the common weal” (“The
World Our Home” 21 August 1914, 393). Similarly, one of the paper’s correspondents pro-
posed that women too should “enlist” (Milner 11 September 1914, 429). But she did not mean
by this that they should join the ranks. She meant that women who have “no men of [their]
own to encourage and send” should put their names, as men do, on a national list of vol-
unteers prepared to replace a man who enlists in supporting his dependents. “Just as the
country calls on the men to ﬁght,” she concluded, “she calls on the women to bring up and
care for those whom they leave behind.” More illuminating still are the profound parallels
between the manner in which these feminists attempted to mobilize women and the man-
ner in which the authorities mobilized men. Witness Millicent Fawcett’s call to women,
emblazoned in bold letters on Common Cause—“Women! Your Country Needs You!” which
exactly paralleled Kitchener’s famous recruitment poster, the absence of Fawcett’s picture
(and pointing index ﬁnger) not withstanding (“‘Women! Your Country Needs You!’” 14
August 1914, 385). Similarly, when the NUWSS, following attacks in the press on young
women who were behaving frivolously with soldiers, decided to create an Active Service Girls’
Cadet Corps to put their energy and enthusiasm to better use, it entrusted its leadership to
Katherine M. Harley, sister of Field Marshal Sir John French.12 Just as her brother was lead-
ing the young men of the nation in their service on the war front, so would she lead the
young women of the nation in their service on the home front: “[W]e have mobilised the
soldier for the front in France and Belgium: we must mobilise the girl for the front in Great
Britain” (A.M.R. December 4 1914, 575). The parallel with the army did not stop at this slo-
gan. Like their male counterparts, these young women were to wear uniforms, be given
medals, have a hierarchy of superiors, and follow rigorous training. Only the latter set them
“Women! Your Country Needs You!” 31
apart from men, however, for they were to be trained not in the art of war, but rather in
the arts of homemaking and relief of suffering: “Drilling, marching, ﬁrst aid to the injured,
and musical practice, both in band instruments and in singing, will form a large part of the
training of cadets.... The other activities will include: Camp Management, Cooking, Knit-
ting, Sewing, Dancing, Acting, Swimming, Organised Games, &c.”13
This mirroring strategy could not always be used, however, because some of the most
important features of the discourse of citizenship were so bound up with masculinity that
their straightforward application to women’s actions was highly problematic. Applying them
to women would thus require their gendering. The concepts of force and honor are two
cases in point.
It is by force that the nation is defended, by force that it protects both itself and its
allies. Good citizens, therefore, use force in defense of the nation. And women, as Common
Cause was keen to demonstrate, were good citizens: “It is the vocation ... of all women, to
be foremost in defence of their country—not by arms but by moral force” (“Defenders of
the Country” 7 August 1914, 371). The “force” that characterized citizenship in war thus
found itself gendered. Men’s “armed force,” used on the war front, was complemented and
completed by women’s “moral force,” used on the home front. Where the former sought
to defend allies and destroy enemies, the latter sought to maintain morale at home.
In using force, soldiers were said to be defending the nation’s honor, by which was
meant its pledged word to defend Belgium in case of invasion. Shortly before the creation
of Katherine Harley’s Active Service Girls’ Cadet Corps, another initiative to tackle the issue
of young girls’ misbehavior had been launched by suffragists: the League of Honour. Its aim
was to bring girls from a privileged background together with their less fortunate sisters
who, it was argued, were engaging in morally suspect behavior with recruits as a result of a
lack of character and education. The motivation for this initiative, however, went well
beyond reforming individuals. Indeed, the third of the League’s four objects was to
“[d]eepen, among women and girls of all classes, the sense of their responsibility for the
honour of the nation, and to make clear the fact that the manhood of our country is either
raised or lowered by the influence of its womanhood” (“The League of Honour” 30 Octo-
ber 1914, 506).
Girls who chose to participate in the League took the following pledge: “I promise, by
the help of God, to do all that is in my power to uphold the honour of the nation and its
defenders in this time of war, by prayer, purity, and temperance” (“The League of Honour”
30 October 1914, 507). We thus ﬁnd the concept of the nation’s honor, habitually described
as solely falling within the male remit via the honoring of the pledge to Belgium to defend
her in case of attack, extended to include women. This is done by claiming that the home
front is, above all, a moral front. The threat to the nation’s honor that Germany poses in
the realm of international relations is paralleled by the threat that the war poses to the
nation’s moral standards at home. Whereas men were the only ones who could defend the
nation’s honor abroad, women were the only ones who could defend it at home, because
the “morality” of their sexual conduct determined the morality of men’s and as a result deter-
mined the moral tone of the nation as a whole. The implication, furthermore, was that an
“immoral” nation at home would be more likely to behave “dishonorably” abroad, an impli-
cation that gave women’s role even greater importance. Through both of these cases we ﬁnd
reiterated the notion that men and women have separate spheres of specialty which map
perfectly to the two “spheres” of the war: the battle front is ideally suited for men’s sex-spe-
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ciﬁc abilities, the home front for women’s. In both also we ﬁnd a central feature of the sep-
arate-spheres discourse, women’s moral superiority to men, claimed and asserted as char-
acteristic of their different but equal face of citizenship.14
In sum, by appropriating the language and ceremony of citizenship via these two dis-
cursive techniques, feminists attempted to redeﬁne women’s sex-speciﬁc actions in war as
duties of citizenship. Doing one’s duty, however, was only one half of citizenship. The other
was proving that one stood united with the rest of the nation. And the suspicion that women
were not doing so or simply could not do so had thus to be continually fought.
Combating the Exclusion of Women
from the National Community
Two months into the war, the Anti-Suffrage Review accused the National Union of not
respecting the “political truce” that everyone otherwise seemed to agree was called for as a
result of war: “The ﬁrst indication that the Suffragist moral code differed from the one
accepted by the rest of the community appeared in the Common Cause of August 28th.... It
was pointed out that the Union had abandoned nothing, and the notice continued: ‘It has
announced that it has temporarily “suspended ordinary political work,” but it is doing a
good deal of extraordinary political work, and with excellent result.’ The subtle distinction
is worthy of the German Press Bureau” (“The Broken Truce” October 1914, 162).
Nor were its opponents alone concerned. One secretary of a society also felt that the
National Union was not behaving sufﬁciently like its male counterparts: “Have not men
forgotten that they are Liberals, Unionists, Ulstermen, Nationalists? What we want to prove
now is that we are, above all, citizens.... We ask for votes in order that we may the better
serve the nation. This is the true basis of any extension of the franchise. If it can be said
with any suspicion of truth that we have served the nation so that we might afterwards
obtain a vote, then our work will, spiritually, if not materially, have lost its value (“Keep-
ing the Union Alive” 4 September 1914, 417).
At issue in both of these attacks was the central concept of unity and its relationship
to citizenship: women must be united with men if they are to lay claim to being citizens;
they cannot be seen to be divisive. And to claim that patriotic work was suffrage work was
to demonstrate one’s inability to transcend one’s own selﬁsh cause for the greater good.
Common Cause’s response was to repeat these feminists’ central claim: that the war had
demonstrated the truth of their position. “We believe in Women’s Suffrage because we
believe the expression of woman’s point of view is necessary for the health of the nation.
We believe this even more in time of war than in time of peace, because the tendency of
war is to trample on all the half of life which more especially belongs to women” (“Keep-
ing the Union Alive” 4 September 1914, 413).
Thus the war, by treading on women’s “half of life,” had allowed the common agenda
(both sexes working together for the common good) to ﬁnally catch up with their own. In
addition to rejecting claims that their own position was divisive, it was necessary to reject
positions articulated by other women that would lead to women as a group being perceived
as divisive or separate from men. Two typical instances were the White Feather Movement
and feminist paciﬁsm.
Following the birth of the White Feather Movement, in which women would hand a
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white feather to men not in uniform as a symbolic accusation of cowardice, Fawcett wrote
to the Manchester Guardian to condemn it: “I do not think it is the function of men or
women to lecture each other on the special duties of the opposite sex. These duties are suf-
ﬁciently obvious” (quoted in “Our Active Service League” 11 September 1914, 430).15 Com-
mon Cause concurred: “We are sick to death, we Suffragists, of being told by men what we
may do—ought to do—what is ‘womanly!’ In the name of commonsense let us not now
copy the folly and set out to tell men what they may do and ought to do—what is ‘manly!’
They know in their hearts what is manly, just as we know what is womanly, if they see us
going about our business we may trust them to go about theirs (“Our Active Service League”
11 September 1914, 431).
Emmeline Pankhurst believed, by contrast, that women had a right to tell men to ﬁght
by virtue of men’s promise to women to defend them (see, for instance, Pankhurst 23 April,
25–26). But for those pursuing a strategy of inclusion, a group that accuses another of not
doing its share of the common load is acting divisively and thus failing to live up to the
standards of good citizenship.
Paciﬁsm posed a different kind of problem. Feminist paciﬁsts were often constitution-
alists who published in the same organs under review here, and worked closely with pro-
ponents of this women-as-citizens discourse. They too argued that women belonged to a
different sphere than men. But for them this forced the conclusion that women must, of
necessity, act immediately for peace. Because such an argument would set women apart
from the united nation and separate them from men who were ﬁghting, it needed to be resis-
ted. But such resistance was made more difﬁcult by the fact that it drew on an identical
understanding of women’s special qualities. The response of these feminists to their paci-
fist colleagues, therefore, was mostly an attempt at containment (“A Sacred Trust” 20
November 1914, 550–1). On the one hand, paciﬁsts were invited, in the name of consistency,
to take part in relief work: “The most paciﬁc of us should ... prove her love of peace to be
not a ‘self-regarding paciﬁsm,’ but a self-regardless pity. Those who hate war the most—
and what woman is there who does not hate war?—must be the readiest to give their lives
to the sacred task of alleviating the horrors of war.”
On the other hand, it was conceded that it was women’s “sacred trust” to “build up
public opinion in such wise that if and when our rulers are in a position to consider terms
of peace, they will ﬁnd behind them a great and mighty force making for justice, for self-
control, for wisdom.”
To remedy this ignorance women must study war: “We are bound ... to consider what
is the cause of war. We cannot be satisﬁed only to heal its wounds so far as we may, though
this healing is a duty from which no woman will dream of holding back.” Following the
publication of this view, a reader asked Common Cause to launch an “educational cam-
paign” in its pages to facilitate this greater understanding (Lyon 27 November 1914, 503).
There followed a new series of articles entitled “Problems of War and Peace” which
attempted to enlighten Common Cause readers on issues ranging from Britain’s treaty obli-
gations to disarmament, from conscientious objection to the Swiss militia system.16
In both cases, the aim was clearly to disarm the threat that feminist paciﬁsm repre-
sented to women’s inclusion in the national community by either co-opting paciﬁst women
into relief work—the work for which women were being praised—or taking the interna-
tionalist and activist sting out of thinking about peace by framing it as yet another duty for
women to engage in as “citizens.” When containment failed, however, and paciﬁsts decided
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to take part, with other women from around the world, in the Women’s Peace Congress at
The Hague, their attitudes were flatly denounced.17 Fawcett put it most strongly. For her,
as long as German troops had not been repelled, it was “akin to treason to talk of peace”
(quoted in Liddington 1989, 96, emphasis original).
The entire women-as-citizens discourse rested on the claim that women were one- half
of a united nation: they could neither be seen as undermining that unity by pointing the
ﬁnger at men for not holding up their end of the bargain, nor could they declare themselves
to be somehow outside of this national community, as having different priorities from those
of the nation. However, the greatest challenge to this discourse did not come from White
Feather movement women or feminist paciﬁsts. Indeed, a testimony to the uphill battle
these feminists faced is the fact that women’s discursive exclusion from the language of cit-
izenship was more often than not to be found in banal forms of speech, such as jokes, say-
ings, and turns of phrase.
Journalists joked that the following advert had appeared in the Times: “Wanted—pet-
ticoats for all able-bodied youths in this country who have not yet joined the Navy or Army”
(“A Bad Joke” 11 September 1914, 426). To which Common Cause angrily responded: “We
express no opinion whatever about the young men who do not volunteer, doubtless they
have their reasons—but the innuendo clearly is that they are unmanly—therefore they are
to be dressed in women’s clothes. No, thank you! An unmanly man is not ﬁt to wear a
woman’s clothes. It is time men learnt that a strong, capable woman is not necessarily ‘vir-
ile,’ nor a feeble man woman-like.”
In contesting this limitation of courage to the male gender, Common Cause was per-
forming two interrelated acts. On the one hand, it was challenging the superimposition of
positive and negative dichotomies on the male-female dichotomy that was central to the
separate-spheres discourse. On the other, it was resisting women’s exclusion from citizen-
ship. Indeed, if women could be successfully associated with non-courageous men, they
could ipso facto be excluded, like those men, from “true” citizenship.18
Not only jokes, but sayings too could be potent vehicles for excluding women from
the community of citizens. Witness the ubiquitous: “For men should work and women
should weep.” In its second issue after the war was declared, Common Cause rejected wide-
spread talk of “weeping women” as offensive. Women, it argued, were “keeping the race
while those we love are slaughtering each other” (“Woman, the Adaptable: The Queen’s
Appeal to Women” 14 August 1914, 388–89). Again the aim was to resist the portrayal of
women as feeble and thus incapable of rising up to the challenge, as men were doing, of
war—that is, of citizenship.
Turns of phrase also attracted the ire of Common Cause, even when they emanated from
such respected an authority as Lord Kitchener himself. In his ﬁrst speech to the troops, the
national hero warned them against the temptations of “women and wine.” The suffragist
paper pounced: “Now, when all women are plunged in grief and dread; when so many
women have only one thought—how best they can make good the inﬁnite disaster; now, in
modern England, we ﬁnd him warning the men with the foul old tag ‘women and wine.’ It
seems to us that the necessary warning might have been conveyed in manlier phrase; that
the men might have been appealed to, as they left sorrowing wives, and mothers, and sis-
ters to keep the home together, that they should respect womanhood, and not merely that
they should safeguard their own health” (“An Unhappy Phrase” 21 August 1914, 395).
To portray women as a danger to the troops was, once again, to present them as out-
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side of the national community. By insisting on the fact that these soldiers had female rel-
atives who were playing a vital role, Common Cause was inserting them back in.
That feminists should have spent precious column inches vigorously countering these
apparently unimportant utterances is only understandable in light of their strategy of deﬁn-
ing women as “citizens.” To let such jokes, sayings, and turns of phrase stand, would have
been to let stand the idea that women were not qualiﬁed to be citizens. Such exclusion of
women from citizenship, however, did not only take place in the discursive arena. Indeed,
a number of decisions taken by the authorities either implicitly or explicitly framed women
as outside the national community or, worse, a problem for it to solve.
The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Bill was debated throughout 1914 and
opposed by women’s suffrage campaigners because it would strip British women who had
married foreigners of their citizenship, while British men kept their citizenship regardless
of their wives’ nationalities. As a result of the outbreak of war these women now fell under
the category of “alien enemies.” The Englishwoman was pained: “hundreds of English women
must now register themselves as alien enemies, and become liable to removal from their
homes if these are in a forbidden area.... This is not a small matter to us, we are accustomed
to be denied citizenship; but to be branded as alien enemies is a deeper humiliation ... it is
an unforgettable blow to what we hold dearest” (“Echoes of War” September 1914, 308).
Nor did the outbreak of war result in women being treated any more equitably by the
authorities. Two cartoons published in Common Cause in consecutive weeks in December
1914 highlight this amply. Although the subjects were different—one addresses the War
Ofﬁce’s decision to put soldiers’ and sailors’ wives under police surveillance (Figure 1, page
37), the other the decision to bar women from pubs before 11:30 A.M. (Figure 2, page 37)—
the message was the same.
In all three cases—marriage law, surveillance of soldier’s wives, and drinking laws—
the same argument was articulated: women were making considerable but unrecognized sac-
riﬁces in this war. Worse still, they were either humiliated by the way the law treated them
or were being punished for the sacriﬁces they had made. In every case men failed to value
their contributions to the nation and, as suffragists had long been arguing, their unequal
treatment resulted from their absence from the bodies that had taken those decisions.
But of much greater concern to the authorities than misbehaving soldiers’ wives or
drunken women were prostitutes who were blamed for spreading disease among recruits.
Defending these women, however, was more difﬁcult: for what contribution to the nation
could they be said to be making? The way in which this problem was dealt with is illustrated
by a leader published in Common Cause which, four months into the war, reflected on the
mixed reactions that were greeting women’s actions. On the one hand, they were being
eulogized for their relief work, on the other there were “bitter and repeated complaints of
the women who are hindering” (“Women’s Part in War Time” 11 December 1914, 596). Of
these there were three types: women who were wasting the money they had received on
account of being “dependents” of soldiers or sailors, young girls who were accused of pes-
tering soldiers and engaging in immoral conduct, and professional prostitutes.
The ﬁrst two cases showed, for Common Cause, not that women and girls were some-
how individually to blame but rather that their social circumstances were the source of the
ill. The dependents of ﬁghting men were often of a poor background and not used to hav-
ing such amounts of money. To address their poverty was the solution. As for the young
girls, they were behaving in this way because, as suffragists had been pointing out for a long
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Top: Figure 1: The Crime of Being a Soldier’s Wife (Common Cause, 11 December 1914). Bottom:
Figure 2: His Patriotic Sacriﬁce (Common Cause, 18 December 1914).
time, they had been socialized into thinking that convincing a man to marry them was their
sole function in life. The solution was to change their education. The prostitute was a dif-
ferent case altogether: “She represents, in an extreme and ﬁnal form, the woman exploited
by society.... It is useless ... to appeal to their patriotism. They have none. A prostitute is
without nationality. Her hand is against every man, and every man’s hand against her. Soci-
ety has exploited her, and she exploits society. What has her country done for her, in heaven’s
name, that she should know ‘patriotism’? Nevertheless, she is human, and every proposal
that assumes that she is not is bound to fail” (“Woman’s Part in War Time” 11 December
1914, 596).
Common Cause concludes that suffragists must help prostitutes as far as possible because
their battle from the beginning has also been to obtain recognition of their status as human
beings. Yet it is signiﬁcant that the setting of reference for dealing with prostitutes is not
the nation, as it is for soldiers’ wives and for young girls, but humanity. By saying that they
have no country, the suffragists are making a clear demarcation between the nation as a
whole and prostitutes. Certainly the fault lies not with prostitutes, but with the nation, and
yet this conveniently distances “women,” who are contributing to the nation’s struggle,
from “prostitutes,” who, although not purposefully, can only undermine it. By saying that
prostitutes must be treated as human beings, these feminists are not saying anything they
had not said about German women stranded in London at the outbreak of war.19
This exclusion of prostitutes from the nation alerts us to the fact that gendering citi-
zenship in order to deﬁne women’s response to war as that of “citizens” had important con-
sequences not only for the concept and language of citizenship, but also for the kind of
feminism that one could articulate.
Deﬁning Women as “Citizens” in the Context of
Total War: Consequences for Feminism
To deﬁne women as “citizens” in the context of total war led to the articulation of a femi-
nism marked by ﬁve principal features, ﬁrst an unconditional acceptance of “the nation”
as the only possible frame of reference for a feminist politics. Witness Common Cause’s jus-
tiﬁcation for its decision not to turn itself into a propaganda machine either for or against
the involvement of Britain in the war: “Great Britain has gone to war. This is a British paper.
We accept the war as our condition for the time being, and our immediate concern is to
bear ourselves as good citizens under these conditions” (“Accepting Facts” 14 August 1914,
386). War is enough to command one’s loyalty to the nation. Thus, whereas Common Cause
had carried numerous articles throughout the month of July on the International Suffrage
Alliance’s meeting in London, in which it celebrated the leaders of sister suffrage societies
around the globe who were in attendance (see issues of 10 July, 17 July, 24 July), its ﬁrst
issue discussing the war (31 July) made no mention whatsoever of their continued presence
in London and even less of the possibility of international (as distinct from imperial) sis-
terly action.
The second feature of this feminism is its rejection of xenophobic nationalism. Indeed,
this discourse’s ideal citizen is fair-minded, heroic, and honorable, someone who loves her
country, defends it because she is bound to, but without hatred for non-nationals. When
“German atrocity reports” began to spread in early September 1914, Common Cause issued
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a characteristic call for Britain not to respond in kind but to continue to behave according
to the laws of “civilised warfare” (“The Crime of Vengeance” 18 September 1914, 440). We
also saw above that the NUWSS took part in schemes that gave relief to “alien enemies.”
These examples, as well as the insistence that one of women’s duties is to prepare public
opinion for peace by thinking through the causes of war and how to avoid them, all point
to this discourse’s solid rooting in the liberal ideological tradition of reason over passion
and right over might. To construct women as “citizens” in war was thus to weld this fem-
inism’s fortunes ﬁrmly to those of British liberal nationalism.
A third striking feature of this feminism is the narrowness with which it deﬁnes its con-
stituency—that is, those whom it recognizes as “women.” Because non-nationals could not,
by deﬁnition, be good citizens, they fell out of the picture altogether, as we have just seen.
This is not to say, however, that all British females qualiﬁed as “women.” The prostitute,
for instance, did not come under the category “woman” because she failed both tests of “good
citizenship.” Indeed, she did not accomplish any act that could be described as fulﬁlling a
duty to the nation, nor could she be said to stand united with the national community in
the common struggle because of the threat she represented to soldiers’ health. The paciﬁst,
similarly, fell outside of feminism’s constituency for failing to stand united in the common
cause of national struggle. That constituency, then, was made up of British women who could
be described as acting in support of their country, as “good citizens.”
The fourth key feature of this feminism is its rhetorical strategy of inclusion. This pro-
vided suffragists with an opportunity to challenge accepted limitations on the “woman’s
sphere” by theorizing opportunities that the war opened up for women as proof of the valid-
ity of a gendered understanding of citizenship. The “woman’s sphere” thus found itself
expanding out of the home into the public domain of men and out of the country, into the
front lines. The success of this theorizing, however, was also its limitation, as indeed is the
limitation of all strategies of inclusion: even as they attempt to transform from within (and
to their advantage) the heavily gendered discourses within which they operate, they tend to
highlight and reinscribe their male bias. Thus the campaign to mobilize women could not
escape the male-centeredness of the discourse of citizenship, the uneasy, “unnatural” rela-
tionship between “women” and “citizenship.”20 When Kitchener pointed his finger at
passersby, the poster did not read “Men! Your Country Needs You!” By contrast, Fawcett
must preface her call to service with “Women!” thus involuntarily highlighting the fact that
it was by no means obvious that women were actually needed. Similarly, Harley does not
compare the “girl” that she is mobilizing with the “boy” that the government mobilized,
but with the “soldier.”
The ﬁnal distinctive feature of this feminism is its vision of the male-female relation-
ship as an essentially harmonious one. Because it locked women into a gendered national
community that was meant to be harmonious, it could not read men’s symbolic, legal, and
literal attacks on women as anything other than irrational bigotry, a lack of understanding
borne of prejudice which could and would be overcome by reasoning and argument. To
understand it as “sex-war,” as Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst did, would have under-
mined the basic notion of a united nation. To understand it as a symptom of militarism, as
paciﬁsts did, would have undermined the premise of the righteousness of the nation’s cause
in this war.
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Conclusion: Feminism in War
The aim of this article has been to understand the response of Fawcett and her followers to
the outbreak of war by placing it in its linguistic context. This has allowed me to draw two
main conclusions.
First, far from representing a knee-jerk flight from feminism, their response was a self-
conscious continuation of a long-standing feminist argument about the gendered nature of
citizenship. By plunging into relief work they were not capitulating to the notion of sepa-
rate spheres or seeking entry into the political system on men’s terms but gendering the
concept and language of citizenship in order to obtain votes for women on resolutely suf-
fragist terms.21 In a context where men and women’s essential difference was heavily insisted
upon and where citizenship was welded to the separate spheres discourse, it was a response
that made considerable sense. Indeed, it gave women’s daily relief work a political signiﬁ-
cance, vindicated the legitimacy of their claim to citizenship, and framed the ubiquitous
language of separate spheres as an acceptable, efﬁcient, and empowering political division
of labor between women and men. Rather than an exemplar of British feminism’s ideolog-
ical collapse in the face of war, the case of Fawcett and her followers provides us rather with
further evidence of the resilience of feminist thinking in this period.22
In addition to strengthening the “resilience thesis,” I have sought in this article to make
a ﬁrst step in moving the debate beyond the collapse-resilience dichotomy by asking not
only “did feminism survive the outbreak of war?” but also “what form of feminism emerged
as a result of the interaction between a long-standing feminist argument and the context of
total war?” Thus, my second conclusion is that to use the long-standing gendered concept
of citizenship in a context of total war had a signiﬁcant impact on the shape of the femi-
nism that Fawcett and her followers promoted. Theirs was a feminism that anchored British
women ﬁrmly into the British political community, reframed separate-spheres discourse to
women’s advantage, and tied feminism ﬁrmly to liberal nationalism. This made it a pow-
erful language with which to theorize the wartime expansion of the “woman’s sphere” as
evidence of women’s rightful claim to enfranchisement. However, by excluding women
both at home and abroad from its constituency and by positing a harmonious national com-
munity, this feminist language left its proponents with few conceptual resources to deal
with British men’s reluctance to treat them as equals. Indeed, they could only fall back on
an appeal to reason, having no possibility of returning to a critique of male domination as
either sex interest or as the symptom of militarism.
Notes
1. See Riley 1988, particularly chapters 1 and 3.
2. That attention to the linguistic context of political thought and action allows us to under-
stand more clearly what actors were doing by performing those verbal and nonverbal actions is a cen-
tral insight of “Cambridge school” historians, particularly Quentin Skinner. His main theoretical
articles on this matter and his critics’ responses have been usefully brought together by James Tully
in Tully and Skinner 1988.
3. On the resilience of suffragism, see also Smith 2005. It will be clear by now that the debate
over the capitulation or resilience of feminist thought in the face of total war has disproportionately
focused on the responses to the war of the main suffrage organizations. In seeking to challenge one
such interpretation, this article cannot but continue that suffrage-centric trend. Yet this should not
be taken to mean that I disagree with those historians who have insisted that the organizations, indi-
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viduals, and ideas that constituted the movement for women’s suffrage do not encapsulate the entirety
of “British feminism” in this period. For a recent brilliant example, see Delap 2007.
4. The same can be said of course of the well-documented position of Fawcett’s opponents in
the NUWSS, the paciﬁsts led by such impressive ﬁgures as Catherine Marshall, Helena Swanwick or
Maude Royden. See for instance Wiltsher 1985, Liddington 1989, Vellacott 1993, Vellacott 2007. Indeed,
the rich diversity of feminist thought in Britain before the war allowed each of these competing fac-
tions to plausibly claim the label “feminist” for themselves, despite the radically different positions
they expounded. The “ideological collapse” thesis tends to conceal, by denying the label to this or that
group, precisely this diversity in prewar feminist thought.
5. These were not the only forums in which this particular discourse was articulated (nor was
it the only discourse presented in those forums), but they were certainly among those in which it was
presented the most clearly. The value of focusing on periodicals for historians of feminism has recently
been highlighted by a marvellous collection edited by Lucy Delap, Maria DiCenzo and Louise Ryan
(Delap, et al. 2006).
6. I borrow the expression “strategy of inclusion” from Judith Squires (Squires 2000, 3).
7. Most of the newspaper articles quoted in this article are only a page long. Therefore, in order
to avoid the multiplication of in-text references, where multiple citations of the same text are made
in one paragraph, the reference is only given once, at the beginning of the paragraph. In addition, the
majority of these articles are not signed. They are therefore identiﬁed by their title, both in in-text
citations and in the list of references.
8. For a discussion of the classical conception of citizenship, see Skinner 1978, 173.
9. For food supplies, see respectively “Eking-out the Food Supply. No I.—Vegetables” 28 August
1914, 407, “Eking-out the Food Supply. No. II.—Fruit” 4 September 1914, 415, and “Eking-out the
Food Supply, Etc. No. III.—Various Produce” 11 September 1914, 431. For the rest, see respectively
“The Care of Maternity” 2 October 1914, 458, “Toys and Toy-Making: National Union Helps to Start
a New Industry” 4 December 1914, 577, and “National Union Workshops” 18 September 1914, 441.
10. See respectively “Soldiers’ Wives” 11 September 1914, 425, “Our Debt to Belgium” 30 Octo-
ber 1914, 510–11, Walshe 16 October 1914, 482–83, and VCCC 11 December 1914, 599.
11. Interestingly, the case for women soldiers was implicitly made in the early days of war in the
pages of the Englishwoman. A testament to the strength of the separate-spheres view throughout British
society, however, is the fact that it was not made in straightforwardly political pieces. Instead it took
the non-threatening form of historical biographies of famous women combatants from the distant
past. See the “Martial Heroines” series written by Edith Palliser, beginning with Palliser September
1914, 273–8.
12. For a perceptive discussion of the moral panic over young women’s alleged collective bout
of “khaki fever” in the ﬁrst months of war, which some argued resulted from their non-mobilization,
see Woollacott April 1994. For subsequent moral panics involving women’s sexuality, see Grayzel
1999, chapter 4.
13. My concern in this article is with the articulation, not the reception, of these feminists’
attempts to appropriate the language of citizenship for women. It is worth noting in passing, how-
ever, that such female organizations styled on the military were largely frowned upon, precisely for
their perceived transgression of proper gender roles. Women could claim for themselves the virtues
of citizenship, but not don its costume. See for instance Watson 2004, especially chapter 2.
14. The notion that the war had opened a “moral front” at home was not an invention of these
feminist commentators. Indeed, their response has much in common with that of the most conser-
vative commentators, who called on women to behave “properly.” See for instance Grayzel 1999, espe-
cially chapter 4. Where they part ways, however, is in the feminists’ insistence that to do so was an
act of citizenship in addition to being an act of proper womanhood.
15. For an influential study of the White Feather Movement, see Gullace 2002, chapter 4.
16. See respectively Blease 4 December 1914, 581, Hobson 24 December 1914, 621, Brockway 29
January 1915, 681–82, and Gunter 22 January 1915, 667.
17. For a detailed account of the Women’s Peace Congress in The Hague, see Wiltsher 1985.
18. Conscientious objectors were disenfranchised for ﬁve years by the Reform Bill of 1918. See
Gullace 2002, chapter 8, especially 178–84.
19. See for instance “International Women’s Relief Committee” 28 August 1914, 403. Accord-
ing to this article the NUWSS’s participation in a relief committee’s work to help “alien enemy”
women stranded in London stems from “a deeply human sympathy with anyone in trouble.”
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20. This uneasy relationship was acutely felt by contemporaries. In the words of Janet Watson,
“Women could only be equal-but-different, and their efforts were always perceived as those of women
in particular, not just citizens” (Watson 2004, 7).
21. For a similar, if brief, assessment of the NUWSS’s relief work as “feminist” but from a per-
spective that is anchored in social and political rather than intellectual history, see Holton 1986, 132.
For a longer defense on similar lines, see Vellacott 2007, 15–32.
22. In fairness to Jo Vellacott it must be noted that her most recent work happily accepts the
prowar wing of the NUWSS under the label “feminism,” although it remains reluctant to do the same
for the jingoism of Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst. See Vellacott 2007, especially chapter 2; for
a critique, see Calvini-Lefebvre 2008.
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The Postcolonial Politics of
Militarizing Rwandan Women
An Analysis of the Extremist Magazine Kangura
and the Gendering of a Genocidal Nation-state
GEORGINA HOLMES
Abstract: Rwanda has been used by many feminist scholars of international relations as a case
study to play out understandings of gender-based violence in war and “civil war.” Few femi-
nists have analyzed the mass rape of Rwandan women in the context of a carefully planned and
prepared genocide. This article considers the ways in which, in the years leading up to April
1994, the Rwandan nation-state became increasingly militarized and masculinized. It exam-
ines the extremist propaganda magazine Kangura’s use of cartoons to militarize Rwandan
women—not just as wives, mothers and prostitutes—but as political subjects.
Keywords: feminist international relations theory; genocide; genocidal
rape; media; militarization; nation-state; propaganda; Rwanda
Introduction
Between April and July 1994, an estimated 250,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu
women were raped, gang-raped, and mutilated during the Rwandan genocide, when nearly
a million men, women and children were killed in one hundred days. Witnesses and sur-
vivors have repeatedly testiﬁed to the brutality of these rapes by the government army, mili-
tia groups, and men and boys from the women’s own communities. Some testimonies report
other Rwandan women’s complicity in rape—by telling men where women were hiding,
goading men to rape, even disabling victims so that they could not physically escape rape.
Most of the work on the conflict in Rwanda by feminist scholars of international relations
tends to discuss gender-based violence in the context of “civil war” rather than genocide.
On those occasions when the term “genocide” occurs, it is often used interchangeably with
war and rarely is space allocated to examine the relationship between the two, let alone to
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consider the politics of interpretation that surrounds them. Elsewhere, in sociology and
international law, feminist scholars have examined the ways in which Rwandan extremist
propaganda was gendered to gear a Hutu population to target Tutsi women with gender-
based violence (Baines 2003; Taylor 1999; Chrètien 1995; Kabanda 2007). Much of this
research, which hones in on women victims of male violence at the cost of sidelining women
perpetrators of genocide, does not adequately examine the complex, gendered power rela-
tions that developed in Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes region in the four years leading
up to the genocide. This research, like much feminist international relations theory, often
presents confused readings of Tutsi women as victims of a blurred civil war or genocide
while rendering other Rwandan women invisible.
Feminists have also considered how women’s lives are integral to sustaining militarized
societies and upholding military ideals both in times of peace and war (Enloe 2000; 2004),
yet few have examined how women are militarized in speciﬁc ways in genocide. This is
largely because many feminist readings take a global view of women’s militarization that
has, for the most part, glossed over the particulars of local politics in Rwanda. By ignoring
the information war between the key actors in the Rwandan civil war and genocide both in
the Great Lakes region and internationally (via the United Nations, its member states, and
international NGOs), gender-sensitive analyses of the Hutu extremist propaganda may actu-
ally serve to uphold the extremist interpretation of “war” and “genocide”: it was precisely
the threat of civil war that the extremists used to mobilize a nation to commit genocide.
This neglect of detail produces prescriptive accounts that time and again in feminist inter-
national relations theorizing negate genocide in the overarching story of “women and war.”
In this article I focus on the operation of militaries and militarized cultures in geno-
cide. I argue that simpliﬁed accounts of the Rwandan genocide camouflage the unique ways
in which gendered depictions of conflict were central to the Hutu extremist propaganda.
The paper focuses speciﬁcally on images featured in the propaganda magazine Kangura, a
mouthpiece for the extremist party Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR), a
Hutu extremist political party whose members included some of the most puissant archi-
tects of the genocide. The paper is divided into four parts. In the ﬁrst part I briefly consider
the deﬁnitions of ethnic war, genocide, gendercide, and genocidal rape before discussing
the scholarly issues of interpreting the history of conflict in Rwanda. In the second I adopt
Cynthia Enloe’s theory of militarization to look at the development of Rwanda’s genocidal
nation-state. In the third I expose some of the inaccuracies of feminist international rela-
tions work on Rwanda and consider how these inaccuracies produce partial readings of
gendered conflict in Rwanda. I conclude with an examination of Kangura’s militarization
of Rwandan women. Here I expand on traditional readings of extremist propaganda to look
at the ways in which Kangura also militarized Hutu Rwandan women. This article is based
on archival research conducted at the educational Centre Iwacu Kabunsunzu in Kigali,
Rwanda. A total of thirty-seven out of the ﬁfty-four editions published between November
1991 and March 1994 were analyzed using discourse analysis. Given time constraints while
in Kigali, it was difﬁcult to gain access to a complete collection of Kangura, since many issues
were destroyed immediately after the genocide by survivors and repatriated Rwandans.
However, the editions I had access to, which spanned from numbers four to ﬁfty-four, give
some insight into the militarization of Rwandan women.
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Part One: Ethnic War, Genocide,
and Gendercide in Rwanda
Genocide scholars focus on the intent of perpetrators to differentiate between ethnic war
and genocide. Ethnic war may include civil war and wars of liberation, and may also incor-
porate ethnic cleansing—deﬁned as “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by issuing
force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area” (Bassiouni Report,
1992 paragraph 55, cited in Allen 1996, 43). The legal deﬁnition of genocide, as coined by
Raphael Lemkin in 1944, was the “intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethni-
cal, racial or religious group.”1 The term “genocide” has in genocide studies been distin-
guished from “war,” although debates about the relationship between the two continue.2
Adam Jones, who criticizes the UN’s gender-blind deﬁnition of genocide, argues that a gen-
dered lens can help us better understand cultural and societal differences between genocides
(2004, vii). For Jones, genocide is “the actualization of the intent, however successfully car-
ried out, to murder in whole or in substantial part, any national, ethnic, racial, religious,
political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are deﬁned by the perpetrator,
by whatever means” (20).
Discussion about rape within feminist theory is diverse. United States–based feminist
Beverly Allen, who conducted ethnographic research with Bosnian-Herzegovinian rape and
genocide survivors in the mid–1990s, coined the term “genocidal rape” to distinguish
between rape in war and rape in genocide. For Allen, genocidal rape is “a military policy of
rape for the purpose of genocide” (1996, 1). While “all rape is related in that it derives from
a system of dominance and subjugation,” genocidal rape is set apart from other forms of
rape by Allen, who writes of the “horrible difference genocidal rape makes” in the “partic-
ular suffering it causes” (39). Methods include gang raping and repeat raping with the intent
to kill, the insertion of blunt instruments into women with the intent to kill, and forced
impregnation as a means to destroy an ethnic group—an act of genocide that Allen herself
believes “makes sense only if you are ignorant about genetics” (87).
The deﬁnition employed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
states that rape is “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on one person under
circumstances which are coercive” (United Nations 1998, 7 paragraphs 2–5). During the
Akayesu case, the Trial Chamber concluded that rape and sexual violence in Rwanda in
1994 did constitute genocide because there was evidence of intent to destroy in whole or in
part an ethnic group (United Nations 1998, 7 paragraphs 2–5). However, it was the ICTR’s
recognition that rape need not include “penetration or physical contact” that moved inter-
national legal understandings of rape forward, since the act of perpetrating rape is not spe-
ciﬁcally male-gendered: women can also be militarized perpetrators of sexual violence, even
if they do not physically commit rape. For Allen, however, genocidal rape more adeptly ﬁts
deﬁnitions of biological warfare than current UN convention deﬁnitions. This is a partic-
ularly pertinent point in the case of Rwanda, where rape survivors recount that men raped
to inflict women with AIDS—the intent to kill by means of a slow death, and signifying the
longer-term destruction of the community, including the death of boys and men (Human
Rights Watch 1996). While Allen refers to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is important to note that
the Serbian genocidal rape policy was remarkably similar to the Hutu extremist policy dur-
ing the Rwandan genocide, despite occurring simultaneously and on different continents.
One signiﬁcant parallel is the raping of women by men of their own communities. As Allen
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states, in Serb-controlled areas where men had fled or had been killed “women were then
often raped in their own homes or taken from their homes to another location and raped,
often by neighbours or people known to them” (1996, 74).
Conflicting Rwandan Histories
A small and densely populated country, Rwanda’s landlocked inhabitants share a common
language and comprise three visible ethnicities—the Hutu (the majority), Tutsi and Twa.
Invisible ethnicities include those who, over time, immigrated to Rwanda from areas that
are now Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.3 In precolonial times certain
regions of contemporary Rwanda were ruled by the mwami (king) whose centuries-old feu-
dal order operated through a series of administrative networks that radiated out from a
core (Melvern 2000, 9). Other regions remained under the authority of wealthy lineages that
could be either Tutsi or Hutu, operating through clan and patron-client systems (Newbury
1988; Newbury, 1998). It is said that there was little ethnic divisionism between Tutsi and
Hutu groups—although anthropologist Christopher Taylor notes that there was in fact more
racism toward the Twa than any other ethnicity, in spite of their exclusion from normative
histories on Rwandan ethnicity (Taylor 1999, 69–70). The advent of German colonial rule
in the 1920s, and later Belgian colonial rule in the 1930s, profoundly altered these lineage
and patron-client systems. Tutsi chiefs and the royal court’s supremacy over once-power-
ful lineages and clans were reinforced and justiﬁed by Belgian colonial rule that aimed to
develop a class-based capitalist society.
As has been well-documented, the European Hamitic hypothesis and “great chain of
being” hierarchy, developed from John Hanning Speke’s theories of race evolution, cate-
gorized Rwandan “ethnicity” into two groups: the pastoralist Tutsi (who were recorded as
being taller and leaner, with high brows and thinner noses and lips, of superior intellect)
and the Hutu, shorter and stockier agriculturalists with flatter noses (see Eltringham 2004;
Prunier 1997; Newbury 1998; Taylor 1999; Mamdani 2001). The history of Tutsi invasion
and conquest was perpetuated during colonial times by Tutsi chiefs to justify their elite
position within Rwandan society (Taylor 1999, 88). Yet the stereotypes were strongly based
on the visibility of Rwandan men’s and women’s bodies as they were reconﬁgured and re-
represented within the Belgian colonial sphere.
The revolution of 1959 grew out of dissatisfaction with Tutsi monarchist and elite rule
but was compounded by increased poverty and loss of control over the means of produc-
tion on the part of the Hutu. Many Tutsis who also suffered under the regime backed the
revolution. In 1957 the Bahutu Manifesto emerged, which introduced “race” into the socio-
political context for the ﬁrst time and was used to fuel ethnic divisionism (Prunier 1997,
45). The 1959 revolution killed an estimated twenty thousand Tutsi and forced thousands
into exile (African Rights 1996, 8). Independence in 1963 followed a political uprising of the
oppressed Hutu majority that saw thousands of Tutsi massacred. In 1974 President Juvenal
Habyarimana, who had taken power in a coup from his predecessor Grégoire Kayibanda in
1973, formed his own political party, Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le devel-
opment (MRND). Habyarimana’s regime rested on the ideology that democracy equated
to ethnic majority (that is, Hutu) rule but in 1978 article 7 of the Rwandan Constitution
claimed that “single-party rule was the basic value of the regime” (African Rights 1996, 8).
After the regime’s refusal to permit them to return, refugees in exile organized themselves
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in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which staged an attack against Rwanda in October
1990.
The 1990s saw the introduction of democracy following internal opposition and pres-
sure from the international community, including public pressure from France’s President
Mitterand. Habyarimana introduced multiparty politics and drew up a new constitution in
June 1991. In line with a shift in the priorities of the international community for Rwanda,
from development to democracy as development, Habyarimana renamed his party as Mou-
vement Républicain Nationale pour le Démocratie et le Developpement (MRNDD). It is
signiﬁcant that the party retained the same acronym: it preached that all Hutus were auto-
matically members of a “naturally” democratic party. In spite of this ideology, the number
of opposition parties burgeoned, including the Hutu-majority party of the South, the Par-
tie Libéral (PL). This reinforced a long-standing regional divide between the Hutus of the
North (Habyarimana’s stronghold) and the Hutus of the South (Melvern 2000, 22). In 1993
the new government entered into talks with the RPF, resulting in the signing of the Arusha
Accords and the creation of the new post of prime minister—held on an interim basis by
Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The early 1990s also saw the growth of NGOs, including women’s
organizations, which became increasingly vocal within the new civil society. With protests
from women’s activist groups, students, and opposition parties, Habyarimana’s regime was
increasingly threatened.
Interpreting War and Genocide
Rwanda’s history and the events leading up to the 1994 Rwandan genocide are complex.
While I have attempted to provide an overview of the key events that led to the civil war
and genocide in Rwanda in April 1994, such an exercise gives rise to a series of contentions
around the interpretation of history. Since independence and most notably since the RPF
invasion of Rwanda in 1990, an information war has ensued between the RPF, the Hutu
extremists, and their respective international supporters—wherein each “side” has inter-
preted the history of conflict in Rwanda in ways that justify their own stance. René Lemarc-
hand asserts that different interpretations of the formation of ethnicity and histories of mass
violence in the Great Lakes region have produced “basic disagreements” that “are traceable
in part to the uncritical use of the term genocide to describe just about any type of ethnic
violence” (1998, 3). This issue is made further problematic when we consider the “forgot-
ten” genocide of Burundian Hutu by Burundian Tutsi in 1972 (Lemarchand 1998, 5).
Social anthropologist Johan Pottier contends that Rwanda’s post-genocide govern-
ment, through the help of Anglophone journalists and “naïve academics” (that is, academ-
ics who are “new” to the study of Rwanda), have manipulated the international community
with “a simple, easy-to-grasp narrative” and “unproblematic representation” of both the
genocide and events since 1994, in particular in relation to the Kibeho incident in 1996,
where thousands of refugees—innocents and extremists—were massacred by the Rwandan
government army (2002, 46). Yet Pottier’s own observations are not value-free: his analy-
sis of the post-genocide information war makes no reference to the continued extremist
propaganda (as evinced in Kangura) generated in Europe—in particular in France, Belgium
and Holland—and within the Great Lakes region, as well as Kenya and Nigeria. Circulat-
ing lecture halls, scholarly work, novels, plays, ﬁlms, and pamphlets, the struggle over the
interpretation of genocide and war in Rwanda has hit the international arena and features
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highly within the Anglophone-Francophone tussle over ideological “ownership” of post-
colonial Africa (Chaffer 2002). Propagated by the many exiled extremists and their sympa-
thizers, this material is intended to destabilize post-conflict Rwanda and to keep Hutu power
alive. The struggle over interpretation has stepped up in recent years, with the publication
of the French-commissioned Bruguiere Report in November 2006 which focused on the
unanswered question of “who shot down President Habyriamana’s plane,” an event said to
be the “trigger” of the genocide. The Rwandan Mucyo Commission report on the role of
the French during the genocide has since followed but, at the time of writing this article, is
yet to be published. Such reports seek to pinpoint who exactly is accountable for genocide.
Whatever the outcome of these investigations, it is clear is that there were deep-seated
structural and social factors that led to the genocide (Uvin, 2001, 85). Nevertheless main-
stream interpretations of Rwandan history tend to be gender blind. With the exception of
Malkki’s excellent anthropological work on the construction of nationalist identity in Tan-
zanian refugee camps, Jefremovas’s survey of Rwandan business women within Rwandan
society, and some important observations made by Christopher Taylor on the position of
women within Rwandan urban society in the 1980s and 1990s, there is very little historical
insight into the militarization of Rwandan women (Malkki 1995; Jefremovas 2002; Taylor
1999).
These multilayered information wars, which give rise to partial stories and accusations
of twisted truths, make for a challenging time for any feminist international relations the-
orist attempting to undertake a gender-aware analysis of genocide and civil war in Rwanda:
in the hope of revealing hidden inaccuracies, she or he may be stand accused of support-
ing a particular “side.” So while within this article I choose to focus speciﬁcally on Kan-
gura’s militarized images of Rwandan women, I do not rule out the militarization of women
by other actors. Indeed, in the four years prior to the genocide and in the months during
the genocide, there were four key military institutions within which both men and women
operated: the Hutu extremists supported by the Habyarimana regime; the Tutsi-led Rwanda
Patriotic Front (RPF); the UN peacekeeping force led by Romeo Dallaire; and the French
troops who were ﬁrst deployed in Rwanda to ﬁght for Habyrimana’s government forces dur-
ing the 1990 civil war, and again toward the close of the genocide to support hundreds of
thousands of refugees (and retreating extremist government supporters) as they fled into
Zaire. These military institutions adopted different ideological representations of women
to help ascertain the type of “war” for which they were ﬁghting. The RPF, for example, were
dependent on recruiting Rwandan women refugees in Uganda to support the plight of
returnees, but its antimonarchist, republican movement which took hold in the early 1990s
can in part be attributed to the campaigning efforts of the women who published and dis-
seminated a particular African-socialist literature. The multicultural Ghanaian, Canadian,
Belgian, and Bangladeshi UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda (United Nations Assistance Mis-
sion for Rwanda—UNAMIR) also adopted speciﬁc ideologies that were in part born out of
their own cultural readings of woman, albeit pinned together by what Enloe terms the “inter-
national” processes of militarization (Enloe 2000, 101). In addition to this, it is important
to consider the media environment within which Kangura was produced. Jean-Marie Vian-
ney Higiro, director of the Rwandan Information Ofﬁce (ORINFOR) in Kigali from 31 July
1993 to 6 April 1994, observes that RTLM (Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines) and
Kangura were not the only media to revise history and make truth claims about the events
unfolding in Rwanda in the early 1990s. The print publications of the RPF and political
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opposition parties “looked very similar in format and presentation....They watched each
other closely and tried to emulate or outsmart each other” (Higiro 2007, 79). Such was the
political climate at the time that examples of “dehumanization could be found in many of
these papers” (Higiro 2007, 79). Yet, as the ICTR media trial conﬁrmed in 2003, evidence
showed that there was a clear link between extremist propaganda, such as RTLM and Kan-
gura, and the actions of perpetrators of genocide (Temple-Raston, 2005).
Part Two: Kangura and the Militarization
of a Pure Hutu Nation State
International relations theorist Cynthia Enloe deﬁnes militarism as an ideology with “dis-
tinctively militaristic core beliefs” that serve to justify war (2004, 219). Within a patriarchy,
militarism privileges certain types of masculinity. Militarization, like globalization, is a
“many-layered [socio-political] process of transformation” (Enloe 2007, 2). In her extremely
thought-provoking polemic Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s
Lives, Enloe considers how American patriarchal military policies that inform men’s iden-
tities in wartime also inform the identities of women. Whether as wives, girlfriends, moth-
ers, or prostitutes, women are conditioned to support war, privileging masculinity in the
process. Women are supporters of war because their sons and husbands ﬁght on the front-
line or because, as prostitutes and mistresses, they are economically dependent on the mil-
itary. For Enloe, the military uses its status to “deﬁne national security” and, in turn, social
order. This “circular process” relies on “those gender deﬁnitions that ... bolster ideological
militarism” where “racism and militarism become mutually supportive in such a national
security state” (2000, 46). Since, as Enloe concedes, “[p]olicies about men are always made
dependent on policies about women” and “[p]olicies about women are always built on poli-
cies about men,” (2000, 216), I ﬁrst turn to look at how militarized masculinities were cen-
tral to sustaining the pure Hutu nation-state before analyzing the militarization of Rwandan
women in Kangura.
Militarising Rwandan Men and the Pure Hutu State
It was the pressure to democratize, the rise of multiparty politics and the Arusha Peace
Accord (which pushed for power sharing between the MRNDD, RPF, and other political
parties) that led Hutu extremists to develop strategies to reunite the Hutus. The obvious
solution was to develop the image of ethnic war between civilian Hutus and the “alien”
Tutsi.4 Focusing on the threat of an invasion by the Ugandan-based RPF, the MRNDD
sought to provide evidence through extremist propaganda that all Tutsi were enemies of
the state, including the Rwandan Tutsi who were portrayed as “the enemy within.” As Gas-
pard Karamero, the editor of the independent journal Imbago, observed in 1995, “despite
the talk of ethnic politics, the point was to eliminate political opposition from whatever quar-
ter it came” (African Rights 1995, 30).
To sustain this public image of ethnic war, these extremists militarized individual
Hutus, preparing them for “war,” while at the same time upholding the ideal of a free, dem-
ocratic subject. MRNDD (Interahamwe) rallies were loud celebrations, with dancing, whis-
tle-blowing, and singing. Hutu citizens were encouraged to learn songs that confused
50 Minerva Journal of Women and War • Fall 2008
messages about democracy and freedom with those about war and, more subtly, genocide.
At one such demonstration, a large group of MRNDD men and women were ﬁlmed chant-
ing: “Nothing scares us, we create terror.... We are not attacked, we attack. Nothing can
crush us, we are the ones who crush. Whenever required, we beat all our enemies. On the
battleﬁeld, we are the greatest. We are the Interahamwe movement that loves Peace, Unity
and Development. We are ready! Our motto[:] We don’t attack. We liberate” (Kabera 2004).
With the backing of the president, members of the Interahamwe and the extremist
party CDR organized militia groups and the government army forces developed training
camps to target unemployed Hutu youths (United Nations 1999, 5). As extremist conﬁdence
grew, so too did the public exhibitionism of guns and weaponry (Melvern 2006, 81). A key
extremist leader, Colonel Théoneste Bagasora, who was instrumental in drawing up and
implementing the genocide plan, demonstrated in his public rallies that the action of civil-
ians carrying and using weapons was “ordinary” and even natural. During one oration a
Rwandan journalist ﬁlmed him displaying his gun as he addressed a crowd of eager listen-
ers. “The gun,” he stated, “no longer belongs only to the soldier. When you see one, do not
be afraid. It can not go off by itself. The gun needs to stop only being for the military. Every-
body has a right to own one. So that when they come for you, you can shoot back. I always
have one with me. Here it is ... here it is” (Bagasora in Kabera 2004). In this major move to
transform Hutu consciousness, extremist propaganda inﬁltrated society at all levels, includ-
ing community and civil society meetings and the media.5 One of twenty extremist jour-
nals, Kangura was established in 1990 with the support of the threatened dictatorial regime
led by President Habyarimana. It took an interactive approach, encouraging Hutus to write
to the magazine with comments and suggestions, devising questionnaires for Hutus to com-
plete and return, and writing letters to the president. Rather like Britain’s Private Eye, Kan-
gura was a monthly running commentary on party politics, and cartoons were one satirical
device among many to poke fun at opposition politicians. Kangura was published in Kin-
yarwanda and French and disseminated throughout the Great Lakes region, most notably
in Burundi and Kenya. Kangura’s satirical genre was new to Rwandans and appealed to peo-
ple in rural communities and cities alike. In a country of high illiteracy, particularly among
women, cartoons became vital means of communicating political ideas.
Extremist Media: Simulating “Ethnic War”
Kangura was quick to play on stereotyped images in its attempt to redeﬁne Hutu conscious-
ness. In “The Fear of the Bahutu,” written by Ndekezi Bonaparte-Gisuma and published in
December 1990, Hutus are described as “naturally fearful, maladroit, indecisive, naïve, with
a characteristic inferiority complex” (Kangura 1990 no. 5, 1). In another early article target-
ing “All the Hutu of the World!” Kangura calls for Hutus to “rediscover their ethnicity” in
the face of a Tutsi determination to keep them down. The magazine then makes a distinc-
tion between the “artiﬁcial nation state” and “natural” ethnicity in an attempt to make the
broad-based transitional government (BBTG) unpopular (Kangura 1990 no. 4, 19). The
modern, postcolonial nation-state constructed under the Arusha Accords is ﬁrst interpreted
as a Tutsi plot to keep the Hutus in line (through an artiﬁcial democracy), then rendered
fragile in opposition to a natural precolonial Hutu ethnicity. Having fragmented the post-
colonial nation state, Kangura proceeds to construct in its articles a pure Hutu nation-state.
We have briefly considered the masculinized ways in which Kangura militarized the Hutu
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population. Before examining how Rwandan women were militarized, I turn to look at how
feminist international relations theorizing has interpreted war and genocide in Rwanda.
Part Three: Feminists Theorizing
International Relations and Rwanda
Despite Cynthia Enloe’s early call for a feminist investigation of Rwanda, many feminist
international relations theorists have failed to distinguish between civil war and genocide
in that country (Tickner 2001; Byrne 1995; El Jack 2003; Goldstein 2001; Enloe 2004). This
is largely because Rwanda appears as one example among many in the overarching story of
women and war in feminist international relations theory. In 1995 Enloe began to unpack
the militarizing processes that deﬁned Hutu masculinities before the conflict, stating that
“increasing numbers of Hutu women thereby became intensely woven into the state’s eth-
nicized system as mothers and wives of regular soldiers” (26). Within her framework of
understanding Rwanda as “ethnic conflict,” Enloe touches on RPF refugee mothers’ patri-
otic responsibilities for “keeping alive, among the next generation, thoughts of a far away
home” (26). Either way, in both camps, “recruiting young men often requires militia organ-
izers to persuade the mothers of potential recruits” (27). Later, in Maneuvers, Enloe spends
some time discussing rape and the militarization of Rwandan women during what she terms
the 1994 “civil war” (2000, 137). In an analysis that unintentionally describes the Hutu
extremist image of a “threat of invasion and ethnic war,” Enloe suggests that as a weapon
of war, rape occurs “in the name of national security,” when a “regime is preoccupied with
‘national security,’” when “a majority of civilians believe that security is best understood as
a military problem,” when “the police and military security apparatuses are male-domi-
nated,” when “the deﬁnitions of honour, loyalty, and treason are derived from the institu-
tional cultures of the police and the military,” when “those prevailing institutional cultures
are misogynous” and, ﬁnally, when “some local women are well enough organized in oppo-
sition to regime policies to become publicly visible” (124).
Enloe’s recognition that “systematic rape” is “administered rape” and that “militarized
rape” is a public act under the gaze of spectators is extremely important. Yet her discussion
of rape in Rwanda is inaccurate because it does not consider the difference of intent between
rape as a weapon of war and rape as a weapon to annihilate. There is a distinction between
the rape committed by the extremist-led genocidaires during the genocide and rape in the
civil war which was occurring in the north of Rwanda at the same time. Following the geno-
cide there were some revenge rapes but these were not proliﬁc and the RPF did not endorse
the policy—whereas the genocidaires did. In reading the Rwandan genocide through the lens
of “civil war,” Enloe cannot unpack the very militarizing processes she argues should be
unpacked. Enloe dismisses key tactics which the Hutu extremists employed to incite sys-
tematic rape—the image of a threat of ethnic war, the image of a threat to national secu-
rity, the image of the loyal, militarized Hutu civilian, the image of the “alien” Tutsi woman.
Rather she confuses these tactics with the factors that actually enabled Hutu extremists to
incite mass rape: a militarized culture, patriarchy, misogyny, and, ﬁnally, the political mobi-
lization of Rwandan women.
Where scholars have undertaken more detailed studies of the gendered impact of con-
flict in Rwanda, they have often continued this trend of ignoring Rwanda’s genocide, seem-
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ingly now entrenched in feminist theorizing of international relations. One example is the
volume edited by Meredith Turshen and Clodilde Twagiramariya, entitled What Women
Do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa (1998). While they are right to assert that there
exist in Africa new forms of war that differ from the conventional Clausewitzean model of
interstate war, Turshen and Twagiramariya appear to imply that these “new forms of war”
are simply variations of “civil wars and wars of liberation” (2). Consequently, their read-
ing of Rwanda in the years leading up to 1994 is, to an extent, lacking in nuance: conflict
in Rwanda occurred because of Rwanda’s “weak state” status (that is, its politically weak
and ineffectual governance arrangements). It is perhaps surprising that Turshen and Twa-
giriamariya, despite recognizing that states deliberately become more militarized to retain
power, do not allude to Rwanda’s genocide. In their chapter on rape in Rwanda they depict
a simple history of the country, focusing on the 1959 Revolution, but arguing that the upris-
ing occurred against colonials, not elite Tutsis and monarchists, before confusing the geno-
cide with civil war. They write: “All Rwandans without exception suffered and are still
suffering from the atrocities of the civil war that started in October 1990 when the Rwan-
dan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded from Uganda.... A group of extremists in the country
turned the power struggle between the government, its opposition, and the RPF, which was
on the verge of resolution following the signing of the Arusha Accords in 1993, into a vicious
and bloody ethnic war” (103). That all Rwandan women (particularly those from mixed mar-
riages) suffer from the different types of mass violence to have occurred in Rwanda since
1990 is at the core of their polemic. Arguing that “Hutus” are not the only perpetrators of
rape, Turshen and Twagiriamariya outline the mass rape committed by the RPF since June
1994, suggesting that some Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) soldiers raped Hutu women “in
a never-ending cycle of revenge” (103). In this “civil war” (but not planned extermination
of civilians, including those politically active or extremist-opposing Hutu) “levels of dis-
trust were very high,” they state, and so the “war brought out the worst in people and a
sense of neighbourliness was lost” (9).
Turshen and Twagiriamariya’s refusal to acknowledge genocide means that their work
presents only a partial reading of the conflict in Rwanda. First, by writing within the frame-
work of civil and ethnic war, Turshen and Twagiriamariya reinforce the Hutu extremist
propaganda of the “threat of ethnic war.” Second, there is no distinction between different
types of rape, including the extremist militarized policy of genocidal rape—a policy sup-
ported and at times perpetrated by women. So while they are right to criticize the simplis-
tic “rendering of ‘evil Hutu’ versus ‘good Tutsi,’” and to emphasize that all Rwandan women
have suffered and continue to suffer in one way or another, they suggest that rape is a crime
committed only by men and that, as a male preserve, women’s role in rape is only that of
the “victim.” For Turshen and Twagiriamariya this has implications for Hutu women fol-
lowing the genocide, who are today categorized as “guilty” and “made to pay for what Hutu
men have done” (4). It would be fair to say that the majority of Hutu women were not impli-
cated in rape and indeed there are many Hutu women who suffered gender-based violence
in spite of their citizenship rights as Hutu.6 However, in understanding sexual violence
against women in genocide, it is also essential to comprehend the role of women within the
communities that are committing sexual violence, including rape.
Let us consider women’s supporter and spectator roles during genocidal rape. In her
paper “The Political Economy of Rape” published in 2001, Turshen presents a more involved
gender-aware analysis to propose a new thesis: that “systematic rape and sexual abuse are
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among the strategies men use to wrest personal assets from women.” If women “owned
property” then militias would claim them as their wives “to legitimate the seizure of land”
(Turshen 2001, 63). Here Turshen describes mass violence in April–June 1994 as “geno-
cide”—although no space is afforded to describe what genocide (or gendercide) means.
Turshen makes no reference to the role of women in perpetrating and endorsing sexual vio-
lence in order to seize property and belongings, despite the countless reports of women rob-
bing dead women or condoning bogus marriage (see Human Rights Watch 1996; African
Rights 1995). We have seen how, within feminist theorizing of international relations, geno-
cide and genocidal rape in Rwanda are depicted in the context of civil war. I now look spe-
cifically at how Rwandan women were militarized within the pages of Kangura to
demonstrate the nuanced ways in which Rwandan women were militarized in genocide—
not just as victims but as perpetrators. I argue that greater attention should be paid to the
way in which Rwandan women were politically mobilized.
Part Four: Citizen versus Partial- and
Non-citizen Rwandan Women in Kangura
In this ﬁnal part of the paper I examine how Kangura imaged Rwandan women not just
according to their ethnicity but by their citizenship status. I deﬁne three groups: non-citi-
zen Rwandan women, full-citizen Rwandan women, and partial-citizen Rwandan women,
each of which was militarized in speciﬁc ways.
Non-Citizen Rwandan Women
Imaged as stereotyped Tutsi women, “non-citizen” Rwandan women were enemies of the
state and secret accomplices in ethnic war. In December 1990 Kangura published the Hutu
Ten Commandments, four of which concerned Rwandan women. One stated that all Tutsi
women worked “only for the interest of [their] Tutsi ethnic group” and all Hutus were
ordered to be distrustful not only of Tutsi women but also of Hutu men who had relations
with them. Another called for the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) to be “exclusively
Hutu” following the RPF invasion of 1990 (Kangura in Human Rights Watch 1996, 11). Two
commandments speciﬁcally referred to Hutu women. I suggest that these commandments
lead to a direct comparison between Hutu and Tutsi women, ﬁrst by claiming that Hutu
women were more loyal and better wives and mothers; then, through manipulating the
colonial obsession with stereotyped physical appearances, by crushing the ego of the sup-
posedly less attractive—that is, less sexually desirable—Hutu woman. Instead Hutu women
are called upon to be “vigilant and try to bring [their] husbands, brothers and sons back to
reason” in the face of deceitful, seductive Tutsi women (Kangura in Human Rights Watch
1996, 11).
In Kangura these Tutsi women spies and accomplices are presented as sexualized mil-
itary operators. In issue 35 of the magazine, which appeared in May 1992, an article enti-
tled “The Dresses of Beauties Smell for the Hutus” is accompanied by a cartoon wherein a
beautiful woman, who appears to ﬁt the colonial stereotype of the tall, slender Tutsi woman,
wears a strapless, floral-print mini-dress, large hoop earrings, and bangles. She is in an
erotic pose, her left hand lifting up the corner of her dress to reveal more thigh to the stereo-
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typically shorter, thicker-set Hutu man standing beside her. Loyal to the Hutu Ten Com-
mandments and thus loyal to the pure Hutu state, he covers his nose with one hand, keep-
ing the other in his pocket. Kangura’s intimation that this Tutsi woman smells posits her
as hypersexual prostitute. Yet thinking out loud, she appears more concerned that her true
identity has been uncovered: “They have known our plot. I think the war can stop now for
our mission has failed” (Kangura 1992 no. 35, 9). This image operates on many levels. First,
it conﬁrms the extremist Hutu theory that Tutsi women “work only in the interest of their
ethnic group.” Second, it conﬁrms that Rwanda is threatened by a Tutsi-led ethnic war.
Third, it provides a reason for Hutu women to condemn sexually attractive Tutsi women,
who may themselves be angered at the artist’s depiction of the colonial stereotype.
At a more intrinsic level the cartoon aims to show how Tutsi women, in using their
beauty and taking advantage of Hutu men’s supposed weakness, inﬁltrate the Rwandan
state. Having represented the Tutsi woman’s sexualized body as a weapon of war, Kangura
proceeds to depict the enemy’s plot as a preordained failure, thus raising the morale of mil-
itarized Hutu men and women. In February 1994, just before the genocide began, the stereo-
typed Tutsi woman is again portrayed as a hypersexual prostitute in cahoots with both the
RPF and United Nations (though this time in a way that makes fun of the UN’s own mili-
tarization of women). UN force commander Gen. Roméo Dallaire sits with his arms around
two RPF women. Both have their hands on his knee and one is kissing his forehead. Both
women are wearing miniskirts, jewelry, and lacy bras. The woman to Dallaire’s right has “I
[heart] RPF” tattooed on her arm. A UN peacekeeper stands guard to the left, his gun poised.
The caption reads: “Tutsi women: responsible for rallying Whites to the RPF” (Kangura 1994,
15). Representation of the stereotyped Tutsi woman prostitute and a public ridiculing of
the UN peace force occurs again in the Hutu extremist journal Power in December 1993.
This time a graphic sex scene depicts an orgy between two Tutsi women and three UN
peacekeepers. Demilitarizing the UN, positing the international institution solely within a
simulated private sphere, the caption simply states: “The Force of Sex and the Belgian Paras”
(Power in Chrétien 1995). Here it should be pointed out that the actions of the Belgian para-
troopers did not help to dispel rumors about their liaisons with Rwandan women. In Jan-
uary 1994 they had been spotted “running after women and causing ﬁghts in local bars and
discos” (Dallaire 2003, 163).
Full-Citizen Rwandan Women
The silent majority in most analyses of extremist propaganda, militarized Hutu women
loyal to Hutu power, were imaged as full citizens. In the four years leading up to the geno-
cide Kangura was quick to present Hutu women who conformed to the genocide ideology
and ideal of the pure Hutu state as equal, democratic citizens. In an early article published
in 1992, there is a portrait photograph of a stereotypically beautiful Hutu woman (she per-
soniﬁes the physical image of a “good,” upper-class Hutu woman). Underneath the image
reads a statement by Mukarkibibi Zayinabo, allegedly made in June 1989: “In these times
we are in, a Rwandan woman should never be denied her rights. Men must know that there
is nothing he has that is better than a woman. All of us, we have equal rights in front of the
law and democracy belongs to us all” (Kangura 1992, back cover).
It should be noted that Kangura’s representation of both Hutu and Tutsi women
depended on their increased visibility within Rwanda’s political sphere. Women represented
The Postcolonial Politics of Militarizing Rwandan Women 55
a large percentage of the population that had recently been politically mobilized with the
opening up to democracy and the growth of the civil society. From the late 1980s to 1994,
thirteen women’s groups and NGOs were operating under the umbrella organization PRO-
FEMMES. Members would travel the country educating women and lobbying the govern-
ment on women’s rights, including land and inheritance rights (which women did not have
at this time). But the extremist network operated to quash these movements. In 1993 the
MRNDD created its own women’s group with the intent to dispel opposition women’s lob-
byist groups (Nyiramatama 2006). So while women were actively pushing to be visible in
their own terms within the public sphere, Kangura rendered their bodies visible only in spe-
ciﬁc gendered terms that sustained the patriarchal dictatorship. Hutu women, then, were
militarized, not just as mothers, wives and daughters, but as political subjects. In Kangura
these women often appear next to men in images of political rallying (Kangura 1993 no. 44,
73) or in local, community-based public protest (Kangura 1992, 35 and 1993 no. 44, 17).
They are imaged as ordinary, non-militarized citizens confounded by the antics of the oppo-
sition parties and advocators of the Arusha Accords peace process (Kangura, 1993 no. 49,
15).
Full-citizen Rwandan women were also depicted as victims of war. In a cartoon pub-
lished in October 1991, the founder of Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM)
and key architect of the genocide Ferdinand Nahimana stands tall, holding the radio sta-
tion above his head. Behind him, crowds of men, women, and children are grouped together
but appear half the size of Nahimana himself—indicating the strength and importance of
Nahimana, as well as RTLM. The caption states that Nahimana founded a radio station in
a community where people had been killed (Kangura 1991 no. 23, 14). Since genocide mobi-
lizes an entire population to annihilate an ethnic group or groups, the war which the extrem-
ists tried to depict was not Clausewitzean by convention: there was no front line, no home
front, and no interstate battle. Rather the extremists depicted the threat of war with the RPF
as the type of conflict which has since been termed new war—based on the RPF movement
to “mobilize around ethnic [or] racial identity for the purpose of claiming the state” and a
deliberate blurring of the public and private spheres (Kaldor 2001, 76). Perhaps one of the
most graphic and shockingly violent images to be published appeared in a parallel journal
Kamarampaka on 7 April 1993. Its intent to blur the boundaries between the “home front”
and the “front line” is clear. In the cartoon, the RPF (identiﬁed by their arm bands) have
pillaged a Rwandan village (a hut is on ﬁre in the distance). A member of the MRNDD is
stripped to his underwear and tied to a tree. Beside him lies the dismembered trunk of a
Hutu man. Two naked women are on the ground to the left of the tree. The woman who
belongs to the Hutu Mouveément Démocratique Républicain is tied up, her hands behind
her back, a stake wedged through her chest. The second woman is a member of the extrem-
ist Hutu party, the CDR. Her hands are being held up by an RPF soldier while his comrade
rapes her. Underneath, the caption reads: “Blood and sex: the horrors of war attributed to
the RPF” (Kamarampaka in Chrètian 1995, 364).
This simulation of rape, which demonized all Tutsi men, including civilian Tutsi men,
is also evident in the extremist-led government army’s military strategies as a means to
instill fear of rape among the Hutu community. In November 1993, the United Nations heard
that thirty-ﬁve people had been massacred in the Rhugenheri region, in ﬁve locations con-
currently. The UN ofﬁcer, Maj. Brent Beardsley, who was dispatched to survey one of the
massacre sites, noted that children had been murdered and that all the girls had been raped.
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Despite inconclusive evidence, the United Nations believed that the massacre had been
staged by the Rwandan government forces. As Beardsley recalls in the 2001 Canadian doc-
umentary Rwanda: The Genocide Fax:
Very conveniently there was an RPF glove left [lying] on the ground. The RPF—I never
saw them wear any gloves and if they did wear gloves, why would they leave it [lying]
on the ground? In addition, the government commanders who [were] waiting for us at
the bottom of the hill [each wore] a red sash cord, a red rope; [all had these] around
their waists, tied, and they [each carried] a very large knife with a big hilt on it. And it
appeared to me more when I looked at these children’s necks [that these cords] had
been used to strangle them and [that] commandos went through extensive training on
how to kill people silently with them [Clarke 2001].
Women Genocidaires
While Kangura militarized women conversely as civilians and victims of war, in reality many
of these politically engaged “free and democratic” women were militarized spectators and
supporters of genocide and genocidal rape. In a special report on Rwanda’s women killers,
the BBC’s Newsnight interviewed a man who witnessed two women in Kigali—Odette and
Mama Aline—using a stick to rape a woman on the side of the road, in broad daylight
(Hilsum 1995). And there are plenty of other examples of politically corrupt women who
took advantage of the personal gains afforded to them as perpetrators of genocide. The only
woman to be tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Pauline Nyi-
ramasuhuko, the minister of women and family affairs at the time of the genocide, is one
of the most famous examples. Witnesses claim that despite her remit to consider the wel-
fare of all Rwandan women, Nyiramasuhuko played an important role in preparing for
genocide in the Butare region of southern Rwanda. Zaina Nyiramatama, founder of the
Association for the Defense of Women and Children’s Rights (HAGURUKA), was in Rwanda
until January 1994. Nyiramatama suggests that Pauline Nyiramasuhuko did not have “gen-
der politics,” rather a “very patriarchal way of thinking ... she was not ﬁghting to get any-
thing out of the government because she was part of the system” (Nyiramatama 2006).
Nyiramasuhuko stands accused of planning systematic rape and imprisoning women
and girls. One witness recounted to African Rights that “the daughters of Buhira, a Tutsi
businessman from Butare, were kept at her house for [her son] Chalômoe to rape (African
Rights 1995, 92). In the same Newsnight special on women killers, British journalist Lind-
sey Hilsum spoke with Pauline Nyiramasuhuko after she had fled to the refugee camp in
Zaire. Despite her high proﬁle role during the genocide, Nyiramasuhuko continued to play
on the stereotype of the respectable, caring woman. Here, we also see evidence of Nyirama-
suhuko manipulating “international community” perceptions of women in conflict. It is
worth citing the interview at some length:
Hilsum: She was working in the social services section, drawing up plans to look after
orphans and abandoned children. She said in April and May last year [1994], she’d
organized what she called paciﬁcation meetings. Her accusers, she says, are targeting all
educated Hutus. The former minister only agreed to be interviewed with her back to the
camera, as she put it, “for security reasons.” I asked her to respond to the allegations
that she had killed.
Nyiramasuhuko (translated from Kinyarwanda): I’m ready to talk to the person who
said I could have killed. It’s not possible. I couldn’t even kill a chicken.... I don’t know.
If there is a person who says a woman, a mother could have killed, I’ll tell you truly
then I am ready to confront that person [Hilsum 1995].
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Partial-Citizen Rwandan Women
By “partial-citizen” Rwandan women, I am referring to the Hutu women who were citizens
by ethnic rights but could not be fully accepted into the pure Hutu state as a result of their
own political actions. These women attempted to exercise their true democratic rights by
campaigning for equality for women.7 Many of them opposed Hutu extremism and ﬁrmly
believed the Arusha Accords would lead to an end to ethnic divisionism. It goes without
saying that these politically moderate Hutu (and Tutsi) women posed a major threat to the
dictatorship and no one embodied this threat more than the then–prime minister of the
interim government, Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana. Since Kangura was primarily a tool
to ridicule opposition parties as much as it was a tool to distill genocide propaganda, the
magazine’s foremost attack on Uwilingiyimana centered on the fact that she was a woman.
After she was appointed minister for education by Habyarimana in 1992, Uwilingiyi-
mana fought to end the quota system in schools which had sustained a Hutu majority. She
was an active member of the women’s civil society movement across Africa and was a founder
of Rwanda’s Seruka (“Show Me”) which aimed to include women in the country’s devel-
opment and played an enormous role in the Forum for African Women Educationalists
(FAWE). Described in Kinywanda as an ingare (rebel), Uwilingiyimana used her political
influence and determination to “combat ethnic and sexual discrimination” (FAWE 2000,
4). She believed that “true democracy” would include the liberation of women and girls from
poverty and forced labor. A Hutu of the South, Uwilingiyimana would frequently speak out
against the president’s policies and often came under ﬁre from Hutu extremist politicians
and the Interahamwe. Melvern observes that on 8 May 1993 Uwilingiyimana was ﬁercely
attacked in her home by militia, a violent act that resulted in a very public protest by her
supporters, including a march led by some 3,000 women (Melvern 2006, 46). On 12 March
1994, Uwilingiyimana was appointed to the post of interim prime minister by President
Habyarimana, although she only held this ofﬁce for thirty-seven days. As Melvern states, it
is believed that Habyarimana “thought she could be easily manipulated,” although he dis-
covered very quickly that this was not the case. The second woman to become a prime min-
ister in Africa, Uwilingiyimana remained deﬁant and on a number of occasions highlighted
the dangers of supplying weapons to the population (Melvern 2000, 104). Uwilingiyimana
is said to have spoken out against ethnic business and identity cards at one protest march
led by women’s organizations in 1993. In an interview with the author of this article, Zaina
Nyiramatama recalled Uwilingiyimana saying: “We shouldn’t value ourselves according to
our ethnic group, but rather what we are able to do to build our country” (Nyiramatama
2006).
In analyzing the images of Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana in Kangura, one can trace
her transgression from full citizen to partial citizen and then to noncitizen, and it is signiﬁ-
cant that the number of published cartoons depicting Uwilingiyimana picked up pace in
the ﬁnal months before the genocide. Kangura took a male chauvinist and sexist approach
to Uwilingiyimana to “reveal” that she used her body to further her political career and to
expose her inappropriate gendered politics. She ﬁrst appeared on the front page in May 1992,
naked and perched on a pile of books, a sign that Kangura had little respect for Uwilingiy-
imana in her role as minister of education. Later Kangura focused on her sexuality and
made claims that she was having an affair with Faustin Twagiramungu, a fellow moderate
Hutu politician, president of the MDR (Mouvement démocratique républicain) and a mem-
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ber of the interim government. Frequently depicted in bed with Twagiramungu, her polit-
ical discussion is reduced to domestic post-intercourse chat, suggesting that the interim
government ruled Rwanda from a very private sphere in contrast to Habyarimana’s public,
and thus democratic, sphere.
In January 1994, Kangura likened Uwilingiyimana to the stereotyped Tutsi prostitutes—
the noncitizens. She appeared on the front page of issue 55 naked in bed, wearing earrings
and sporting a short haircut reminiscent of the prostitutes in the previous month’s por-
trayal of UN peacekeepers’ liaisons with women by Power. Sitting on the edge of the bed
looking sexually aroused, Twagiramungu asks Uwilingiyimana, “Baby, why are you crying?”
(Kangura 1994 no. 55, 4). In a ploy to destabilize the peace process, Kangura depicts Uwi-
lingiyimana as a self-interested woman who cares little for democracy and the needs of the
Rwandan people. Uwilingiyimana responds by reminding Twagiramungu that he must make
her “the Prime Minister in the Transition Government.” In a second bedroom scene, pub-
lished in March 1994, Uwilingiyimana and Twagiramungu discuss the need to send her hus-
band abroad on an assignment so that they can spend more time with each other (Kangura
1994 no. 57, 5). In another move to further derail Uwilingiyimana’s political credibility, Kan-
gura depicts her as pregnant, a claim that the journal portends to be against the will of God.
In March 1994 a religious ﬁgure separates a crying, naked, and heavily pregnant Uwilingiy-
imana from a naked Twagiramungu, while shouting “I curse you, sinners!”(Kangura 1994
no.58, 12).
In May 1993 military strategy and media voyeurism converged when Kangura, in
response to the public outcry, published a cartoon depicting the moment when Uwiligi-
mana was attacked in her home. Uwilingiyimana is pictured lying half-naked on the floor,
staring out toward the reader in yet another provocative pose. Five men (journalists) appear
to have just burst in through the doors. Uwilingiyimana says, “Forgive me, I will give you
everything that you need.” The cartoon is accompanied by an article in which Kangura
addresses Uwilingiyimana directly with a series of questions aimed at discrediting her claim
to have been attacked. In depicting her as a “mother” and exposing her supposed “lying
about her leg,” 8 Kangura bolsters its own media credibility by imaging itself as loyal to the
government: “Because of the respect media journalists have to give politicians, they packed
their machines and announced to the country that the Prime Minister was beaten badly by
thieves.” Once more the focus is on Uwilingiyimana’s gender. When criticizing Uwilingiy-
imana for standing up to President Habyarimana’s extremist policies, Kangura argues that
she is “known for abusing and disrespecting the President,” claiming that her “stubborn-
ness” is (as expressed in Kinyarwanda) the trait of a woman who is “either crazy or brings
a curse.” In this article, she is “shaming” her parents and makes a mockery of her husband,
whom Kangura portrays as weak in the face of her strength:
“Where was your husband when you were having this misfortune? Doesn’t a man have
a word in his own home, if it’s really his?” (Kangura 1993 no. 15, 4). Criticizing Uwilingiy-
imana’s silence on the questions they pose, Kangura demands “explanations” or they will
have to rebuild the reputation of the (extremist) “national forces” that they accuse Uwilingiy-
imana of destroying when she “said they refused to come and rescue [her]” (Kangura, 1993
no. 15, 4).
Continually imaged in the very private sphere of the home or bedroom, stripped naked,
exposed, and likened to the hypersexual Tutsi women and “prostitutes,” Uwilingiyimana is
militarized by Kangura as the accomplice to the enemy within. Yet women enemies and their
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accomplices are presented by the magazine as highly feminized, domestic and lacking in
military clout. Just as the body of the Tutsi woman is imaged as a weapon of war, so too is
Uwilingiyimana’s, only this time for selﬁsh political gain that contravenes Hutu extremist
deﬁnitions of democracy and gender equality. In the penultimate issue of Kangura, the
extent to which Uwilingiyimana is perceived as a “non-citizen” is clear when she is imaged
as a rat that is eating money—a Hutu man is depicted as being on the verge of killing her
and Twagiramungu (also imaged as a rat) with a club (Kangura 1994 no. 56, 6). In the same
edition, Uwilingiyimana and Twagiramungu are portrayed as dancing chickens (Kangura
1994 no. 56, 3). These depictions are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda about Jews and other
ethnic minorities.
Agathe Uwilingiyimana was one of the ﬁrst politicians to be assassinated on 7 April
1994. She was shot by presidential guards in the early hours of the morning (Melvern 2006,
162–63). At the time, the prime minister’s murder was underreported in the British press,
appearing instead as an appendage to the deaths that day of the ten Belgian peacekeepers
who had been assigned to protect her. In spite of Kangura’s attempts to slander her,
Uwilingiyimana’s strength, courage, and deﬁance in the face of extremist politicians remains
something quite remarkable. In what is possibly the last interview she gave to an interna-
tional journalist—with Francois Ryckmans in Kigali on 15 March 1994—Uwilingiyimana,
in exercising her true democratic rights, observed the “confusion” the extremists were delib-
erately creating in playing “the ethnic card.” She argued that there was “bad will and irre-
sponsibility on the behalf of some people,” that Habyarimana was “trying to control the
political parties,” and that ultimately ordinary Rwandans were suffering: “Almost every day,
people are dying, assassinated. The poor peasants, as usual, are not responsible for the polit-
ical situation. There’s starvation all over the country. People die of hunger everyday, dysen-
tery and malaria. We haven’t got the institutions capable of negotiating with our funders”
(Uwilingiyimana 1994).
Conclusion
In this article I have argued that feminist international relations theory often presents con-
fused readings of Tutsi women as victims of a blurred civil war and genocide that renders
other Rwandan women invisible. I have attempted to reveal the ways in which extremist
magazine Kangura militarized Rwandan women as political subjects and in doing so have
distinguished the ways in which women were militarized differently as noncitizens, full cit-
izens, and partial citizens. This distinction exposes the disparity between the images of full
citizens (who did not speak out or otherwise oppose the Hutu nation state) and partial cit-
izens—Hutu and Tutsi women who, in ﬁghting for women’s equality, were ﬁghting for true
democracy. In exposing this political militarization I hope to further our understanding of
the militarized roles of women in genocide as well as genocidal rape.
In this article I have also considered the information war that continues to circulate
internationally in any recounting of conflict in Rwanda and, in light of this ideological
struggle, have suggested that feminists theorizing international relations should be more
cautious of the impact of negating the Rwandan genocide—and the complex, gendered
power relations that led to genocide—as they embed “Rwanda” in the overarching interna-
tional story of “women and war.” In producing partial readings of conflict in Rwanda, many
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feminist international relations readings obscure some of the complexities that women cur-
rently face in post-genocide Rwanda since blanket coverage of “Rwandan women as vic-
tims” masks the challenged relationships between women—as well as between men and
women—within Rwandan communities today. Indeed, more work needs to be done to
examine the militarization of refugees, returnees, and survivors, as well as post-genocide
Rwandan society more generally, where security remains tight and where the community-
based legal process, Gacaca, may perpetuate masculinized and militarized readings of con-
flict in Rwanda. I do not in any way wish to render all Hutu people as extremist: there are
many cases in which Hutu men and women protected fellow Tutsi and Hutu men and
women. Above all this article does not reflect the enormous amount of work that women
in Rwanda have done—and are continuing to do—in rebuilding their lives, and their coun-
try.
Notes
1. United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1948) cited in Shaw 2003, 34.
2. See Martin Shaw (2003) on war and genocide operating on a continuum, and Paul Bartrop
(2002) for the argument that genocide does not always occur in the context of war.
3. Newbury (1988) states that there were high levels of migration into Rwanda as people sought
to escape famine, disease, and war in other Sub-Saharan regions.
4. For a comprehensive discussion on the politicization of “civilian” and “alien” identities in
Rwanda, see Mamdani 2001.
5. For a detailed account of extremist attempts to change Hutu consciousness, see Mamdani
2001.
6. Umutesi (2000) reveals the sexual insecurities that Hutu women fleeing Rwanda endured,
particularly if they were mistaken as Tutsi.
7. Cynthia Enloe (2004) observes that a “successful democracy incorporates sexual equality”
(138).
8. A photograph taken of Uwilingimana at the time shows that one of her legs had been wounded
in the attack (Chrétien, 1995).
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Nationalism, Gender and (In)Securities
in Postcolonial Indian Politics
A Feminist Critical-Constructivist Analysis
RUNA DAS*
Abstract: This article uses some of the shared premises of feminist readings of gender and
nationalism and critical-constructivist analysis of identity and (in)security to render problem-
atic the constructions of gender, nationalism, and nuclear (in)securities in Indian politics. It
explores how India’s postcolonial nationalist identity has incorporated gender with continuities
and discontinuities to construct divergent forms of statist identities, cartographic anxieties, and
nuclear (in)securities. The article demonstrates that the contours of nation-building in post-
colonial India have represented a shift from a political to a cultural reconstruction of nation-
alist identities, thereby also shifting (and producing more complex) representations of gender
identities and (in)securities to justify the nation’s security policies.
Keywords: feminism; gender; nationalism; India; constructivism;
identity; security; international relations; postcolonial politics
“Nationalist ideologies rely on constructions of masculinity and femininity to
naturalize power struggles over who gets to deﬁne what the nation stands for.
Nations are thus not just systems of cultural [or political] representation[s], but
also constitutive of people’s identities through social contests that are frequently
violent and always gendered.”—Anne McClintock, “No Longer in a Future
Heaven”
Introduction
Religion, nationalism, and politics are intimately intertwined and historical processes of state
formation, whether secular or communal, have used women as signiﬁers to delineate their
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nationalist identities. While feminist analysis has made signiﬁcant contributions in this area
of study, such analysis appears limited, particularly when connecting gender issues with
South Asia’s recent resurgence of cultural nationalism and nuclear (in)securities in a crit-
ical-constructivist analysis of (in)security. In this context, as Ranchod-Nilsson and Tetreault
(2000, 7) claim, “the chameleon quality of nationalism means that it can be couched in mul-
tiple and ... competing organizational forms,” requiring theoretically and conceptually newer
forms of analysis to review the relation between gender, nationalism, and politics. I ﬁnd
this observation quite compelling when applied in the context of India’s nationalist and com-
munalist identity since it enables me as a feminist scholar of international relations (IR)
engaged in security studies to problematize certain contested rearticulations of Indian
nationalism, gender identity, and nuclear (in)securities.
In initiating this line of analysis, it is important to note that not all feminist scholars
of international relations engage in security studies. Likewise, not all constructivist schol-
ars in IR are feminists.1 In fact, as Locher and Prugl (2001) have pointed out, there remains
a reluctance on the part of both feminists and constructivists, despite their similar inter-
subjective ontological bases, to engage with one another to provide a more gendered and
constructivist reading of everyday reality.2 While it is not my purpose in this paper to offer
a theoretical reformulation of feminism, I consider it of signiﬁcant merit as a feminist scholar
of IR to provide a feminist rereading of nation, gender, and (in)securities by situating this
in terms of the critical constructivists’ premise of the cultural construction of identities and
(in)securities (Weldes et al. 1999).
In the pages that follow, I highlight the woman question in Indian politics by explor-
ing how the processes of India’s nation-making, whether secular or communal, have relied
on gendered discourses and symbolism to remap the nation, its nationalism, and (in)secu-
rities.3 In doing so, I use some of the shared premises of the feminist readings of national-
ism and gender(ed) identities and the critical constructivists’ analysis of (in)security to
explore how India’s postcolonial nationalist identity (that has been contested between polit-
ical-territorial and a cultural nationalism) has incorporated gender with continuities and
discontinuities to construct divergent forms of statist identities, cartographic anxieties, and
nuclear (in)securities. In initiating this line of analysis, I begin with the assumption that the
central attribute of nation formation in international politics requires the mapping of a
sovereign territorial space, or a geopolitical vision, which accompanies certain cartographic
anxieties reflective of a nation’s boundary-making exercises (Krishna 1996). Accordingly,
postcolonial nations, including India, have tried to conﬁgure their geopolitical visions by
consolidating their territories, investing them with national sovereignty, and securing them
from others, often by taking recourse to complex gender representations. Thus representa-
tions of gender in the task of nation making are nothing new and have even been evidenced
and documented by scholars in Indian politics. Starting from this premise, I explore the
ways in which the nature of representing the Indian nation, its women, and (in)securities
has changed from a geopolitical to a cultural and communal perspective with the rise of the
recent Hindu-Right BJP government in India,4 which is guided by the Hindutva ideology.
This represents a shift from a political to a cultural reconstruction of identities and (in)secu-
rities necessitating a constructivist reading of the nation, gender, and (in)securities. Although
it is rooted in local and cultural contexts, my work also incorporates an interdisciplinary
engagement which connects feminist literature on gender and nationalism to constructivist
discourses and practices of international relations and security studies.
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In this study, I use a critical discourse analysis to explore the constructivist links between
Indian nationalism, gender, and (in)securities. The term “critical discourse analysis” refers
to the study of the organization of language and its implications (beyond words written or
spoken) as may be evidenced through written texts or conversational exchanges (Stubbs
1983). As an interpretive or intersubjective framework of inquiry, critical discourse analy-
sis asks questions about the ways in which speciﬁc discourse structures (such as power and
ideological hegemony) may produce and legitimize social, political, and cultural dominance,
and how such discourse (whether a part of a conversation, news report, public demonstra-
tion, or other forms of communication) will help in the production of common-sense
knowledge (Van Dijk 1999).
The data for this paper comes from primary sources such as Indian parliamentary
debates, election manifestos, journals, newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets produced by
the Congress Party and the BJP, as well as speeches by Congress and BJP politicians. These
sources were supplemented by semi-structured, open-ended interviews with male and female
politicians and activists of the Congress and BJP which I conducted in New Delhi between
1998 and 2004, together with interviews conducted in 2007–2008 pertaining to the post–BJP
years. Using a critical discursive approach to the contents and implications of these texts
and interviews, I analyze the intersubjective links between these leaders’ ideologies, their
articulation of India’s nationalist and gender identities, and (in)securities.
The article begins with a review of traditional and feminist scholarship on national-
ism and gender identities. Following this review I suggest that such feminist interpretations
of nationalism and gender might offer a more compelling and pragmatic reading of the
gender and nationalism scholarship if supplemented with a critical-constructivist frame-
work of (in)security. With this in mind, the second part of the article introduces the concep-
tual frameworks of representation of dangers; cartographic anxieties; and the constructivists’
premise of cultural construction of (in)securities. I draw together some of the shared prem-
ises of the feminists and the critical constructivists to situate my theoretical argument for
this paper, that is, a feminist critical-constructivist framework, which I use to explain the
discursive and constructivist shifts between nationalism, gender identities, and nuclear
(in)securities in Indian politics. The third part of the article undertakes a study of postcolo-
nial India’s nationalist and gender identity under the leadership of the Congress Party, and
explores how the symbolic constructions of gender to ﬁx the newly born nation’s territo-
rial boundaries and (in)securities have served a political and nationalist project of the Indian
state under the Congress Party. The fourth and ﬁnal part of the article addresses the resur-
gence of a cultural nationalism in India under the BJP and explores the ways in which
rearticulations of gender, nationalist identity, and (in)securities along cultural lines have
justiﬁed new trajectories of interstate nuclear policies. I conclude by highlighting how some
shared premises of feminism and critical constructivism may offer conceptual and theoret-
ical spaces whereby feminist scholars of IR, constructivists, and others can converse around
shared concerns about the cultural construction of gender identities and (in)securities.
Nationalism and Gender(ed) Identities
in International Feminist Politics
According to the traditional theories, nationalism is a state-led or a state-seeking form of
political identiﬁcation (Deutsch 1966). Reflective of a secular, modern, and European ide-
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ology (Kedourie 1960) or primordial attachments of ethnicity or religion (Geertz 1973),
nationalism signiﬁes a process of assimilation of all within a state’s preferred cultural or
political form for the purposes of nation formation. The desire for nation formation is
rooted in the “nationalist ... myths of affection shared between the citizens and the govern-
ment,” which enables nationalism to “serve as a vital political discourse ... to mobilize dif-
ferent strata, uniting divergent social interests, and legitimize their political aspirations”
(Breuilly 1982, 85; Horowitz 1985; Smith 2000, 1991). Such traditional interpretations of
nationalism represent state-centric discourses where the state (or the nation) remains “time-
less and immutable, hence fundamentally ahistorical and natural” (Einhorn 2006, 197).
Critics of nationalism have rejected the conceptual merger of nation and nationalism,
arguing that nationalism as a cultural phenomenon ensures the homogeneity of the cultur-
ally dominant, and hence is a fragmented concept, existing only in the imagination and rep-
resenting an invented tradition (Chatterjee 1993; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm and Ranger
1983). For Hobsbawm and Ranger, nationalism as an invented tradition is a process of rep-
resentation, where the communitarians will create and symbolize the social cohesion of the
majoritarian community as constituting the nation. Such invented traditions, a particularly
modern phenomenon and evidenced in the newly modernizing societies, represent social
engineering of national histories and practices to establish continuity between the past and
present. Three modes of inclusion and control perform this task of social engineering: ﬁrst,
the use of institutions such as sports, festivals, and processions; second, the creation of new
modes of socialization such as hierarchical education systems; and, ﬁnally, the drawing from
past traditions, myths, history, and symbols to forge a nation (such as the BJP’s construct
of Hindu nation/rashtra). In this context, as Smith claims: “Traditions, history, and sym-
bols must all grow out of the existing memories and beliefs of the people who are to com-
pose nations. Their popular resonance will be greater, the more continuous with the past
as they are shown to be.... The task, therefore, for those set out to forge nations is more of
reconstructing the customs, traditions, and institutions of the [majoritarian] community,
which form the basis of the nation.... This means that manipulation and reconstruction
exist and re-enforce the process of nation formation” (1991, 358).
“As insightful and helpful” as Anderson (1991) and others were “in charting new ways
to think about the creation of nationalist ideas,” Enloe writes, “they left nationalists ...
ungendered” (Enloe 1993, 231). This gender deﬁciency has been addressed by liberal and
postcolonial/critical race feminists, who have engaged in the debates of nationalism and gen-
der identities from such overlapping (yet divergent, interdisciplinary) angles as that of IR
feminists, security studies feminists, and/or feminists problematizing the symbolic imbri-
cations of nation, gender, and sexuality in global politics.5
Led by Enloe (1993), the liberal feminists6 have challenged the gendered nature of
nations and nationalisms along three lines. First, they have shown how nationalist ideolo-
gies based on public-private dichotomies have depicted women’s images and identities as
objects, symbols, and victims in bounding the nation. They have, secondly, located gender
and nationalisms within the principal focus of international-relations studies. Third, they
have addressed women’s involvement in the context of anticolonial and nationalist strug-
gles. Representing the ﬁrst line of liberal feminist analysis, Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989)
and others, such as Pettman (2002, 2007),7 have elaborated how women have symbolically
ﬁgured in the national project. Women have been presented as biological reproducers of
the ethnic collectivity, as reproducers of the boundaries between ethnic and national groups,
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and as agents in the ideological reproduction of the groups’ ethical and cultural identity
and as symbolic signiﬁers of group differences. Highlighting this gendered process of nation
building, more recent scholarship shows how male-centric nationalisms “construct and
functionalize women through discourses of appropriate femininity [and masculinity]” to
forge nations and nationalisms (Peterson and Runyan 1998, 8). This body of work demon-
strates the ways in which nationalist discourses use “images and practices of sexuality [as]
the malleable means of reproducing homogenous and bounded [nations]” (Dwyer 2000,
27) and how nationalist ideologies deploy women’s sexuality in us-versus-them frames—
to project “dangerous sexuality ... emanating from either ‘enemies’ within, or ‘Other’ nations’
men” (Einhorn 2006, 202; Mayer 2000). In the context of India, such scholarship has inter-
rogated the ways in which India’s nationalist projects have constructed women primarily
in their difference from men. These projects have differentiated between women and ide-
alized women to serve as signiﬁers to support the male-centric nationalist projects (Sarkar
and Butalia 1995; Menon and Bhasin 1996).8
The second line of feminist analysis locates gender and nationalisms within the prin-
cipal focus of international relations and examines how militarized cultures of states imply
sexual violence at local, national, regional, and international levels. Enloe (1990, 2000)
focuses on the militarized masculinity of states, which, embedded in states’ military poli-
cies, legitimize sexual violence in the name of conflict resolution. Chenoy (2002) analyzes
militarized and masculinized cultures of South Asian states and their implications for
regional gender security. Cohn (1989, 127) extends this analysis to the case of the nuclear
arms race and explores the usage by defense intellectuals of gender-loaded terms such as
“impregnability, penetration, violation” to justify the military projects of states.
The third group of liberal feminists addresses women’s involvement in the context of
anticolonial, nationalist struggles. While this group generally views anticolonial, national-
ist struggles as the manifestations of an oppressive, male-dominated agenda which push
women to the margins during later periods of state consolidation, some see such struggles
opening some space for women’s liberation (Jayawardena and DeAlwis 1996; Yuval-Davis
1997). In the context of India’s anticolonial struggles, feminists have explored the ways in
which conflicting forms of nationalisms (an apparently secular Indian and a Hindu nation-
alism)9 have relied on considerable manipulation of gender identity to suit their national-
ist imaginations (Sangari and Vaid 1989; Sarkar and Butalia 1995; Marik 2001–2002). Such
analysis has been evidenced along two lines. The ﬁrst reveals how early Hindu nationalists,
such as Saraswati, Savarkar, and Golwalker, used images of Hindu women to sustain “a pol-
itics of [Hindu] community-formation based on the creation of a Muslim Other” (Marik
2001–2002, 121–22). The second line of this analysis demonstrates how the secular Indian
nationalists’ women-centric reforms (such as promoting women’s education, encouraging
widow remarriage and abolishing suttee), ostensibly undertaken to form “New [Indian]
Women” ultimately served nationalist male-centric agendas and discourses (Chatterjee
1993).10 As Chatterjee explains, the nationalists’ motivation for such reforms was guided by
their desire to learn selectively from European ways. This was evidenced in the distinctions
that the nationalists maintained between the West and the self, where tradition, home, and
women represented the inner or spiritual realm and the colonial world represented the outer
or material realm. Sinha (1995) does not accept that Chatterjee’s concept of the inner and
outer realm accounts for women’s subjugation.11 Both Sinha and Chatterjee agree, however,
that women’s identities were deployed by both the secular and the Hindu nationalists to
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forge the nation, and that the fate of women’s bodies was not treated as an issue to be
addressed in its own right but was used as a pawn by two groups of men in their ideologi-
cal contestations for nationalist reconstruction.12
The liberal feminists, while progressive in certain contexts, unintentionally narrow the
implications of their studies. This is because their analysis of nationalism, which empha-
sizes the role of violence against women, reduces women to abstract entities and precludes
an analysis of the many examples of women’s activism against nationalist projects. In addi-
tion, in delineating the masculinized and militarized implications of nationalisms, liberal
feminists view masculinities as arbitrary constructs and fail to recognize that the relation-
ship between masculinities, nationalist projects, and women is not a one-way process.
Instead this is a complex relationship, whereby women traditionally conceived as passive
may be co-opted as militant voices by male-centric nationalist projects, as in the case of
militant Hindu nationalist women in India. By contrast, postcolonial/critical-race feminists
adopt a critical line of analysis based on Orientalist readings of politics that provides a more
historically grounded approach to the study of nation, gender, and nationalism.13
Postcolonial/critical-race feminists examine how historical constructions of race, gen-
der, class, and culture attenuated by western colonialism and imperialism have made use
of gendered and hierarchical language of colonization. This is evidenced through everyday
colonial exchanges, census reports, media portrayals, and so on, and constructs categories
such as the Third World and the West, as well as stereotypical gender identities of the Third
World and race (Kabbani 1986; Miller 1990; McClintock 1995; Grewal 1995; Prakash 1995;
Stoler 2002; Banerjee 2005).14 The premise of postcolonial/critical-race feminists is that
identities are results of “material and ideological [power] struggles of historically situated
agents” (Agathangelou and Ling 2004, 518). This premise continues to be reflected in post-
colonial state formations, where states have taken recourse to a complex bundling of com-
munal, ethnic, and gender identities to rearticulate their desired nation-states (Agathangelou
and Ling 2004; McClintock 1995; Ling 2002; Agathangelou 2004). Locating this bundling
of identities in the process of nation formation in contemporary South Asia (Jayawardena
and DeAlwis 1996; Yuval-Davis 1997) and, more speciﬁcally, India, postcolonial feminists
have shown how the nationalism of the contemporary Hindu Right in India has recon-
structed the nation in three complementary ways. First, the boundaries of Hindu domes-
ticity, community, and nationhood have been realigned using gendered and communal
perceptions. Second, Muslims have been depicted as an Other to Hindus. Finally, the bod-
ies and identities of Hindu women have been deployed in militant ways to delineate the
political and cultural landscape of post-partition India (Sarkar and Butalia 1995; Basu 1995;
Bachetta 2004). The depiction of Muslims as an Other echoes the British construction of
communal identities in colonial India,15 albeit with more complex implications for identity
formations in the postcolonial Indian context (a point to which I will return later in the
text).16 Noting the emergence of such complex identities at the interstices of colonial and
postcolonial world orders, which produce some of the ambivalences of postcolonial moder-
nity, Agathangelou and Ling (2004, 518) claim that: “Agents [read: colonized of the Third
world]17 and structures [read: colonizers] transform each other constantly ... at the inter-
stices of contending world orders ... producing unanticipated hybridities.... These new mean-
ings and social relations [evidenced within postcolonial nation formations] compel ... a
political realization that we are inescapably accountable to others [our colonizers].” Yet,
the postcolonial feminists do not initiate a constructivist line of analysis to explore how an
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interaction of cultural, religious, historical, and ideological processes may construct the
nation, nationalism, and gender in relation to the nation’s (in)securities. As suggested ear-
lier, I address this lacunae by supplementing the feminist analysis of nationalism and gen-
der identities with a critical-constructivist framework of identities and (in)securities to offer
a more compelling and pragmatic reading of the nationalism and gender scholarship.
I digress briefly to introduce the terms representations of danger, cartographic anxi-
eties, and cultural construction of (in)securities in order to resituate the feminist readings
of nation, gender, and (in)securities from a constructivist perspective.
Representing Danger: Cartographic Anxieties
and Construction of (In)Securities
A geopolitical vision includes “any idea concerning the relation between one’s own and
other places, involving feelings of (in)security and/or invoking ideas about a collective mis-
sion or foreign policy” (Dijkink 1996, 11). In this sense, a geopolitical vision also reflects a
nation’s boundary-making practices, or what Krishna (1996) calls cartographic anxieties.
Such anxieties center around questions concerning one’s nationalist identity and survival,
and require a distinction between them and us, as well as an emotional or political attach-
ment to one’s place and close feelings of nationalism and national identity with one’s own
territory. However, as Krishna explains, cartographic anxieties go far beyond mere techni-
cal and scientiﬁc mapping of a country’s boundaries. They also include representational
practices that in various ways have attempted to inscribe a nation with a content, history,
meaning, and trajectory. This is because the central attribute of nation formation and nation-
alist identity in international politics requires the production of a particular conﬁguration
of territorial space—“that is territorially disjointed, mutually exclusive, and [yet] function-
ally similar like other sovereign states” (Ruggie 1993, 144). Accordingly, nations (including
India) have tried to conﬁgure their territorial boundaries and invest them with national polit-
ical sovereignty. Reconﬁguring territorial boundaries, however, also means that territories
need to be constantly guarded, remade and resecured, and that this nation-making process
is maintained by the production of an Other.
Security is thus closely linked to nationalist identity politics. How we deﬁne ourselves
depends on how we represent Others, and this becomes integrally linked to how we secure
ourselves against Others. In this representation of danger, threats do not merely exist. Rather,
they emerge from certain “context-bound” judgments made by policy makers where a “his-
torical mode of representation,” which self-consciously adopts an imagination of the self
and the Other, is adopted to deﬁne danger (Campbell 1992, 8). In this dynamic of project-
ing the self and Other, identity becomes an inescapable dimension of being. It is not ﬁxed
by nature but constituted in relation to difference. As Campbell (8) argues, “Whether we
are talking of the body or the state ... the identity of each is performatively constituted.”
The constitution of a state’s identity is achieved through the construction of boundaries
which serve to “demarcate an insider from an outsider, the self from the other, and the
domestic from the alien” (Campbell 1992, 8). In this sense, a state as a sovereign entity in
world politics has no ontological status, but is tenuously constituted by a discourse involv-
ing “repetition of acts ... through a regulated process of repetition.” Thus, “states are never
ﬁnished entities” because the performative nature of their identities and the practices that
constitute it can never be complete (Campbell 1992, 9, 11).
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In this context, one may raise the following questions: If there are no primary or sta-
ble identities then how can international relations speak about state, war, security, danger,
sovereignty? Is not security determined by the presence of a sovereign state and war con-
ducted in its name before anarchy? Problematizing this conventional assumption that inter-
national relations is in a state of anarchy, critical constructivists view (in)security as what
Campbell (1992, 2) calls “representations of danger.” For critical constructivists, “(in)secu-
rities [are] cultural in the sense that they are produced in and out of the contexts within
which people give meanings to their actions, experiences, and make sense of their lives”
(Weldes et al. 1999, 2). Operating within frameworks of meanings, assumptions, and dis-
tinctive social identities—the representation of the Other and what constitutes (in)securi-
ties are left open to the dynamics of interpretation, whereby relations of identity and
Otherness may be produced, enforced, and reiﬁed in a conflictual manner. Thus an Other
is considered threatening not only by its actions but also by its very constitution through
certain “codes of intelligibility,” thereby making (in)securities a cultural production of dan-
ger (Weldes et al. 1999, 2). Moreover, constructing identities of an Other in interstate rela-
tions may not simply be conﬁned to rigid interstate dynamics, but mediated by a complex
realignment of political structures, ideological perceptions, and cultural and religious tra-
ditions involving state elites, which may themselves play crucial roles in reproducing sta-
tist identities and (in)securities (Weldes et al., 1999).
These constructivist perspectives allow us to understand states as paradoxical entities
that do not possess preexisting stable identities. As a consequence, every state is marked by
a tension to adjust to the many axes of its nationalist identity in order to represent an imag-
ined community. Central to this process of constituting a state’s identity is the state’s secu-
rity and foreign policy and its construction of danger which serve to consolidate the state’s
identity. This is because if a state faces no dangers then it would implicate an absence of
movement via stasis and would wither away. Accordingly, a state’s security and foreign pol-
icy, by inscribing certain “codes of dangers,” helps to contain and reproduce the state’s
boundaries, and ironically guarantees for the state an impelling identity (Campbell 1992,
11).
A Feminist Critical-constructivist Framework
In this paper I use some of the shared premises of feminist readings of nationalism and gen-
der identities and the critical-constructivist reading of (in)security to render problematic
the constructions of gender, nationalism, and nuclear (in)securities in Indian politics. These
premises are, ﬁrst, that the world is intersubjectively created (Agathangelou and Ling 2004;
Campbell 1992; Weldes et al. 1999); second, that identities are constitutive of historically
situated ideological power struggles (Agathangelou and Ling 2004; Weldes et al. 1999); and
third, that “a commitment to an ontology of becoming,” that is, exploring how identities
are constructed, can serve as the basis for a better theoretical and empirical understanding
of world politics (Locher and Prugl 2001, 111; Campbell 1992; Weldes et al. 1999). Yet there
are differences between the feminists’ and the critical constructivists’ readings of identity
politics. First, most constructivists, like Campbell (1992), Weldes et al. (1999) and others,
have “ignored feminist literature and gender analysis,” which lead them to “miss an impor-
tant part of the empirical reality in power politics” (Locher and Prugl 2001, 113). Likewise
feminists in IR (Peterson 1996; Pettman 2007) agree that gender is a social construct and in
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this sense were talking about social construction much earlier than the constructivists. Yet
“many feminists [if not all] are ... uncomfortable with the styling [read: usage] of construc-
tivism as [an] alternative or a middle ground” for feminist analysis (Locher and Prugl 2001,
113). In this particular instance I do not seek to elaborate the analytical differences between
feminism and constructivism (for such details see Locher and Prugl 2001). Rather, follow-
ing suggestions made by scholars such as Locher and Prugl (2001, 111), that “a dialogue
between [or combination of] feminism and constructivism ... can yield better theoretical
and empirical understandings of the world,” I proceed in the rest of the essay to build on
their mutual premises to provide a constructivist and gendered reading of certain critical
but understudied terrains of India’s nationalism, its woman question, and nuclear (in)secu-
rity politics.
Nationalism, State Identity, and Discursive
Otherness in Postcolonial India
The concept of India’s geopolitical vision has an implicit connection with the project of
modernity. On the one hand, national movements in India were reacting to the subjuga-
tion inherent in colonization and thus indicative of counter-hegemonic projects. Yet, the
reigning models of nation building in postcolonial India were derivative of the western
experiences of modernity. In this section I will use this premise to analyze the emergence
of India as a modern postcolonial state that set in motion two contradictory processes of
nation building based on imaginative nationalism and a reflexive Otherness. The ﬁrst process
produced India as a cartographically deﬁned geographical whole based on cultural synthe-
sis and territorial ﬁxity, while the second represented a reflexive Otherness (that is, a process
by which alignments between the state’s identity and its territories constituted gendered
practices of subordination and hierarchy).18 I argue that both trends are gendered byprod-
ucts of postcolonial modernity and, like the ambivalences of modernity as alluded to by the
postcolonial feminists, have contributed to internal contradictions within the Indian polity
facilitating the rise of the BJP.
Territorial/Political Nationalism and State Identity
Reflecting the claim by Smith (1991) that imagery has always played a crucial role in poli-
tics and nowhere more so than our understanding of nationalism, the western-educated
political elites in India, deeply influenced by the imageries of the eighteenth-century liberal
state in Europe, attempted to conjure into existence a modern India in terms of a political
and geographical integrity. Given India’s colonial history, its leaders recognized that a strong,
uniﬁed, and sovereign state was essential in order to establish India’s sovereign presence in
the world, to preserve its unity against foreign powers as well as its internal cohesion. Fix-
ity as a nation, deﬁned in terms of its territorial integrity expressed as political and territo-
rial nationalism rather than cultural and religious nationalism, was the ﬁrst step toward this
concept of nation formation. It signiﬁed the emergence of an approach by the state that
emphasized an “impersonal, statistical collective identity of the people as a complex mal-
leable unit, representative of the individuating logic of modernity” (Kaviraj 1997, 325). An
accompanying aspect in this process of nation formation was the plasticity of its social and
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political world, where the population as an imagined Indian community could be molded
by certain intentional actions of its state leaders, such as India’s national security policies
(which I describe below), to secure the boundaries of the modern Indian territory.
An important aspect of a modern state in producing nationalism is that the rulers and
the ruled share a common nationality, and the concept of a territorial and political nation-
alism along with the secular ideology of Sarvadharma Swamabhava (all religions are equal)
provided India’s foundations as a modern state. In articulating a secular nationalism, Nehru
was aware that “bringing religion into politics meant the ruin of both” and claimed that “it
was for the Hindus to make the larger number of Muslims ... feel at home in India”
(Parthasarathy 1989, 9). However the secular nationalism of Nehru did not preclude some
majoritarian nationalists, such as Sardar Patel, from making their presence felt during the
debates over constitution making (Balachandran 1996). In fact, one can argue that such
Hindu sentiments, although subdued from dominating India’s formal politics, did exist
underground and enjoyed a resurgence on a national scale in 1998.
For purposes of brevity I will not develop this analysis further but proceed to build on
the feminist critical-constructivist premise to show how representational and discursive
strategies used by the immediate post-independent secular Congress leaders have drawn on
women’s images and identities to construct India’s geopolitical visions, identities, and
(in)securities.
Geopolitical (In)Securities and Gender in India
As elaborated above, the logic of international politics requires that in mapping a nation’s
identity, states, as sovereign and self-contained entities, must guard and secure their bound-
aries. Thus India’s boundary-making exercise, the very condition of its nationalist identity,
has deﬁned India’s postcolonial (in)security. In this context, as Muppidi (1999, 126) points
out, the boundaries are reached when particular representations of the Other seem “unin-
telligible, irrational, or ungraspable” in and through the lenses of the articulators of this
(in)security. The conception of a sovereign Indian state to be formed after independence
from its colonizer had legitimized the (in)security imaginary of colonial India. In the post-
colonial era this imaginary was rearticulated by the Congress Party vis-à-vis an Other [Pak-
istan] that was carved out of the violent partition of the country. Thus the postcolonial
Indian state’s efforts in producing external dangers has not only emerged from its drive to
secure its identity but also from an (in)security pegged to India’s partition history. Accord-
ingly, cartographic anxieties, understood as physical preservation of India’s borders to be
metonymous with the state of the Union, justiﬁed postcolonial Indian political actors’ dis-
courses of (in)security (Muppidi 1999). Gender became integral to the Indian state’s nation-
alist discourses to construct its boundaries, anxieties, and (in)securities.
As Nehru himself once argued, “nothing adds to popular passions more than stories
of abduction of women, and as long as these ... women are not rescued, trouble will sim-
mer and might blaze out” (Jenkins 1974, 52). The connection implied in this statement
between Indian women’s abducted bodies (violated by abduction, enforced conversion, and
impermissible cohabitation) and securing India’s nationalist boundaries vis-à-vis this abduc-
tor (Pakistan) has consumed the major debates surrounding India’s (in)security. For exam-
ple, in the aftermath of partition the government of India was swamped with complaints
by relatives of abducted women seeking to recover them, either through government, mil-
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itary, or voluntary efforts. In this act of recovery, carried out by the government through
the Central Recovery Operation (1947–1952), the “material, symbolic, and political” signif-
icance of the abducted women was not lost either on the women themselves or on the lead-
ers of the state (Menon and Bhasin 1996, 5). Leaders of the Indian state guided by certain
masculinist notions—which I term as a traditional and Indian masculinity—repeatedly used
instances of the rape and abduction of their innocent Indian mothers and sisters to artic-
ulate India’s nationalist identity as a territorial space vis-à-vis Pakistan. They expressed
their concern and anger at the moral depravity of Pakistan that characterized the shameful
chapter in the history of both countries (Constituent Assembly of India 1947). That “our
[India’s] innocent sisters” had been dishonored was an issue that could not be looked upon
with equanimity. (Constituent Assembly of India 1947, 122) The All India Congress Com-
mittee passed a resolution (November 1947) which stated that: “The Congress views with
pain, horror, and anxiety the tragedies of Calcutta, East Bengal, Bihar.... These new devel-
opments in communal strife ... have involved ... mass conversion, abduction, and violation
of women and forcible marriages.... Women who have been abducted and forcibly married
must be restored to their homes” (Constituent Assembly of India 1947, 122).
In addition, members of the Indian government also drew upon cultural and religious
icons to underscore their protectionist stance vis-à-vis Indian women. As one member of
the Indian Parliament said: “If there is any sore point or distressful fact to which we can-
not be reconcile under any circumstances, it is the question of abduction and non-restora-
tion of Hindu women. We all know our history ... of what happened in the name of Shri
Ram when Sita was abducted. Here, where thousands of girls are concerned, we cannot for-
get this. As descendants of Ram we have to bring back every Sita that is alive” (Constituent
Assembly of India 1949, 137).19
The issue of abduction was also analyzed by the Indian leaders in terms of India and
Pakistan’s civilized and uncivilized identity. This is because, as Anderson (1991) observes,
passionate human loyalty reaches unprecedented heights when the nation imagined as a
monolithic community faces an Other, differentiated community. This sentiment was
reflected in a resolution passed by the All India Congress Committee in November 1949,
which also drew upon Indian women to conﬁgure the Indian self and Pakistani Other: “Dur-
ing these disorders, large numbers of women have been abducted ... and there have been
forcible conversions on a large scale. No civilized people can recognize such conversions
and there is nothing more heinous than the abduction of women. Every effort must be made
to restore women to their original home” (Constituent Assembly of India 1949, 138). Inter-
estingly, as Menon and Bhasin (1996) note, nowhere was the government of India’s con-
demnation of rape accompanied by eagerness to take action against the abduction of Muslim
women by Hindu men (instances of which were many) because here no offenses had been
committed against the Hindu community or religion.
Furthermore, at the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Session held in December 1951
considerable dissatisfaction was expressed at the slow pace of recovery of Indian women
from Pakistan. There was extreme disquiet at the mention of two thousand Indian women
being held by government servants in Pakistan and at the agreement by the Indian govern-
ment of a cease-ﬁre with Pakistan over Kashmir without ﬁrst negotiating the return of
abducted Hindu women to India. Some members of the Indian Parliament even went out
so far to call for “an open war to recover our sisters and daughters lying helpless in Pak-
istan” (Constituent Assembly of India 1951, 138).
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It is not my intention to suggest that the predicament of these abducted women taken
to the Pakistani side was not traumatic or that the government of India’s repatriation pro-
gram was not humanitarian in seeking to return these abducted women to their rightful
places. Yet I also share Menon and Bhasin’s (1996) view that one cannot argue that the lots
of all these abducted women were uniformly grim and that all their abductors on the Pak-
istani side were bestial. Menon and Bhasin, as well as a Hindi movie from India, Pinjar
(meaning “Skeleton” in the Punjabi language), provide examples of Indian women who
were abducted by Muslim men and taken to Pakistan but who were unwilling to return to
India during the repatriation and resettlement programs. These women had settled with their
new husbands and families in Pakistan and felt accepted and respected there. Such exam-
ples that contradict the negative image of Pakistan were undocumented or ignored in India’s
statist accounts that sought to secure the nation and its women. In this context, following
the feminist-constructivist premise, one may argue that the Indian government’s recovery
program not only enabled the government to draw upon the identiﬁcation needs of the
Indian state as caring, secular, and modern (which the Other, Pakistan, was not), but also
enabled the state to construct itself benevolently vis-à-vis Pakistan, to articulate a statist
vision of what constituted the legitimate place of Indian women in their families, commu-
nities, and the nation, and also use victimized images of women (while denying autonomy
to their lived experiences) to deﬁne a threatening Other (Pakistan). Moreover, the Other
was identiﬁed at the most crucial site of patriarchal control, that is, over the issue of Indian
women’s sexuality that by implication belonged to the paternal realm of the Indian state.
While some may argue that for India the urgency of securing both its borders and
women’s bodies is understandable, an urgency rooted in the making of a postcolonial nation,
I argue that this had a political and symbolic implication for women: abducted women
became symbolic of demarcating territories, crossing borders and articulating (in)securi-
ties associated with violating or consolidating the social, cultural, and political boundaries
of the Indian and Pakistani states.
Indeed, India’s nationalist discourse sheds light on the fact that India’s political nation-
alism was not homogeneous and, despite its modernist identity, was no less silent in draw-
ing on women’s images and identities to articulate (in)security imaginaries vis-à-vis an
Other. To this extent the Indian state’s masculinity has been reflective of the colonial mas-
culinity’s savior and patriarchal agenda vis-à-vis Indian women, and has also drawn from
Hindu religious and cultural metaphors to justify India’s boundaries vis-à-vis the other
nation. I also accept that the nationalism of Congress was implicitly Hindu-centric (there
is further evidence of this in the contradictions that emerged in the theory and practice of
secularism of post–Nehru Indian prime ministers), and has even created space for the emer-
gence of the BJP’s Hindu nationalism on a national scale. From the standpoint of real pol-
itics, one must also be cognizant that soon after their independence, India and Pakistan
fought a war in 1948 (over Kashmir), and in this geostrategic sense Pakistan did constitute
a security threat to India. Yet my point in the above section, albeit drawing on some of the
familiar feminist discourses of Indian women’s abduction and repatriation, was to show how
the discursive interpellation of Indian nationalism with women’s bodies and identities to
construct the nation’s identity, the location of its Other, and frame its national (in)secu-
rity discourses has constituted a symbolically signiﬁcant political and not a communal activ-
ity for the Indian state under the Congress Party. Seen from a feminist, critical-constructivist
lens, the symbolic construction of gender has served a political and nationalist project for
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the Indian state, which, reflective of the newly born nation’s cartographic anxieties, has
“construct[ed] and functionalize[d] women through discourses of appropriate femininity
[and masculinity]” to inscribe “codes of dangers ... that help[ed] containing and reproduc-
ing the state’s boundaries” (Peterson and Runyan 1998, 8; Campbell 1992, 8). Ironically, it
has also “guarantee[d] for the state an impelling identity” (Campbell 1992, 8).
Yet, as constructivists argue, every state is marked by an inherent tension to adjust to
the many axes of its nationalist identity to represent an imagined community, and inscrib-
ing “codes of dangers” keeps the process going. (Campbell 1992, 11) Following this prem-
ise, I describe below how the boundary-making exercise of India and its discursive
articulation of a Pakistani, Islamic danger assume a qualitatively different turn under the
BJP. Gender, nationalism, and (in)securities get reconstructed culturally to support the
BJP’s ideological construct of India as a Hindu nation.
The BJP and the Making of a Hindu India
Several factors explain the resurgence of the BJP’s nationalism/communalism and mas-
culinity in contemporary India. For example, this can be seen as a legacy of the colonial
construction of racial and religious identities, which over the years have fanned the early
and later Hindu nationalists’ militancy to counter colonial projections of Hindu virility. Or
it could be regarded as among the dilemmas of the secular Indian nation that, having become
too modern, secular, and global, has lost its indigenous cultural space, thus necessitating
its revival. It could also be argued that the pro–Hindu practices adopted by Congress lead-
ers for electoral purposes created the space for the resurgence of Hindu nationalism. With-
out entering into these debates, I proceed in the remainder of my paper to explore how the
BJP, guided by the Hindutva ideology, has linked the nation’s internal and external
anti–Muslim anxieties to reconstruct the nation (rashtra), gender, and its (in)securities
from cultural and religious perspectives.
Cultural/Religious Nationalism, the Rashtra,
Gender and (In)Securities
Like its master organization the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS), the BJP has sought to make
Hindutva its ideological mascot, which, rooted in the “one nation, one people, one culture”
concept, redeﬁnes India as a Hindu rashtra (BJP Election Manifesto 1998, 6). Pitrabhoomi
(fatherland), jati (bloodline) and sanskriti (culture) were identiﬁed by the BJP as the three
principles of Hindutva. According to the BJP, the ﬁrst principle, pitrabhoomi, implies that
to be a Hindu one should be born within the territorial boundaries of India. Jati (blood-
line) claims that to be a Hindu one should establish lineage from natural as opposed to con-
verted Hindu parents. Sanskriti (culture) implies that only those whose sacred land (sacred
to their religion) lay within their fatherland (India) actually have the moral basis for claim-
ing citizenship of India, thereby privileging a cultural and religious rather than a territorial
concept of citizenship in India (Deshpande 1995). The BJP also ﬁnds a linkage between Hin-
dutva, the Hindu rashtra, and a cultural nationalism in India. A suggested linkage of this
communal cause in building a nationalist India becomes particularly visible in the BJP’s
Election Manifesto (1998). In the introduction, which spelled out the vision, faith, and com-
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mitment of the BJP, the manifesto declared that “[t]he present millennium began with the
subjugation of our ancient land. Let a reinvigorated, proud, and prosperous India herald
the next millennium” (6). It ended with an appeal to “all patriotic Indians” to assist the BJP
in the task of reconstructing a nationalist India representative of a composite culture (80).
However, the deﬁnition of this composite culture echoes a rather a communal fervor. In
the words of the then BJP president: “despite the composite nature of Indian culture, Hin-
duism remains by far the most powerful and pervasive element in that culture. Those who
lay great stress on the composite nature of Indian culture, frequently minimize this basic
fact” (Bharatiya Janata Party 2000, 160).
A seemingly harmless concept deemed essential for the development of the nation, the
“one nation, one people, one culture” concept of the BJP makes Hinduism the common
denominator of India’s national identity—one inextricably woven with the humanism of
the land. It forces one to use the terms “Hindutva,” “Hinduism,” and “the Hindu nation”
synonymously (Chowdhry, 2000).
The BJP’s commitment to Hindutva, underpinned by the assumption that the land of
the Christians and Muslims lay outside India, has enabled the party to utilize this aspect of
Hindutva to depict the Hindu nation’s enemies through religious lenses. Thus a part of the
BJP’s nationalist and communalist agenda has been to construct the Indian Muslims as a
locus of internal threat to the nation and use Indian women (redeﬁned by the BJP as Hindu
women) to justify this threat. The party’s nationalist discourse deﬁnes “patriots” and “trai-
tors” in terms of their religious afﬁliations and gender remains integral in establishing this
image. For example, a woman BJP member, Sadhvi Rithambara, supported the Hindus in
the Ramjanmbhoomi (1992) riots20 as a “ﬁght for the preservation of a civilization, for Indi-
anness, for national consciousness” (Kakar 1996, 157). BJP spokeswoman Sushma Swaraj
suspected treachery on the part of the Muslims against India because “the former rooted
for Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war” (Chowdhry 2000, 117). Another representative
of the BJP, projecting rape as a communal discourse, claimed that “the rape of Hindu women
by Muslims becomes a strategy for the community to express their jehadi mentality, by
inflicting such harms on a Hindu women’s right to bodily honor and integrity” (Gouri,
personal communication with the author, 16 August 2004).
Indeed, some might argue that if the nationalist discourse of the BJP, like that of the
Congress, also draws upon Hindu women’s right to bodily honor and integrity, then what
makes the BJP’s nationalist discourse distinctive? I argue that the masculinist assumptions
underpinning the BJP’s nationalist and communalist discourse, which Banerjee (2005)
deﬁnes as an “armed masculinity,” assumes a much more militant, aggressive, and com-
munal tone. This tone enables the party to construct the images of Hindu women in newer
ways to rearticulate the Hindu nation’s cartographic anxieties and (in)securities in order to
justify a nuclear policy. I explain below the concept of “armed masculinity” and then relate
it to the cultural reconstruction of gender and nuclear (in)securities of the BJP.
Cultural (In)securities, Gender, and Nuclearization
of the Hindu Rashtra
Invoking a postcolonial feminist line of analysis, Banerjee (2005) contends that a particu-
lar interpretation of Hindu manhood, armed and communal, informs the BJP’s national-
ist and communalist agenda. In this model, the Hindu male, which is an ideological
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construct, is both a “Hindu soldier and warrior monk.” The Hindu male as a “Hindu sol-
dier” incorporates ideals of Hindu spiritual strength and moral fortitude and, as a “warrior
monk,” represents certain virtues that enable him to oppose an enemy who is evil and com-
munal (14). The Hindu male, representing a “Hindu soldier and warrior monk,” is “deci-
sive, aggressive, muscular, willing to engage in battle against an enemy, and is also opposed
to the notions of femininity ... the latter characterized by weakness, non-violence, compas-
sion, and willingness to compromise” (14). When these two attributes of Hindu masculin-
ity intersect, nationalist discourses of the Hindu Right rearticulate the nation’s enemy, the
location of Hindu women, and (in)securities vis-à-vis this enemy through communal lenses.
I suggest that Islamic phobias perceived by the Hindu leaders vis-à-vis Indian Muslims
(internally), as illustrated above, get discursively transposed to phobias that the nation per-
ceives vis-à-vis Pakistan (externally). An illustration of this process can be seen in the fol-
lowing comment from a BJP leader: “In the history of all violence against our women either
the Indian Muslims or their extended hand Pakistan has been the abductor community
country that has revealed a lustful behavior of its males towards our women. If there is any
reprehensible past which we cannot forget and forgive, it is the abduction and torture of
Hindu women by Pakistan during partition” (Ramji, personal communication with the
author, 17 July 2002).
Likewise another BJP leader says: “Recall our history: Hindu women from the Indian
side had been kidnapped to the other side of the border to the Northwest Frontiers and
Rawalpindi, and were stripped and paraded in Kabul; they were sold at the bazaars (mar-
ket places). If India should remember this history of its sisters, then it should retaliate against
Pakistan ... and retaliate on the grounds of its sisters whom our country has a tradition of
protecting” (Madanbhai, personal communication with the author, 4 August 2003).
In perceiving their role as the protectors of Hindu women, the BJP leaders also situ-
ate their notions of (a Hindu) India “as a Ram Rajya [land of the Hindu deity Ram], where
the Sitas need to be protected against Pakistan” (Rakhalbabu, personal communication with
the author, 13 July 2004). While the same analogy of Indian women as Sitas was used by the
Congress leaders, in the case of the BJP the discourse of the protection of women before an
enemy is rearticulated in a communal context unlike the discourse of Congress, which was
rooted in a geopolitical context. This communal tone is evidenced from the rest of Rakhal-
babu’s statement, that “some of our misguided brothers [meaning Hindu men] also have
committed similar crimes [of abduction] to a certain extent, but greater fault lies with the
Pakistani community and its men.” I argue that this aspect of the BJP’s cultural/Hindu mas-
culinity appears disturbing from two aspects: ﬁrst, in highlighting a link between Hinduism
and the Indian state; and second, in using bodies of Hindu women in overtly communal
ways in reconstructing India as a Hindu nation. In such communal discourses, the collec-
tivity of Indian women is substituted by the term “Hindu women.” Additionally, prepared-
ness against this enemy, even if through a nuclear weapons policy, becomes imperative. A
BJP representative states: “India should do something commensurate to retaliate with the
gravity of the situation.... One should understand that with the Islamic bomb in their [Pak-
istan’s] hand, India needs to be prepared.... Not only because it is the right thing to protect
our bharatmata [motherland] and our sisters but also because it is our tradition”
(Madanbhai, personal communication with the author, 21 August 2003). Likewise, another
BJP member claims: “Here, when our entire nation is concerned, we thousands of Hindu
women, we must be fully prepared to avenge ourselves on those [Pakistani] responsible for
78 Minerva Journal of Women and War • Fall 2008
the past humiliation of our nation and our sisters ... more so, considering the imminent
nuclear danger that we are facing from them. Every Sita and Draupadi must be protected”
(Sureshji, personal communication with the author, 15 March 2004).21
The above sentiments reveal the extent to which the BJP’s discourses on Hindu women
as bounded collectivities vis-à-vis Pakistan infuse the party’s nuclear weapons policies. While
much of this gloriﬁcation of traditional representations of Hindu women is seen by the
party as a necessary corrective so that a Hindu Golden Age can be brought back to contem-
porary India, a deeper analysis of such sentiments reveals that the depiction of Hindu women
in their traditionally threatened capacities vis-à-vis Pakistan and Islam constitutes an effort
by the party to justify a nuclear trajectory in Indo-Pakistan relations. In other words, what
I argue here is that the BJP’s concern for Hindu women (reflective of the Sitas and Drau-
padis of the Hindu rashtra) is ultimately tempered by the production of a communal, patri-
archal visual self, where the vulnerable nature of Hindu women thus portrayed and the
speciﬁc protective norms envisaged for their protection justify an anti–Pakistani (in)secu-
rity imaginary for the nation.
Further complicating the feminist analysis of nationalism from a constructivist per-
spective, it is also interesting to note that the image of Hindu women envisaged as passive
and traditional does not always remain so for the Hindu leaders. In a sharp disjuncture from
the traditional Indian masculinity of the Congress (which mainly drew upon women’s iden-
tities as passive entities), the BJP’s masculinity—armed and aggressive—also calls women
to rise above their traditional roles and images. In this militant form, women become vis-
ible in the women’s faction of the BJP (known as the Mohila Morcha) and become power-
ful orators of the party’s armed and communal masculinity. The Sadhvis (women ideologues
of the BJP) have erased visible markers of their womanhood—jewelry, make-up and femi-
nine dress—and have become aggressive, powerful, and masculinist to enter the realm of
this discourse. Expressed in their chilling tones is a jingoistic fervor by which they articu-
late a Pakistani nuclear danger that faces the Hindu nation and its women—which even jus-
tiﬁes a Hindu bomb. Evidenced is a tone of militancy from a woman BJP ideologue, who
interweaves religious overtones with militant images of Hindu goddesses such as Durga and
Kali to legitimize India’s Islamic adversary and the (Hindu) bomb: “Look at the Hindu god-
desses. They all bear weapons in their hands. Kali had a Brahmastra [a weapon of great
power]; Durga had a chakra [a weapon in the shape of a disc]. We need our ashtra [nuclear
weapon] too, to ﬁght the rakshas [demon] threatening our nation” (Kamaladi, personal
communication with the author, 6 April 2002).
According to Menon (2003), the presence of a few virulently anti–Muslim women in
the BJP does not imply that most of the Hindu women attracted to the party are also
anti–Islamic or militant. While this point is well taken, one must also accept that the dis-
cursive reconstruction of Hindu women in their militant forms to support the party’s nation-
alist, communalist, and (in)security agenda represents the rise of a new sexism in
postcolonial Indian politics—one not so overtly manipulated under the Congress Party.
While the militancy of these female ideologues is projected by the BJP as empowering women
(by enabling them as sovereign embodiments of the state to speak before a strategic Islamic
threat), I argue that the apparent spatial mobility allowed to these women become contested,
since their token of liberalization is ultimately rooted in the party’s communalist, patriar-
chal image.22 In this sense, the BJP’s rearticulation of Indian-Pakistani identities based on
unfathomable Hindu-Muslim differences is not only reflective of the resurgence of colo-
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nial legacies at this particular juncture of postcolonial Indian politics. From a feminist, crit-
ical-constructivist study of identities and (in)securities this development appears more dis-
turbing given that the party uses its Hindutva-dominated masculinity to reconstruct Indian
Hindu women, to link the nation’s internal and external cultural (in)securities, and to jus-
tify a new trajectory of interstate nuclear politics.
Conclusion: A Feminist Critical-Constructivist Analysis—
Implications for Nation, Gender and (In)Securities
As Samaddara (2001, 31) argues, “We live in partitioned times ... it is within our post-colo-
nial being, in our agony, pessimism and strivings.” In this sense, the history of partition is
an incomplete one. It is simultaneously an event of the past and a sign of the present. As
the postcolonial Indian state continues to grapple with its task of nation building, forms of
cartographic anxieties have subsumed the state’s identity (as a self) and have enabled the
state’s leaders to construct various conﬁgurations of sexist ideologies to manipulate women
as markers of hostile interstate identities, Islamic (in)securities, and nuclear trajectories. In
making this linkage between nationalist identity, (in)security, and gender, I am cognizant
that nationalist, fundamentalist regimes all over the world have essentialized gender to serve
their nation-building projects. Postcolonial India was no exception to this, and both the
Congress Party’s traditional/Indian and the BJP’s Hindu masculinity have drawn on gen-
dered representational strategies to deﬁne India’s nationalist imaginations and cartographic
anxieties vis-à-vis the Pakistani state. Despite this commonality between the masculinity of
the Congress and that of the BJP (whereby each masculinity has represented a gendered
nationalism of the Indian state), the feminist critical-constructivist line of analysis followed
in this article has enabled a revisiting of the issues of nation, nationalism, and gender by
linking the consolidation and continuation of these issues to postcolonial India’s nuclear
(in)security politics.
Read through some of the shared ontological premises of feminist critical-construc-
tivism, namely that identities are intersubjectively created and constitutive of historically
situated ideological power struggles, I have explored in this paper how certain contested
notions of Hindu-Muslim communal identities that were (mis)articulated in the British
colonial context have reemerged in postcolonial Indian politics with more complex varia-
tions on nationalism, gender identities, and (in)securities. To this extent, I have argued that
whether it was the postcolonial nationalism of the Indian state (grounded in the western
modernity and the Enlightenment) or the Hindu nationalism of the BJP (with promises of
the return to a Hindu Golden Age), both nationalist discourses have selectively appropri-
ated gendered representations to deﬁne the nation’s (in)securities. Based on a realist, neolib-
eral reading of international relations or on traditional state-centric discourses of
nationalism, such nationalist endeavors of the Indian state represent a politics of statecraft
to conﬁgure their territorial spaces, which must be “territorially disjointed, mutually exclu-
sive, and [yet] functionally similar like other sovereign states” (Ruggie 1993, 144). A femi-
nist critical-constructivist reading of this phenomenon, however, unravels more critical but
understudied terrains of nation, nationalism, and gender studies. Such a theoretical frame-
work, albeit at the margins of mainstream IR and security studies, enables one to explore
how certain culturally guided codes of intelligibility, representing a complex alignment of
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political structures, ideological perceptions, and cultural and religious traditions, may con-
struct gendered identities and communal (in)securities in intra- and interstate relations
and politics. Indeed, the BJP’s Hindu masculinity representing the ideological construct of
a “Hindu soldier and warrior monk” is an example of just such a complex alignment that
has interwoven religion, culture, and gender to construct the Hindu rashtra and its Islamic
(in)securities.
Although a Congress-led alliance, the UPA (United Progressive Alliance), has governed
India since 2004, Hindutva, as articulated by the BJP, remains an important component of
India’s political culture (which contains possibilities of the BJP’s return to power as the
national government in India). To this end, recent ﬁeld trips and interviews conducted with
BJP ideologues in India, especially with those at the Mohila Morcha (the BJP women’s wing),
reveal that they continue to articulate anti–Islamic, anti–Pakistani sentiments. Conflating
Indian nationalism with a Hindu cultural identity, a BJP activist recently claimed, “No mat-
ter what you say, secularism has not given us [Hindus] any homogenous identity; we have
remained one among many in our own land.... We are Hindus, tied by our unique cultural
virtues ... and will not hesitate to hold on to this identity and that of our cherished Hin-
dustan” (Sharmaji, personal communication with the author, 12 May 2008). Furthermore,
embracing the model of militant womanhood against a cultural enemy, a women ideologue
from the party said, “In the name of Shri Ram, I will sacriﬁce my son, even if I have to send
him to the borders [the India-Pakistan line of control where most India-Pakistan wars are
fought] to defend my country against them” (Manju, personal communication with the
author, 2 May 2008). Yet these statist discourses should not preclude the existence of agency
in Indian politics by men and women challenging these discourses of identity and (in)secu-
rity23—a point well-heeded by both the feminist (namely postcolonial) and critical-construc-
tivist analysts of identity and (in)security.24 To this extent, the contribution of this article
lies in the application of some of the shared contours of feminism and critical construc-
tivism to study an empirical phenomenon of nationalism, gender, and (in)security at a
localized and culturally speciﬁc context of postcolonial Indian politics. This article also
offers some conceptual and analytical spaces (which I term here as a feminist critical-con-
structivist framework of analysis), whereby international relations scholars—feminists, con-
structivists and others—can engage in conversations around shared concerns about the
cultural construction of gender identities and (in)securities. To this end, as Tickner (1997,
630) says: “Seeking greater understanding across theoretical divides, and the scientiﬁc and
political cultures that sustain them, might be the best model if feminist international the-
ory [and analysis] is to have a future in the discipline [of international politics].”
Notes
1. I will elaborate on these observations later in the article.
2. For a detailed analysis of this argument and a discussion of similarities and differences between
feminists and constructivists, see Locher and Prugl (2001). For a similar line of reasoning suggesting
a dialogue between constructivism and postcolonial IR/feminist theory, see Ling (2002).
3. I undertake this analysis with reference to the Congress Party and the BJP’s (in)securities vis-
à-vis Pakistan because these governmental phases represent two very different visions of India’s nation-
alist identities and (in)securities. The formative years of modern India’s nation building and
perceptions of Pakistani (in)securities under the leadership of Congress (evidenced through their gen-
dered efforts in ﬁxing the state’s boundaries) become particularly interesting when contrasted with
the state’s communalist identity and (in)securities that were articulated under a BJP government.
Nationalism, Gender and (In)Securities in Postcolonial Indian Politics 81
4. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is a Hindu Right party that headed the governing national
coalition of India from May 1998 through April 2004. It maintains ties with its master organization
the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS) and upholds the ideology of Hindutva. Hindutva is rooted in the
concept of “one nation, one people, and one culture” and depicts India as a Hindu nation.
5. For illustrations of such overlapping scholarship in the ﬁeld of gender and nationalism stud-
ies, see Pettman (2002, 2007).
6. I categorize this group of feminist approaches to nationalism as liberal because this group,
despite making progressive contributions to the ﬁeld, has failed to initiate a more critical and histor-
ically grounded analysis of the subject, which is done by the postcolonial critical-race feminists.
7. Pettman’s scholarship (2002, 2007) represents simultaneous efforts at unraveling the gen-
dered nature of nations and nationalisms as well as locating issues of women’s security vis-à-vis gen-
dered states in IR theory. Thus her work on gender and nationalisms spans feminist IR studies, security
studies, and symbolic studies of gender and nationalism in global politics.
8. Some recent feminist historians, anthropologists, and literary studies scholars have also
identiﬁed the ways in which images of Indian women have been projected in Indian commercial cin-
emas, documentaries, calendar arts, novels, and maps to suit India’s nationalist projects (Ramaswamy
2003).
9. The rise of a Hindu nationalism coincided with the rise of a Hindu patriarchy in early twen-
tieth-century India. This rise was a consequence of a prevalent view among upper-class and high-
caste Hindus that there was a staged deterioration of the Hindu civilization before the proliferating
Muslims. Notably, this phobia of a Muslim threat was a consequence of the colonial construction of
antagonistic Hindu-Muslim communal differences—an aspect that remains an important theme of
this essay—which I argue has been replayed by the BJP.
10. Some of these secular Indian nationalists, such Ambedkar, were implicitly Hindu-centric.
11. She suggests that the colonial construction of the self versus the Indians initiated practices
of disempowerment of Indian males in the public sphere, which compelled Indian males to further
restrict women’s mobility at home to establish their superior selves.
12. However, women’s agency did exist in early India, evidenced through English-educated
protofeminists such as Pandita Ramabai.
13. Given these limitations, I deﬁne the collective genre of the liberal feminist analysis of nation-
alism as engendering the literature on nationalism but not paying sufﬁcient attention to the “how-
possible” questions in the constructions of gender and nationalisms.
14. Grewal (1995), Prakash (1995) and Banerjee (2005) have highlighted the gendered nature of
British colonialism vis-à-vis Indian women. Banerjee (13–14) particularly notes how the colonial mas-
culinity “rooted in an Anglo-Protestant interpretation of manhood” and “deﬁned by martial prowess”
constructed Indian males as barbaric (thus justifying the colonizers’ savior efforts to liberate India
women by abolishing suttee); projected Indian men as cowardly (by showing preference for the mar-
tial Muslim races over the non-martial Bengalis/Hindus); and also, unrealistically, depicted the Hindu-
Muslim communities in colonial India as representing unfathomable differences.
15. For a detailed analysis of the colonial construction of communalism in colonial India, see
Chandra (1984) and Pandey (1992).
16. Yet Third World women are not simply victims vis-à-vis their power structures (in this case
the communalist, chauvinist Indian state); rather they engage in survival strategies in relation to the
latter, illustrations of which are ample in India and elsewhere in South Asia (Jeffery and Basu 1998;
Jayawardena and De Alwis 1996).
17. According to postcolonial theory, the colonized are not simply victims of the power struc-
ture (the colonizer) but reveal agency that leads to a mutual transformation of both the colonizer and
the colonized.
18. For more detailed explanations of the terms “imaginative nationalism” and “reflexive Oth-
erness” with regard to India’s state formation, see Kaviraj (1997) and Chaturvedi (2001).
19. In the Indian epic Ramayana, Sita (the princess-queen of Ayodhya) was abducted by the
demon-king Ravana while in exile with her husband Lord Ram. Following this abduction, a war was
fought between Ram and Ravana, and Sita was rescued. Hindu nationalists focus on and glorify the
chastity of Sita and the trial by ﬁre (representing the Hindu god of purity) that she had to endure to
prove that she had remained faithful to her husband even while imprisoned by another man.
20. The Ram Janmbhoomi-Babri mosque riots occurred in December 1992 in the Indian town
of Ayodhya. The riots were the result of a religious dispute centering around the Hindu fundamen-
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talist claim that the Babri mosque, built in 1528 for the Mughal King Babur, was constructed on the
site of a Hindu temple. Following communal instigation by the Hindu Right, thousands of Hindu
fundamentalist agitators destroyed the mosque.
21. Draupadi is the queen in the Indian epic Mahabharat and the shared wife of the ﬁve Pan-
dava brothers. Although revered in the Hindu texts, she too had to face the challenges of patriarchy,
for Draupadi was lost by her husbands in a game of dice and narrowly escaped having to disrobe as
a result.
22. Exploring such links between Hindu women’s militant agency and (a Hindu) patriarchy,
Sen (2007), in a recent study conducted in the slums of Bombay, explores the actions of women
belonging to the Shiv Sena, a Hindu nationalist party that has been very active in Indian national pol-
itics since the 1990s. Sen studies the women’s efforts to foment communal violence against their neigh-
boring Muslim communities and concludes that this course of action represents a rational survival
strategy on the part of these women to protect themselves from the male violence that they encounter
within their own families and communities.
23. For such accounts of agency, especially in Indian politics, see Das (2007).
24. For a critical constructivist’s optimistic view of agency that denaturalizes the dominant dis-
courses of security, see Weldes et al. (1999, 16–21). For a feminist analysis of agency as a common
ground on which both feminists and critical constructivists can converse, see Locher and Prugl (2001).
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The Letters of Mollie Weinstein
Experiences of a WAC in Wartime Europe1
CYNDEE SCHAFFER
Abstract: This research note presents and discusses extracts from the letters of Mollie Wein-
stein, a member of the U.S. Women’s Army Corps who served in Europe during the Second World
War. The passages reproduced here focus on Weinstein’s experiences in London in 1944 and in
France during 1944–45. Weinstein’s letters to her family give a flavor of the everyday experi-
ences and the concerns of U.S. service women as well as the hardships faced by civilians in both
countries during the war.
Keywords: Second World War; Women’s Army Corps; London;
France; bombing; women’s military history
Mollie Weinstein (now Schaffer) (born 1916) was a shy, retiring, young Jewish woman from
Detroit who enlisted in the Women’s Army Corps (WACs) just months after it was estab-
lished in 1943. Before she enlisted, Weinstein already had some experience of the U.S. mil-
itary as a result of her job as a medical transcriber for the Veterans Administration in
Dearborn, Michigan, but her decision to volunteer to serve her country in uniform was
influenced primarily by the examples of family and close friends who had already joined
the armed forces. Her favorite ﬁrst cousin, Jack Winkour, was killed in a flying accident in
1942 while serving in the U.S military in the South Paciﬁc. Two of her closest friends, Ella
Marcus and Helen Freidberg, had already enlisted in the WACs. Weinstein decided that soon
there wouldn’t be anyone her age left at home so she might as well join. Rather than seek
employment with any of the industries that supplied the U.S. war effort or indeed another
of the women’s services, she decided to join the WACs because she knew that they were
being assigned overseas and she wanted to serve in Europe. Weinstein found that joining
the services was not as easy as she had anticipated, however. Initially she was rejected because
she did not meet the minimum weight requirement of 105 pounds set by the U.S. Army for
its recruits.2 She went home to “fatten” herself up for about a month and was ﬁnally accepted
in October 1943.
Mollie Weinstein’s letters to her sister Beck (Rebecca Winston, 1912–1999), brother
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Jack (Jack Weinstein, born 1922) and best friend Sarah (Sarah Weinstein, now Kaminsky)
provide a chronology of her service as a WAC, from its beginnings with her train trip to
Daytona Beach, Florida, for basic training in October 1943, through her ﬁrst assignments
in California and Georgia, her service overseas in England, France, and Germany, and her
return to the United States on the Queen Mary in November 1945.
Weinstein worked for the Medical Intelligence3 squad in the European Theatre of Oper-
ations (ETO) as a stenographer for Lt. Col. William A. Howard. Much of her work, which
was highly praised by her commanding ofﬁcers, related to soldiers who had been injured
and were sent to military hospitals in the area, and involved drafting reports and taking dic-
tation, although the restrictions of wartime military censorship meant that she was not able
to refer to her job in any detail in her letters to family and friends.
In London with the Doodlebugs
In April 1944 Mollie Weinstein left Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, for England. She was sta-
tioned in London during the city’s bombardment by “Doodlebugs.” Doodlebugs or “buzz
bombs” were missiles that would explode on impact. Germany began to use them to attack
the southeast of England shortly after the D-Day invasion began on 6 June 1944 (Blumen-
son 1978, 26).4 When military censorship permitted her to write about conditions in Lon-
don, Weinstein described the continuous bombings and their effects on WACs stationed in
London as well as on the city’s civilian population. Although initially everyone sought pro-
tection from the bombs, as the bombardment continued over many weeks the situation
came to be regarded as “normal” by Weinstein and the other WACs, who just went about
their daily business amid the noise and danger (Holm 1992, 83).
Weinstein shared this information with her sister in the letter reproduced below but
she did not want her parents to know about the dangers she was facing and so titled this




Restrictions on the Doodlebug situation as far as our mail is concerned have been
lifted somewhat since Churchill’s speech. In fact, I could have written a few weeks ago
about it but held off. But now I have gotten to a point where I feel a lot of those people
back home, who sit back complacently, ought to know that there is a real war going on,
and Beck, I see it every day. The air raid sirens are a frequent sound to us during the
day as well as the night. And, it means the real thing over here—those damn buzz
bombs come a floating round. They have been our unwelcome visitors both day and
night since approximately one week after D-Day.
I am sure that many of the people I write to think because I write only of the pleasant
things that there is nothing else that enters into our little lives. I don’t believe that the
people back home can grasp any part of the situation over here. For some unknown rea-
son, I know it just doesn’t penetrate.
However, the wonderful thing about it all is this one fact that will certainly defeat the
other side and soon, too—we continue with our work. Work goes on as usual, which, of
course, is something that the Axis are totally unprepared for....
I, of course, have many incidents to relate, which will have to wait until I see you,
however, this one, through the courtesy of the censor, I know, you will ﬁnd interesting.
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One night after a particularly busy day at the ofﬁce, I was sleeping most soundly at our
billets. It happened to be during the early days of those confounded “things.” Well, any-
way, their roar was terriﬁc and yet I slept. I noticed a heavy feeling on my head and
awoke drowsily to feel my bunk mate holding on to my hand and sitting on my bed; she
had placed my helmet on my head and we both listened for the damn motor to shut off
and fortunately it didn’t land where we expected it to. You can bet your boots we both
felt to see if we were wearing our dog tags.
Another time when I was getting a permanent in a particularly popular section for
those Doodlebugs to land, the imminent danger signal went off for that particular vicin-
ity. (The imminent danger signal is usually a whistle that goes off in your particular
vicinity and that means it is just about overhead. That is different from an air raid
siren.) Well, those darn old whistles started going off right in the middle of his hair cut-
ting and I looked just like a portrait of the old “Madame Zulu” herself. Naturally the
hair cutting stopped immediately. He took me to a particularly sheltered spot on the
stairway of his shop and away from any windows of any type. Of course, we did feel a
jar when the damn thing hit not too far away. Then Mr._____ took me back to the
beauty chair and continued with the handiwork. When he put me under the machine
for the permanent, he told me if there was another imminent danger signal, that he
would disentangle me from the contraption. But I was most rash—I said I would take a
chance and go through—regardless. (I really don’t think my hair is worth such a rash
statement but I trusted to luck and the imminent danger signal did not go off while I
was in the beauty shop)....
Taking it all in all, it really is a great experience and certainly makes one appreciate
the good old USA more than you can realize. I know you are anxious about me—but
don’t be because for some reason I am most calm about it. Even if I had the opportu-
nity to go home right now, I don’t believe I would take it—no—not until this war is
really over.... Another sight always gives me a peculiar feeling and really penetrates—
when I see the bus loads of children being evacuated from London to safer places, hav-
ing separated from their family and friends. However, during the early days of the buzz
bombing, I happened to see and hear many bus loads of these children being evacuated.
They were singing and hooting and waved to us as they passed us on the streets.
In her letters Weinstein talked about the “Doodlebugs” as a matter of fact and almost
in passing, as in a letter to her sister dated 1 August 1944, when she remarks, “Yes, we are
still dodging ‘Doodlebugs.’” However, her family back home in Detroit did not take this
situation lightly and she discovered in the letter from her sister reproduced below that her
descriptions of life in wartime London had been read not only by her parents but also by




Ma and Pa know about your letter of the 26th. I felt it would be better that they
should as they keep inquiring. Also I had shown your letter to Dena,5 the girl at the Jew-
ish News and she asked permission to show it to Mr. Slomovitz, the editor. He begged
me to allow him to use some of it. He said it was so interesting and after all you can’t be
an ostrich about such things....
You know, Mollie, even though your letters previous to the July 26th were merely of
social activities, I felt all along that you were in or very near London, because of the fre-
quent times you spoke of having been there on pass. The papers at this time, of course,
are ﬁlled with the numerous and constant robot bombings and the fact that they seem
to be more frequent than less. We naturally are concerned and would appreciate hearing
from you as often as possible.
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Although Weinstein provided lengthy accounts of the Doodlebug bombardment for
her sister, she continued to urge Beck not to share every detail with their parents in order




Just a few lines to let you know I am okay and feeling ﬁne.... This paragraph you can
leave out for Mom and Pop. Anyhoo, this morning while slapping on my make-up, we
had a couple or three of those Doodlebugs glide over our billets or close enough to feel
a vibration, which I can assure you was most uncomfortable—but did I stop my make-
up—no! Anyway, we did hear two of them land. In other words, if the people back in
the States think this war is already over, I do think they are a bit mistaken.
Soon Weinstein’s letters home were being shared not only with family members and




To PFC Mollie Weinstein, a Grand Girl Overseas
Dear Mollie:
You see, Mollie, I get your sister to read to me at least parts of almost every letter you
write. So I know a lot about your experiences, your reactions to what you are doing and
what you think, more than you would imagine....
I do hope, Mollie, that you can keep some sort of a diary. When you think of the
things that have happened to you in the past year that never happened before and never
will again, it is really quite thrilling. Can you tell us any more about your work? The
Nazis seem to be getting hell right now and we are all hoping as hard as we can that the




A few months later, Weinstein remarked in her correspondence that she had recently
realized that she never told her sister very much about her closest friends in the army with





That is odd my not telling you about the girls I pal around with and with whom I
live. Completely slipped my mind I do believe. I think by now you have received pic-
tures of all the gals: “Johnnie,”6 “Smitty,”7 “Loddo”8 and “Bats.”9
Johnnie is the one I know best of all, that is, because we were together in the Forward
Echelon and “sweated-out” the London doodlebugs together....
Johnnie was with me the night we moved from one billet to another in London.... At
5 am we have a practice air alert and we certainly found out later no one needs any
practice on that. And, to top it all off at 7 am as I get locked in the latrine when the
door knob falls off, who comes to the rescue—well, Johnnie, of course! She calls the jan-
itor and “our little Nell is saved!” Never will I forget that night.
I don’t have to detail our experiences with the doodlebugs in London but I do laugh
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at Johnnie when she says I am the only one who got her to wear her “dog tags.” But that
is an army regulation—as if she didn’t know.
Weinstein and her fellow WACs were determined that the enemy would not prevent
them from fulﬁlling their professional responsibilities or indeed from enjoying themselves
in their off-duty hours, and this determination comes through very clearly in the selection
of letters reproduced above. Sympathy for the hardships and dangers endured by British
civilians, especially the children, is also evident in this correspondence, along with a deep
appreciation for the peace and security of ordinary life in the United States and a quiet con-
ﬁdence in the eventual success of Allied forces.
In France after D-Day
In the summer of 1944 Mollie Weinstein was transferred to France in the European The-
ater of Operations (ETO) Forward Echelon,10 following Allied troops into Normandy after
the D-Day invasion. First she was stationed in Normandy (August 1944), living in the woods
in tents pitched in the mud. Then she moved to Paris (September 1944) and ﬁnally to Ver-
sailles (July 1945).
As a recurring theme throughout these excerpts from her letters, Weinstein found her
high school French to be a signiﬁcant asset, as she was frequently asked to act an interpreter




I had this letter kicking around my pocket and decided to add a little more. Last night
Smitty (my gal friend, the draftsman) and I went out with a couple of Sgts. We stopped
at a very nice farmhouse and the man who lived there gave us cider and wouldn’t let the
boys pay for anything. He gave us fresh ﬁgs and kept giving us more, not giving any to
the boys—of course we gave them out to the boys, too. The old Frenchman kept saying:
“Les ﬁlles Americaine sont tres jolies.” (The American girls are very pretty.) Smitty and
I kept laughing. We translated it to the boys. Then the Frenchman said: (to make the
boys feel good) “Les soldats sont jolis.” (The soldiers are pretty.) That really made us
laugh. I learned a lot from that Frenchman—They hadn’t had soap in 2 years; no sugar
for months, and many other things.
By the middle of September 1944, Weinstein was able to tell her family that she was in
Paris and enjoying the sights and sounds of the city. Her letters include her comments on
fashion, her accommodation, the nightlife that was available, and the shows which she and
her friends saw. She continued to ﬁnd herself called upon to act as an interpreter in many




I know that you wonder how I am getting along with the French language. Am doing
wonderfully well. In fact, yesterday I acted as an interpreter. Last night a number of us
went to the Arc de Triomphe. We wanted to go up into it and see the view of Paris but
the gendarme there said that we could not at that time as it was closed for the public—
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Mollie Weinstein in Paris, Winter 1944–45. (Photograph reproduced by permission of Mollie Wein-
stein Schaffer.)
perhaps later he said. All that in French and he could not speak one word of English.
Then we walked away. We didn’t get very far when I heard a shuffling of feet and turned
around—there was the gendarme making a “bee-line” for me with an Air Corps Captain
in his tow. The Captain asked me if I could speak French and I said a little. He asked me
to ask the gendarme several questions and I translated the answers. It was great fun and
I understood everything. They were trying to determine whether our pilots had flown
any planes under the Arc, which was against regulations. Anyway, the answer was no.
As the letters reproduced below demonstrate, Weinstein continued to enjoy using her
skills as a French interpreter and often received praise for her abilities from French people




Saturday night Smitty, another WAC and myself met some very nice French boys at a
G. I. show. They understood my French very well—anyway they are coming over to our
Recreation Room at our Hotel and they want to learn English and will teach us French.
One of the fellows insisted he would have to bring a hammer with him to teach one of
the girls (Loddo—another one of my pals, who can’t seem to twist her tongue for those
French words) and really pound that into her. They didn’t think I would need such
drastic lessons. They didn’t speak a word of English and I was the only link. What a spot
to be in—I had to translate everything my friends wanted to say. Many a time I would
be actually stuck for a word—without a dictionary at hand. Anyway they seemed to




Today, we ﬁnally tracked down a French tailor. I had to get a size 14 uniform cut
down a bit to ﬁt me.... He didn’t speak a word of English. For a moment I thought he
was going to give me a ﬁt—something like we see in the movies. You know, where they
hold the front of your suit up while you look at the back and vice versa. However, I do
think it will come out well....
My French is coming along very well, and I enjoy it no end. In fact, today I happened
to pick up a French paper and was amazed at how much I could actually understand. It
just dawned upon me that I am adding new words to my vocabulary every day. How-
ever, I still can’t understand a word when two excited Frenchmen get into an argument.
Paris, den 10 October 1944
Dear Beck:
Almost forgot to tell you about the French chemist I met. He was so amazed to hear
me speak French. He said something that would make my old French teachers so proud.
He said I was one of the few Americans that spoke French without an English accent.
He said he had spoken to an American ofﬁcer (Colonel) who perhaps had a greater
vocabulary in French—but spoke it with a distinct English accent which made it difﬁcult
to understand. By the way, this chemist spoke only French!
Mollie continued to use her French and even to improve on it whenever the opportu-
nity arose.




By the way, I still see my French friends once a week and learn French. However,
didn’t see them last week on account of my cold. You would have laughed your head off
if you had heard me talking with my French friend on the phone, explaining my cold in
a darn nasal voice—but maybe it helps French pronunciation—you know that language!
Weinstein brought a friend along to search for the sister of one of her Detroit friends
who had been living in Paris with her young son. When she found the sister, she learned of
the horrors that they, as foreign-born Jews, had experienced during the war.11 Once again





After lunch Coleman12 met me at my hotel and we went searching for Mrs. Sally Fish.
We had absolutely no trouble ﬁnding the place. Coleman has a wonderful sense of
direction. He doesn’t speak French but can ﬁnd any place in Paris. (You guessed it. He
used to be a Boy Scout!) As we stood in front of her address, we weren’t quite sure that
was the place. There were stores on the ground floor and then a doorway leading into a
courtyard. It was a very old and dreary looking place. An old Frenchwoman saw us
looking around and asked us who we were looking for. I said “Mrs. Sally Fish—does she
live here?” She said “Yes—second floor.” We crossed the courtyard and walked into the
old building. They were uneven stone steps and the hallway gave me an eerie feeling. I
turned around to Coleman and said I was sure glad that he was with me. You see it’s
not too good an idea going traipsing around Paris to places you don’t know. Anyway,
we got to the second floor and there were three doors. Coleman said “Try this one.” I
knocked on the door and a short woman with blond hair answered. I said “Are you
Mrs. Fish?” She said she was. I said—“You have a sister in America, Mrs. Weissenburg,
who gave me your address—which was sent to me from America by my sister.” Mrs.
Fish asked us to come in and was so happy to see us. She asked us to sit down. Her
apartment was most bare. She has absolutely nothing. Only one blanket for covering on
her bed. Victor, her little son, who is just darling was scooting around the room with his
scooter and he had a few broken toys strewn around the room. He is four years old—
reminds me a lot of Georgie in England. I immediately gave him a couple of Nestle’s
candy bars that I had saved from my rations and also some little candy Charms that I
had received in a small package from Gloria Cooper, one of the girls at the V.A.F. Victor
was so cute—he said: “C’est tres gentile de vous.” (It was very nice of you.) And I said:
“Il n’y a pas de quoi.” (You’re welcome.) You know candy is a rarity for the French
people. As he sucked one of the Charms, he kept tell his mother—“Il y a du sucre.”
(There is sugar.) He was so happy. I guess they hardly ever get anything with sugar in it.
Anyway, Mrs. Fish asked us what language did we want to speak. She did not speak
any English at all. So I spoke French and Coleman spoke German and we got along just
ﬁne. She spoke French, German and Yiddish. With the three languages working at all
times, this is the story I got from her.
She has just returned to Paris. Has been here only two weeks. Eight months ago her
husband was taken away by the Germans. They had been hiding successfully until
then—but he happened to go out on the street one day and they picked him up. She has
tried to contact him through the Red Cross but they know nothing. She has had to buy
herself free (herself and child) twice. Once she had to pay a ransom of 10,000 francs.
These stories are unbelievable, sad, but true. She, of course, has no way of knowing
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what has happened to her husband. She also does not know how the rest of the family
is—I believe two sisters (or maybe three, can’t recall) fled to Poland. Has no word about
them.
Weinstein’s friends used her expertise in speaking and understanding French to help
them in work-related situations. Weinstein found that even if she did not know the French





By the way, you would have laughed at me today and would have gotten a big kick
out of my situation. Loddo, my bunk mate, who works on the floor above me, rushed
down this morning for me to come into her ofﬁce to act as an interpreter. It seems that
the First Lt. in her ofﬁce was having a little difﬁculty explaining to two Frenchmen what
he wanted done with two telephones. It seems he wanted one phone to be left in its
place and the new phone to be installed. The Frenchmen wanted to pull out the old
phone and install the new one in another place. I couldn’t think of the word
“remove”—but the Lt. was pretty cute—he said “removeeee” (trying to help me out) so
I looked at the Frenchmen and in the course of my conversation threw in the word
“remove” with a questioning look on my “pan” (face)—I said it very French-like but it
didn’t work. I guess there is no such word in the French dictionnaire. Anyhow, I ﬁnally
got them to understand the problem. It’s very silly but I often “fake” words and it’s sur-
prising how many times it does work.
In social situations, Weinstein was also never at a loss in conversing in French.
PARIS, FRANCE
10 Feb 1945, 8:30
Dear Beck:
Anyway, the payoff is that he ﬁnally made a special, special effort (I mean the Sarge13)
and invited me out to some civilian friend’s house.... The women were all dressed beau-
tifully, two were synthetic blondes. I felt sort of out of place with my dark hair. They all
spoke French. They understood English very well but just a few spoke it so that you
could actually understand what they meant. By the way, I knew the Sarge was trying to
show me off.... There was a French Colonel that sat next to me (by the way, he was
unattached)—although he didn’t speak English very well, I could understand him. (I
think he understood my French.) He said to me in French: “Si vous voulez apprendre
the langue Francais, il faut que vous couchez vec—“ (If you wish to learn the French
language, you must sleep with—) Right then and there I chimed in (I’m not even at a
loss for retorts in the French language) and said: “Oui, une dictionnaire vivante!” (Yes,
a living dictionary!)—Don’t know if my French is spelled correctly but you do get the
idea, don’t you? If not, let me know. (Ha.)
Even among her friends and during her off-duty hours, Weinstein found no respite




After a hectic Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday until 1 p.m. (in the afternoon) when
I went back to work—I decided Wednesday evening, which was last night, to take it
really easy and go to bed after supper. Anyway, I told Loddo to wake me at 6:30 pm
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when everyone else ﬁnished with their baths and ironing. I would do my little chores
after I rested—that would be from 6:30 pm till 8:30 pm. I fully intended to sleep while
everyone piddled around and ﬁnished their work. But, Beck, it always happens to me.
There I was in bed practically asleep; Johnnie had just ﬁnished her bath and was lying in
bed; Loddo was ironing; Helen (new girl) as Bats is no longer with us, was lying on her
bed resting—SO WHAT HAPPENS—A civilian French gal that Loddo looked up for
someone in America—One of those correspondents I believe from French class or
something—comes over. I was so d––– tired and so was everyone else—but we had to
entertain. I really think she thought we were quite nuts. Lying in bed and entertaining. I
guess you couldn’t do that in civilian life—but there we were. Loddo was at a complete
loss—she had had only six months of French in school years and years ago and didn’t
know what to say or do. So—I had to come to the rescue. I—was the interpreter. So did
I get to bed early—NO! The gal’s name is Renee and she is in her last year of college—
going in for teaching school.
By the way, her visit to us was one of the most amusing I have encountered. You
know I never use a dictionary (French English)—not that I am so good, but just that
I don’t have one. Anyhoo, I got stuck for a word and I used our telephone and asked
our operator, who is French.—Well after beaucoup discussion and she had difﬁculty
too—and everyone in our room went into hysterics—she ﬁnally came forth with the
wrong word. Anyway, I struggled through and ﬁnally did get the correct word. What a
life!
Weinstein also acted as an interpreter when she showed American soldiers around
Paris and her friends enjoyed hearing her speak French.
6 March 1945
Dear Beck:
The afternoon we went sightseeing. It wasn’t too nice a day and don’t think we took
many snaps. Anyway, with my sense of direction, it turned out so that Charles14 was tak-
ing us on the tour. He would orient himself with the map—and then I would act as the
interpreter and ask the French people how to get there. Dick and Charles got the biggest
kick out of my French speaking so that they kept asking me to ask the French people
questions. Anyway, we saw: the Louvre Palace, Palace des Invalides, Tomb of Emperor
Napoleon, Arc de Triomphe, Place de la Concorde (where the guillotine stood during




Anyway, he15 wanted to do something entirely different the last evening—not be with
a lot of G.I.’s—wanted to go to one of those real Frenchie cabarets. He left the planning
up to me. (I am getting to be a real “operator”).... At 7:30 pm we were all ready and
started out on our big evening. We were going to the famous Montmartre district,
which, I understand is similar to New York’s Greenwich Village. We went by Metro and
got off at Pigalle. Then we set out to ﬁnd the famous Bel Tabarin. We really didn’t have
much difﬁculty in ﬁnding it. I talked with one of the waiter—in French—and the place
didn’t open until 9 pm and the “spectacle” was on at 11 pm—which, of course, would be
too late for a couple of Cinderellas like Loddo and me because we had to take the last
Metro at 11:15 in order to make our darn old bedcheck. However, we were not too dis-
appointed as there were many other famous cabarets for us to track down and besides
they wanted to hear me speak French. The next place we went to was Chantilly—which
was a similar set-up. We ambled by the Paradise but decided to forego the information
quiz there as it was a bit dark and eerie. All of a sudden it dawned on me—what about
MOULIN ROUGE. (You must have heard of that place, Sarah. I believe it used to be
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only a theater.) Well, that’s where we ended up. The place opened at 9 pm and the vari-
ous acts began at 10 pm. That set-up was much more to our liking.
Weinstein’s knowledge of French continued to be very helpful in solving the problems





Yesterday, I had to ask the Colonel16 to let me off for a while in the morning to act as
an interpreter between Loddo and the man at the optical shop. He doesn’t speak a word
of English. Then later in the day, we stopped at the tailor shop and there was a WAC Lt.
who was in quite a mess trying to grab off her two shirts and jump into her jeep—she
was in a h––– of a hurry and couldn’t make herself understood. She looked at me help-
lessly and asked if I could speak it. It seems the time before she was given two shirts that
didn’t belong to her and the tailoress wanted her to return them and wouldn’t give her
anything else. There were three skirts involved in the deal somehow and she wanted at
least one of them for the big parade Monday.17 So—you can see what a mess that was.
Well—I got it all straightened out and everyone was happy. It was really very simple.
All in all Weinstein’s ability to speak and understand French aided her, her friends,
and her acquaintances in all aspects of everyday life in France. She facilitated situations that
were complicated and at times unmanageable for others who did not posses her knowledge
of the French language, thus making otherwise difﬁcult circumstances tolerable and more
pleasant for those who sought her assistance.
Notes
1. First and foremost, I want to thank my mother for her service to her country during the Sec-
ond World War, without which this article and the forthcoming book would not be possible. I would
like to thank my aunt, Rebecca Winston, for saving my mother’s letters from her wartime service. I
would like thank Teri Embrey and Amanda Catanio of the Pritzker Military Library, Chicago, Illi-
nois, for their research assistance. I am grateful to my sister Roberta Schaffer, my brother Joel Schaf-
fer, my daughter Ariel Schwartz, and my son Jordan Schwartz for their help in reviewing this
submission, and to my uncle Jack Weinstein who has taken the time to review the entire collection
of letters. Most of all, I want to thank my husband, Douglas Schwartz, for his everlasting support for
this submission as well as for the completion of the book.
2. The army also required recruits to be at least ﬁve feet tall and to have at least twelve teeth
(Armchair Reader World War II 2007, 88).
3. During the Second World War, the U.S. Army’s surgeon general established the Medical Intel-
ligence Division to support wartime planning by providing comprehensive information about the
conditions in locations where American military forces were likely to be deployed. As soon as plans
were made for moving troops into speciﬁc regions, the Division researched local diseases, disease-
spreading insects, sanitation, sewage disposal, water supply, and buildings that could serve as hospi-
tals (Ratcliff 1943, 119–120).
4. The term “Doodlebug” was used to refer to two different types of jet- and rocket-propelled
bombs: V-1s and V-2s. The V-1s were noisy and relatively slow which made it easier for the British to
shoot them down, but the V-2s were silent and traveled at higher speeds and therefore caused more
damage. London and other populated areas continued to be bombarded until the Allies captured most
of the launching sites in the closing months of the war (Blumenson 1978, 26).
5. The secretary at the Detroit Jewish News.
6. Before joining the WACS, “Johnnie” (full name unknown) was a secretary for an investment
counselor in Louisville, Kentucky.
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7. Before joining the WACS, “Smitty” (Faye Lyne) was a drafter from Georgia.
8. Before joining the WACS, “Loddo” (Mary Grace Kirby) was a stenographer from Pennsyl-
vania. Weinstein and Kirby continued their correspondence after the war until Kirby’s death in 2007.
9. Before joining the WACS, “Bats” (whose last name was Batastello) was a statistician from
Boston, Massachusetts.
10. The ﬁrst WACS to land in Normandy started arriving by boat on 14 July 1944 and were
assigned to Forward Echelon, Communications Zone. They camped out in an apple orchard and slept
on army cots in shelters or tents, living in the mud and cold (Treadwell 1954, 387–88).
11. Foreign-born Jews in Paris were subject to brutal treatment by the Nazis and many were
deported to concentration camps, never to be heard from again. (Blumenson 1978, 13–14)
12. Coleman Bricker was one of Weinstein’s constant companions from the time they met in
Paris in October 1944 until she was transferred to Frankfurt, Germany, in August 1945, after which
they corresponded through letters until they each returned to their respective homes in the United
States, Weinstein to Detroit and Coleman to Los Angeles. Although they lost touch in the interven-
ing years, contact was reestablished in 1999.
13. Alex Korody, who lived in New York after his wartime military service and died in the late
1970s.
14. Charles Knotts and Weinstein met when they were both stationed in Wilmington, Califor-
nia. They kept in touch when they were each transferred to the ETO and were stationed in the same
general vicinity. Weinstein wrote to Knotts’s colonel, telling him that she was Knotts’s ﬁancée and
asking for permission for Knotts to visit her in Paris. In fact they were not engaged but Weinstein
wanted him to have some time off from the dangers and hardships of combat duty.
15. Sergeant George Greenberg, another soldier who looked Weinstein up while in Paris.
16. Weinstein’s commanding ofﬁcer, Lt. Col. William A. Howard.
17. This refers to the parade on 14 May 1945 to mark the third anniversary of the formation of
the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps, the forerunner of the WAC.
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